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The purpose of this MBA Project is to document and analyze the history of 
management reform within the Department of Defense from 1947 through the present 
day based on the annual reports of the Secretaries of Defense to the Congress.  Since its 
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management reforms.  It appears that each administration attempts to introduce some 
type of management reform agenda to improve the Department of Defense business 
processes and incorporate recent management ideas from the business community.  Some 
of the changes are real and significant; others are changes in name only.  Through 
analysis of annual reports of the Secretaries of Defense, a compilation of significant 
management reforms was created for each secretary.  These reforms were analyzed and 
compared to one another to identify both general trends and truly unique changes in 
management practices.  Ultimately, this analysis will help distinguish the relative 
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Since its inception in 1947, the Department of Defense has undergone nearly 
constant management reforms.  It appears that each administration attempts to introduce 
some type of management reform agenda to improve the Department of Defense business 
processes and incorporate recent management ideas from the business community.  Some 
of the changes are real and significant; others are changes in name only.  Through 
analysis of annual reports of the Secretaries of Defense, a compilation of significant 
management reforms was created for each secretary.  These reforms are then analyzed 
based on their type, area, magnitude, and reform “tide”, then compared to one another to 
identify trends or changes in Department of Defense management practices. 
Several trends became evident in the analysis of data.  The structure of the 
Department was the highest priority in the earlier years, but tapered off in the later ones.  
It appears that once the areas of responsibility and chain of command had matured and 
been exercised through numerous global crises, a sound organizational framework was 
gradually developed that has endured the last few decades with only incremental changes.  
The focus on acquisitions has accelerated in recent years, perhaps because of the total 
dollar value of acquisitions, or because of the dramatic costs and schedule growth of 
high-technology systems.    Since Forrestal began the drawdown of the support structure 
following World War II, the elimination of excess base capacity and the more efficient 
use of facilities has been an unstoppable progression.  The establishment of the BRAC 
Commission formalized the process, but the objectives remain virtually unchanged.   


























The objective of this project is to conduct archival research to identify the 
management reform agendas for each Secretary of Defense and compare and contrast 
those with each other to identify recurring themes.  Ultimately, this analysis will be part 
of a larger study conducted by the Center for Defense Management Reform.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
It sometimes appears that each new Secretary of Defense introduces a whole new 
way of doing business within the Department of Defense, but it may be that through the 
years the names have changed but many of the actual policies have followed a larger 
trend.  To investigate, this project documents the history of management reform as part of 
a larger project by the Center for Defense Management Reform.  The research question is 
as follows:  What is the history of defense management reform of the Secretaries of 
Defense from James Forrestal to Donald Rumsfeld?  Specific questions that will be 
answered are: What are the similarities and differences of the reform agendas for each 
Secretary of Defense?  Are there recurring themes? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this report begins with identifying the problem.  Each new 
Secretary of Defense introduces management reforms of some type, whether they are 
broad-scoped or focused in specific areas.  The true value and uniqueness of these 
reforms is often drawn into question, as the names have changed but the substance of the 
reforms seems strangely familiar.   
Previous research has been done on management reform trends in numerous 
areas, to include business, government, and the Department of Defense.  However, the 
authors have not identified any previous work that compiles the management reform 
trends of the Secretaries of Defense from 1947 to 2005.  This paper will attempt to 
compile the significant reform initiatives of each secretary from their annual reports to  
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the President and the Congress.  The data, then, is a compilation of what each secretary 
hoped to accomplish, as stated in their own words.  From this data, analysis will be 
conducted that will extrapolate the following:  
• The initial introduction of new management ideas and programs. 
• The general trends and themes that appear across secretaries and over 
time. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins the project with a review of previous works on change 
management and management reform.  Consideration is given not only to Defense 
management reform, but also reform in both general government operations and the 
business community.  This is important for two reasons.  First, management reforms are 
rarely developed in isolation from other government agencies.  Rather, they are often an 
extension of the Presidential administration agendas.  Second, the business community is 
usually the innovator of management techniques, always looking for news ways to 
maximize profits and the efficient use of assets.  While the Department of Defense has no 
profit motive, it does operate in many respects like a large multi-national organization 
and is supported by what are essentially business processes.  This chapter is by no means 
a comprehensive review of all previous works, but a summation of significant previous 
works in change management and management reform that will serve as a point of 
reference for this project. 
The data are presented in Chapter III.  The data were drawn from the Annual 
Reports of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress from James 
Forrestal in 1947 to Donald Rumsfeld in 2005.  Each annual report was examined and the 
significant management reform initiatives and policies were drawn from them.  The 
authors then compiled those findings under related functions and presented the data for 
the entire duration of each administration.     
Chapter IV presents the analysis of data.  The qualitative nature of the data does 
not lend itself to standard statistical analysis.  Instead, the data were analyzed in two non-
quantitative ways.  In the first analysis, significant management initiatives were grouped 
into functions such as organizational management or financial management.  Within each 
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function, all data related to a specific theme were consolidated so that a chronographic 
depiction of reform trends could be identified.  That is, the analysis was conducted in 
such a way that only significant reform initiatives of the secretaries for any given 
function were recognized, and for that given function or theme, a general trend could be 
identified. 
The second analysis looked at the data from a different perspective.  In this 
analysis, management initiatives were first classified into several categories that 
addressed the type of change involved in the initiative.  The categories included Area of 
Change, Magnitude of Change, and Tide of Change.  Each category contained several 
sub-categories, of which one was assigned to each reform initiative.  This analysis 
attempted to identify general macro-level change themes over time and across categories, 
such that trends in the type and magnitude of reforms would become apparent.           
Chapter V is the culmination of the project and presents the conclusions derived 
from the analysis.  It also makes recommendations for further research into various areas. 
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The Department of Defense has a record of conducting study after study to 
identify management reform opportunities.  Often, after the findings are published, the 
new Secretary or his administration begins implementing recommended changes, with 
the objective of creating new and innovative ways for the Department to operate.  This 
work, along with others that will follow from the Center for Defense Management 
Reform, will provide a reference of management reform for future administrations so 
that, in formulating their strategies for management reform, they heed the lessons learned 
from previous administrations and avoid the pitfall of approaching reform de novo. 
This study of management reform trends has numerous limitations.  The authors 
attempted to review every annual report of the Secretaries of Defense from 1947 to 2005 
but 1976 (James Schlesinger) and 1984 (Caspar Weinberger) were unavailable in the 
Naval Postgraduate School Library.  From each report, the authors attempted to 
extrapolate the significant management reform initiatives and programs of that Secretary 
of Defense.  Early reports did not explicitly mention management reforms in a specific 
 6
part of the report.  The authors had to extract that information from the report by focusing 
on sections that addressed organizational or business management or elements thereof, 
not the entire report.  The later reports often had sections devoted to management issues 
and reforms of the Department, but they were different in both content and format, with 
no consistent approach as to what topics were included and which ones were not.  Thus, 
the authors attempted to gather consistent data to the greatest extent possible, but they 
were not necessarily able to compile all significant programs and initiatives of all 
secretaries.  The information on the relative importance and magnitude of management 
reforms comes from the Secretaries of Defenses’ own words, and has not been judged 
critically against other historical material. 
Another limitation stemmed from the manner in which the reports were written.  
Some Secretaries, such a William Cohen, wrote lengthy sections about management and 
management initiatives.  Others, such as Donald Rumsfeld during his second term in 
office, wrote very little.  This disparity is evident in the presentation of the data, and must 
be considered when interpreting the analysis.  While the names have changed over the 
years, the purpose has remained constant: to inform the President and the Congress of the 
actions and initiatives of the Department over the previous year and to project future 
initiatives and strategies.  Some of the reports were written as if by the Secretary himself, 
while others were written in the third person as merely a documentation of what the 
Department was doing.  This is important because the reports may or may not accurately 
depict the personal initiatives of a given Secretary, but rather the Department as a whole, 
such that initiatives may have begun with little or no input from the Secretary. 
Just as there were limitations to data collection, there were also limitations to the 
analysis.  Determination of who first started a program was sometimes unclear.  In these 
cases, the authors used their best judgment based on previous and subsequent reports and 
other references.  Assignment of an initiative or reform to a specific category of change 
was done according to the definitions for each of those categories.  This was achieved 
using the authors' best judgment, in as consistent of manner as possible, but it is still 
subjective.  Therefore, it is quite possible that certain specific initiatives have been 
categorized incorrectly, but the authors believe that the general trends should be 
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unaffected by these discrepancies.  Finally, this report makes no attempt at evaluating the 
effectiveness of any reforms or initiatives.  To do so would require in-depth analysis to a 
degree far beyond the scope of this work.  It is merely a compilation of attempted or 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Department of Defense (DoD) was created by the National Security Act 
of 1947, the Secretaries of Defense and their administrations have sought continuous 
improvement in management of personnel and resources.  The DoD was by no means 
unique in trying to achieve more efficient and effective management, which has long 
been a goal of governments and the private sector alike.  In 210 BC Petronius Arbiter 
complained that “we trained hard…but it seemed that every time we were beginning to 
form up into teams we would be reorganized… I was to learn later in life that we tend to 
meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating 
the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization” (as 
quoted in Downs and Larkey, 1986, p. 184).  Fortunately, this decidedly negative outlook 
on change and reorganization is only one view of the situation.  To better understand and 
appreciate management reforms, specifically within the Department of Defense, those 
reforms must be considered within the context of existing organizational change theories.  
This chapter will examine several of those theories as they pertain to three specific areas: 
change management in organizations, differences between change management in private 
and public sector organizations, and analysis of historical change within the executive 
branch and the Department of Defense. 
B. TYPES OF CHANGE 
What is change, and how is it typically described in literature?  There are many 
different definitions and nuances of change, several of which are germane to our 
purposes.  Linda Ackerman defines three common types of change as Developmental, 
Transitional and Transformational.  Developmental changes are “the improvement of a 
skill, method or condition that for some reason does not measure up to current 
expectations” (Ackerman, 1986, pp. 1-8).  Transitional changes are changes to a defined 
end-state, and Transformational changes are leaps to an unknown end-state (Ackerman, 
1986, pp. 1-8). 
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Golembiewski, Billingsley and Yeager (1976) categorize organizational change 
into three types, Alpha, Beta and Gamma.  Alpha Change is a “variation in the level of 
some existential state”, where the basic state remains the same.  Beta Change is a 
“variation in the level of some existential state [where] some intervals of the 
measurement continuum…have been recalibrated”; the state is still the same but some 
measurements have gone off the original scale.  And finally, Gamma Change is a 
“redefinition or reconceptualization of some domain, a major change in the…frame of 
reference”; a whole new thing. 
C. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
It is often assumed that bureaucracies are very resistant to change.  Bureaucracies 
can sometimes be resistant to change because they often rely on rules and hierarchically- 
based decision making, rather than encouraging new ideas (Kelman, 2005, p. 27).  
Government bureaucracies can be even more resistant to change than private sector ones 
because of the lack of incentive structure and the constant turnover of leaders (Kelman, 
2005, p. 28) combined with a corresponding low turnover of lower-level personnel 
(Kelman, 2005, p. 29).  Management reform strategies must be driven by motivated, 
empowered individuals (Kettl, 2005, p. 44), and modern management reform must be 
backed up by solid evidence (Jones, et al., 2004, p. 6).  Sometimes leaders may not try to 
initiate change often enough, possibly hesitating because they fear resistance to change, 
or they may fail to keep driving a change once it has started (Kelman, 2005, p. 8). 
However, Kelman contends that change does not always need to be driven; rather, some 
members of an organization may already be seeking change (p. 7), the “change 
vanguard” (p. 39), and change leaders can harness their dissatisfaction with the status quo 
to power change. 
Reforms may be difficult to implement because their results are difficult to predict 
in advance and to measure once completed.  Because of this, reformers may be tempted 
to overstate both the problems inherent in the current system and the benefits of any 
potential reform effort, or reforms may be implemented in name only, as a “paper 
exercise” (Pfiffner, 1998).  In the end it is difficult to tell if many reforms have a real and 
lasting effect, and whether any measured effects are caused by the management reforms 
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themselves or other outside factors (Kettl, 2005, pp. 60-61).  Sometimes reform efforts 
demonstrate the “Hawthorne Effect”, that any attention causes improvement in 
performance (Pfiffner, 1998).  On the other hand, reorganizations, even well designed, 
often do not show any immediate benefit (Pfiffner, 1998).  In the public sector especially, 
management reforms are often judged on political results than on professed economic or 
performance achievement (Kettl, 2005, p. 61).  It is difficult to judge reorganizations; one 
may only notice the failures, and the improvements may be difficult to see.  
Reorganizations often seem to be carried out in the name of efficiency, but they may 
really be purely for political or selfish goals (Downs and Larkey, 1986, pp. 184-186). 
“The fact that reform is never finished has been the most important lesson learned from 
the strategies and tactics of management reform” (Kettl, 2005, p. 59).    
D.  DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR REFORM 
“The reform of public management has become a centerpiece in the twenty-first 
century… governments feel obligated to launch reforms… they feel further obligated to 
trumpet their success” (Kettl, 2005, p. 77).  Most government reforms are based on some 
sort of business best practice (Downs and Larkey, 1986, p. 23).  It is important to 
recognize, however, that there are several fundamental differences between the private 
sector and the public sector.  Unlike most businesses, government bureaucracies usually 
have multiple, conflicting and unique goals (Downs and Larkey, 1986, p. 3). The public 
sector is primarily concerned with “public goods”, which cannot be managed by the 
“bottom line”, and instead are subject to the changing winds of politics (Pfiffner, 1998).  
“Defense resource planning and budgeting is part managerial and part political” (Dawes 
and Jones, 2005, p. 58).  Another difference is that in the private sector, managers are 
relatively free to select their own goals, while in the government the goals are generally 
provided by law and managers are free only to accomplish those goals in different ways 
(Pfiffner, 1998). Management reform decisions within the public sector are made by 
politicians and managers who may have different goals (Jones, et al., 2004, p. 8).  Finally, 
public organizations are accountable to the Congress and the taxpayers and hence are 
subject to intense public scrutiny in a way that private businesses are not (Pfiffner, 1998).   
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Management in the federal government is inefficient by design, through the 
checks and balances put in place by the Constitution (Pfiffner, 1998).  There is also 
inherent competition between the legislative and executive branches.  Congress can and 
does attempt to micromanage the executive branch via rules and laws (Pfiffner, 1998). 
All of the executive managerial reform tactics try to overcome the typical bureaucratic 
problems of top-down hierarchical and rules-based control (Kettl, 2005, p. 41). 
There are also difficulties due to turnover within the public sector.  When 
different political parties gain power every few years policies may be reversed and 
changes undone.  Goals may be set to ensure reelection rather than to achieve long-term 
progress.  The high number of political appointees in the U.S. government, relative to 
other modern democracies, creates further turnover (Pfiffner, 1998).   
E. CHANGES WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
“If there is any constant in the globalizing world, it is the rapid pace of 
government change”, Kettl says (2005, p. vii).  There have been several trends evident in 
government reform efforts in the United States during the last century.  “Since WWII 
virtually all reform models seem to have a maximum shelf-life of about a decade” (Jones, 
et al., 2004, p. 5).  Defense management reform has historically come in cycles (Dawe 
and Jones, 2005), and public management reforms tend to be one of three types: modest 
reforms, big-bang reforms, or incremental reforms (Kettl, 2005, pp. 80-81).  However, 
Kettl says that “over time reforms have tended toward convergence, characterized by 
efforts to strengthen the coordination among government programs; strategies to enhance 
government control over programs, especially through measurement of outcomes; and 
efforts to enhance public capacity to deliver results” (2005, p. 40).  Modern management 
principles tend to embrace decentralization and delegation (Jones, et al., 2004, p. 8). 
Government reforms have also tended toward a smaller government in terms of percent 
GDP spent by the government (Kettl, 2005, p. 64).  But, though reformers generally 
sought to make government smaller, they rarely attempted to reduce its [their] power (p. 
71).  
The government’s interest in Scientific Management, management by analysis 
and measurement, began with Frederick Taylor and peaked in the 1930s (Pfiffner, 1998).  
 13
Beginning in the 1930s the Human Relations Movement took hold.  The idea of treating 
workers better in particular was transferable from the private to the public sector 
(Pfiffner, 1998).  After WWII the United States government increasingly began to 
wonder how to ensure that the government was efficient and effective (Kettl, 2005, p. 
19).  The next forty years saw a steady increase in federal (executive) power, until 
Reagan began to dismantle some of the structure that the government had taken (Kettl, 
2005, p. 210).  During the Clinton years the federal government began to pass some of 
the responsibilities it had accumulated back to the states (Kettl, 2005, p. 35).  The 
National Performance Review report, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government 
That Works Better and Costs Less of September 1993, resulted in the “most systematic” 
federal government reform effort to date.  The program attempted to incorporate private 
sector ideas like “putting the customer first”, decreasing centralized authority, and cutting 
the workforce, in public sector management (Pfiffner, 1998).       
Much of the management reform within the federal government has been 
proposed by government or independent commissions.  According to Pfiffner, there have 
been four purposes of the “Blue Ribbon Commissions” seen in the 20th century United 
States:  First, “[to] provide political or technical legitimacy for a specific change”; 
second, to provide an excuse for delayed action; third, some are mandated by congress 
for its own purposes; and finally, some are to provide a face-saving way to accomplish 
necessary bipartisan initiatives (Pfiffner, 1998).  The commissions that actually produced 
change generally increased presidential authority, reorganized the executive branch, or 
increased efficiency by improving management or trimming fat (Pfiffner, 1998). 
The sitting JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, said in 1982 that because of 
decentralized control and interservice rivalry, changes in the DoD would always be 
marginal (Jones, David C., 1982).  However, there are some indications of real 
management change in the executive branch, both revolutionary: “During the 
1950s…executive budgeting was transformed somewhat radically through the institution 
of performance measures into budgets” (Dawe and Jones, 2005), “The PPBES and budget 
changes implemented under the Bush administration in 2003 are the most comprehensive 
since the system was established in the early 1960s” (Dawe and Jones, 2005, p. 46), and 
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incremental: “While no abrupt shifts were made, the Laird era was marked by a steady 
and persistent shift away from McNamara’s emphasis on centralization” (Dawe and 
Jones, 2005, p. 38), “DOD has managed the constant evolution of PPBS while keeping its 
basic structure relatively stable.  However, the pace of evolutionary change quickened 
under Secretary Rumsfeld” (Dawe and Jones, 2005, p. 50). 
F. LOOKING AT LEGISLATED MANAGEMENT REFORM 
In 1997 Paul C. Light published a book called The Tides of Reform: Making 
Government Work, 1945-1995.  This book specifically examines legislated reform, but 
the methods of evaluation are important and relevant.  The book catalogues and analyzes 
141 management reform bills passed between 1945 and 1995.  The analysis is presented 
in a series of tables listing the percentages or number of reforms falling into the category 
being addressed.   
According to Light, government reform generally falls into four categories, which 
he calls “tides”, that first emerged in the 1830s (Light, 1997, p. 17): Scientific 
Management (efficiency), War on Waste (economy), Watchful Eye (inspection and 
oversight), and Liberation Management (letting managers manage) (Light, 1997, p. 1).  
Liberation management can be seen as the opposite of scientific efficiency (Light, 1997, 
p. 36).  It calls for decentralization of power (Light, 1997, p. 37), “customer service 
standards” (Light, 1997, p. 39) and “establishment of measurable goals” (Light, 1997, p. 
39). 
Since these different “tides” are not necessarily compatible, many new reforms 
undermine old ones (Light, 1997, p. 4).  By its nature, the executive branch tends to 
concentrate on Scientific and Liberation management (Light, 1997, p. 2).  A significant 
portion of reforms carry traits of more than one “tide” (Light, 1997, p. 69).   
To analyze the legislative reforms, Light subjectively ranks each reform initiative 
in each of several different categories, in addition to identifying their “tide”. 
• Legislative History: where did the idea come from (Light, 1997, p. 47)?   
• Reform Philosophy: “accountability mechanism and general view of 
government” (Light, 1997, p. 51).   
• Change Strategy: focus, tactics and target (Light, 1997, p. 55).   
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• Scale and Size of initiative: is it a “modification of an existing practice” or 
is it “a large departure from a prevailing practice” (Light, 1997, p. 58).  
• Implementation, permanent or temporary, broad or targeted (Light, 1997, 
p. 60).  Impact, what does it change (Light, 1997, p. 65).   
Various national events drove the mood of reforms, and significant events seemed 
to create “hurricanes of activity” (Light, 1997, p. 90).  Light identifies seven “hurricanes” 
of management reform since 1945 (Light, 1997, p. 90).  They are: 
• 1945-1946 (scientific management, watchful eye [Light, 1997, p. 91]). 
• 1949-1950 (results of the Hoover Commission, high point of scientific 
management [Light, 1997, p. 93]). 
• 1965-1967 (war on waste and watchful eye [Light, 1997, p. 95]). 
• 1969-1971 (scientific management, war on waste, liberation management 
[Light, 1997, p. 98]). 
• 1973-1975 (centralization of control by the Nixon Administration, then 
Watergate, which resulted in the peak of watchful eye [Light, 1997, p. 
101]). 
• 1977-1979 (combination of “reform-minded” president and congress, 
watchful eye [Light, 1997, pp. 107-108]). 
• 1987-1989 (primarily war on waste and watchful eye, but also scientific 
and liberation management [Light, 1997, p. 111]).  
There were larger trends at work as well.  For example Watergate (1974) marked 
the transfer of responsibility for driving reform from the president to the Congress (Light, 
1997, p. 101).  The three presidents who stand out for total reforms are Eisenhower for 
scientific management, Reagan for war on waste, and Clinton for liberation management 
(Light, 1997, p. 132).  President Johnson’s presidency saw the largest scale of reforms, 
and Clinton’s the second largest (p. 143).  And significantly, “The post-1974 era shows 
the greatest share of new ideas, large or small” (Light, 1997, p. 196).  Light noted that 
there has been a trend of reduction in reforms resulting in the consolidation of executive 
power since 1945 (Light, 1997, p. 145).  “The tides of reform appear to be accelerating.  
The interval between the last reform and the next appear to be shrinking” (Light, 1997, p. 
223). 
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Finally, Light acknowledges that it is difficult to measure the results of many of 
the reforms, as “it is very rare to find an acknowledged failure on the list [of 141 
legislative reforms]” (Light, 1997, p. 180) and that “there is truly nothing new under the 






























III. THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT REFORM IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Brief History of the Military Organization of the United States 
The United States’ military has been somewhat different from other militaries 
since its inception.  There are several reasons for this.  Although based loosely on its 
European heritage, the United States’ (US) military has sought always to find a balance 
between national security and the freedom of the individual (Stewart, 2004a, p. 14).  For 
much of our history, our geography has isolated us from belligerents, reducing our need 
for standing forces; only recently has technology closed the gap (Stewart, 2004a, p. 15).  
Immediately after the American Revolution Congress wrestled with the question 
of whether the United States should keep a standing army or rely on citizen militias, and 
whether available funds would be better spent on a Navy as George Washington 
suggested (Stewart, 2004a, p. 108).  In 1784 Congress authorized a standing force of two 
artillery and eight infantry companies (Stewart, 2004a, p. 109), but for larger forces they 
were still at the mercy of the individual states (Stewart, 2004a, p. 111).  The Constitution 
originally provided the Federal Government with the power to create an army 
independent of the states (Stewart, 2004a, p. 112) and gave all the war power to the 
President, by making the War Secretary report to him instead of to the Congress (Stewart, 
2004a, p. 113). 
The Department of War was created on August 7, 1789 and was given jurisdiction 
over both army and naval matters.  The Board of Treasury was the first organization to be 
charged with procurement of stores and supplies (Stewart, 2004a, p. 113).  Supply 
contracts were given at a fixed price to the lowest bidder, who would then subcontract for 
a wide range of supplies and equipment (Stewart, 2004a, p. 114).  The US was still solely 
dependent of foreign arms sales, so the Springfield Armory was established to develop 
domestic production capability and reduce dependence on imported arms (Stewart, 
2004a, p. 114). 
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At this time the bulk of the armed forces was still state militias, and no law had 
yet been passed giving the Federal Government the power to raise a national militia 
(Stewart, 2004a, p. 114).  In 1802 the Congress divided the country geographically into 
three military departments each run by a military agent and assistant agents responsible 
for troops and supplies within that department (Stewart, 2004a, p. 123).  In 1812 
Congress created an Ordinance Department to look after arms, and a Quartermaster 
Department to replace the military agents, and for the first time gave the Secretary of War 
complete control over the Army’s supply system (Stewart, 2004a, p. 134).  In 1813 
Congress created Offices of the Adjutant General, Inspector General, Surgeon General 
and Apothecary General and increased the Army staff of the War Department (Stewart, 
2004a, p. 148).  There was still no central system of supply, however, and the contractors 
were inefficient and fraud was rampant (Stewart, 2004a, p. 148). 
The War of 1812 highlighted the need for a professional army (Stewart, 2004a, p. 
149).  Congress authorized a standing army of 10,000, and created a professional general 
staff based in Washington (Stewart, 2004a, p. 150).  Beginning in 1818 supply 
contractors were required to deliver supplies to central supply depots rather than directly 
to the troops so that their performance could be more closely monitored (Stewart, 2004a, 
p. 163).  A Commanding General of the Army Position was created in Washington in 
1818 (Stewart, 2004a, p. 164).  In the late 1830s a Corps of Artificers was re-introduced 
to repair wagons and boats (Stewart, 2004a, p. 171). 
On the personnel front, difficulties in fielding armies near the end of the Civil 
War led to the first use of federal conscription (Stewart, 2004a, p. 298).  In 1867, after 
disagreeing with the president over reconstruction, the Congress created the office of 
General in Chief, through whom all orders would be issued, and who could only be 
removed by the Senate (Stewart, 2004a, p. 306). 
At the end of the 19th century there was still no coordination between foreign 
policy and military planning (Stewart, 2004a, p. 346).  The Spanish American War 
revealed the need for “reform in the administration and direction of the Army’s high 
command and for elimination of widespread inefficiency in the operations of the War 
Department” (Stewart, 2004a, p. 369). 
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Secretary of War Elihu Root, appointed in 1899, was the first Secretary of War to 
import business practices into the Department of War.  He “tended to see the Army’s 
problems as similar to those faced by business executives.  The men who have combined 
various corporations… into what we call trusts have reduced the cost of production and 
have increased their efficiency by doing the very same thing we propose you shall do 
now” (Root, as quoted in Stewart, 2004a, p. 369).  The problem with the organization of 
the military was the separate authority of the Commanding General of the Army and the 
Secretary of War.  This could be solved by making the Commanding General of the 
Army into the Chief of Staff, responsible to the president, through the Secretary of War 
(Stewart, 2004a, p. 370). 
In 1910, the Chief of Staff Major General Wood changed the General staff’s focus 
to planning (Stewart, 2004a, p. 371).  The National Defense Act weakened the General 
Staff, but increased the peacetime strength of the Army to 175,000.  It gave the president 
the authority to force industry to comply with defense orders (Stewart, 2004a, p. 382).  In 
July 1917, over 150 purchasing committees were competing against each other in the 
open market.  Efforts were introduce to “centralize and streamline the supply activities” 
(Stewart, 2004b, p. 19).  Chief of Staff Major General March set about establishing 
“effectiveness and efficiency in the General Staff and the War Department” (Stewart, 
2004b, p. 19). 
The National Defense Act of 1916 increased the size of the regular officer corps 
and included training of the reserve forces in their mission, and specifically assigned 
mobilization and industrial planning to the War Department (Stewart, 2004b, p. 57).  In 
1918 the Overman Act was passed, which gave the President the authority to reorganize 
executive agencies and made the Chief of Staff a full general, able to exercise authority 
over the Bureau Chiefs (Stewart, 2004b, p. 20).  General March quickly expanded and 
reorganized the General Staff, centralizing authority (Stewart, 2004b, p. 20).  The War 
Industries Board was given “broad powers to coordinate all purchasing by the Army and 
Navy” (Stewart, 2004b, p. 23). 
As Chief of Staff from 1930-1935, General MacArthur reorganized the War 
Department to contain four Army Headquarters (Stewart, 2004b, p. 66) and focus on the 
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defense of the Western Hemisphere and the nation’s seaports (Stewart, 2004b, p. 67).  
The War Department created strategic plans for industrial mobilization and manpower 
mobilization (Stewart, 2004b, p. 68). 
After Casablanca in 1943, the American military staff realized the need for closer 
coordination with the President (Stewart, 2004b, p. 107).  As more and more of the Army 
deployed during World War II (WWII), bases and posts were consolidated to reduce 
overhead (Stewart, 2004b, p. 120).  In WWII the US relied on “central logistical control” 
to balance the manpower needs of the fighting forces with the manpower needs of 
industry (Stewart, 2004b, p. 125). 
2. Brief History of the Department of Defense 
During demobilization from WWII, outgoing and incoming Generals of the Army 
George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower called for “strong centralized control at 
the national and theater levels” while Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal fought for 
sustaining the current decentralized system (Stewart, 2004b, p. 202).  The reform 
advocates hoped to reorganize to gain economy and efficiency (Stewart, 2004b, p. 202). 
After three years of debate, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 
which created the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Military 
Establishment (NME).  It also created the National Security Resources Board to control 
manpower and materiel readiness and mobilization (Stewart, 2004b, p. 202).  The 
National Security Act of 1947 created a federated military, with a relatively powerless 
Secretary of Defense and unclear chains of command (Stewart, 2004b, p. 203).  The 
NSC, consisting of the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the three Service 
Secretaries, would create integrated plans and present them to the president for approval, 
then implement them (Stewart, 2004b, p. 202).  The NME, run by a cabinet-level 
Secretary of Defense, included the Army, Navy and Air Force departments and the Joint 





The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act renamed the NME the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and created the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) (Stewart, 2004b, p. 203).  It also gave the Secretary of Defense more control over 
the Service Secretaries (Stewart, 2004b, p. 203). 
B. JAMES V. FORRESTAL 
1. Background 
James V. Forrestal served as the first Secretary of Defense, from September 17, 
1947 to March 28, 1949.  From 1916 to 1940, except for a short stint in the Navy during 
World War I (WWI), Forrestal worked for an investment banking house, William A. 
Read and Company of New York.  In 1940 he began his government service, working as 
an under secretary in the Navy in charge of administrative and legal affairs before 
becoming the Secretary of the Navy in 1944.  He was known in Washington as a capable 
manager and administrator.  Prior to becoming the Secretary of Defense, he helped 
develop the National Security Act of 1947, although he was against unification of the 
services.  Within the Department he spent much of his time implementing the National 
Security Act.  He was also involved in the drawdown from WWII, the implementation of 
the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and the early escalation of the Cold War 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Upon his appointment as Secretary of Defense (after President Truman’s first 
choice, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, refused the job), Secretary Forrestal 
was immediately involved with Congress and the President in defining the role of the 
Secretary of Defense within the National Military Establishment (NME).  He first asked 
Congress for an Undersecretary of Defense to help with his workload.  He asked to be the 
sole military representative on the National Security Council (NSC).  Additionally, he 
requested clarification of his power as the Secretary of Defense in exercising direction, 
control, and authority over the military departments.  Separately, he removed the military 
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (CINC) and created the position of Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (Forrestal, 1948, p. 3).  To further unify the military 
departments and clarify the chain of command, Secretary Forrestal established unified 
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theater commands (Forrestal, 1948, p. 6).  The military services were working through 
the growing pains of operating under a unified chain of command, and Forrestal 
understood the need for incorporating the different experiences and perspectives of each 
service into the new structure (Forrestal, 1948, p. 8).  The true creation of a unified 
structure would come “not from an Act alone, but from the actions of lieutenants and 
soldiers” (Forrestal, 1948, p. 19).  He firmly established that military department plans 
were subordinate to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) plans (Forrestal, 1948, p. 41) and that the OSD would step in when the combined 
departments’ requested budgets exceeded that of the president (Forrestal, 1948, p. 41). 
The OSD began making changes to improve the “economy and efficiency” of the 
armed forces, while keeping the military capability (Forrestal, 1948, p. 7).  However, 
Forrestal recognized that economy and efficiency would not happen simply as a result of 
unification of command, but through “careful examination and vigorous persecution of 
the manners of economy and efficiency” (Forrestal, 1948, p. 17).  He further noted that 
the institution of the methods for achieving long-term economy are more important than 
the achievement of immediate, small gains (Forrestal, 1948, p. 18). 
The major effort to achieve economy and efficiency was through the 
establishment of joint and unified boards, and through standardized procedures and 
formats for the individual processes of each service.  Secretary Forrestal established 
uniform procedures for submission of legislative proposals (Forrestal, 1948, p. 20) and 
budget submissions to Congress (Forrestal, 1948, p. 40).  He created numerous joint 
organizations: a Joint Committee on Accounting Policy (p. 43); an Interdepartmental 
Forms Standardization and Control Board (Forrestal, 1948, p. 45); Committees on 
Civilian Components (Forrestal, 1948, p. 46), Service Pay (Forrestal, 1948, p. 47) and 
Medical and Hospital Services (Forrestal, 1948, p. 49); and a Research and Development 
Board and a Munitions Board, each responsible for joint long-range planning (Forrestal, 
1948, p. 40). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary Forrestal implemented new accounting and budgeting procedures.  One 
was the reporting of obligations and funds available to Congress in addition to the 
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required expenditures (Forrestal, 1948, p. 35).  Another involved grouping all costs 
(except personnel) related to an identifiable program, then grouping those programs by 
primary function (Forrestal, 1948, p. 40).  Finally, he looked to private industry to 
provide help in planning for industrial mobilizations (Forrestal, 1948, p. 15). 
C. LOUIS A. JOHNSON 
1. Background 
Louis A. Johnson served as Secretary of Defense from March 28, 1949 to 
September 19, 1950.  A practicing civilian lawyer and state legislator who saw combat 
action with the Army in WWI, he entered federal service as the Assistant Secretary of 
War from 1937 to 1940, then spent the next nine years in civilian practice again before 
being appointed Secretary of Defense by President Truman in 1949.  The National 
Security Act Amendments of 1948 greatly increased the power of the Secretary of 
Defense during his time in office (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories , 
Accessed October 2006).  He was also a constant advocate of universal military training 
for all American citizens (Johnson, 1950c, p. 5).  By the time he left office, the Soviet 
Union had detonated a nuclear device and North Korea had invaded South Korea 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
In his first report to Congress, which was also the first to include the individual 
service reports under a unified title (Johnson, 1950a, p. 1), Secretary of Defense Johnson 
highlighted the importance of maintaining strong military forces despite the pressure for 
demobilization (Johnson, 1950a, p. 8) and stressed the coordination of foreign policies 
and military policies via the National Security Council (NSC) (Johnson, 1950a, p. 22).  
He also emphasized that although unification was important, the Department would not 
combine the individual services (Johnson, 1950a, p. 8), as each service must maintain its 
own unique character (Johnson, 1950a, p. 9).   
Johnson physically rearranged the Pentagon offices, bringing military and civilian 
leadership closer together (Johnson, 1950a, p. 14), and implemented the newly created 
position of Undersecretary of Defense (Johnson, 1950a, p. 19).  He asserted his 
willingness to rely on the expertise of the JCS (Johnson, 1950a, p. 10), while further 
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consolidating power by declaring that “no service can be permitted to exercise exclusive 
judgment on how much money it should get or how it should be spent” (Johnson, 1950a, 
p. 11).  Later he credited the unification of the armed forces with an increase in national 
security (Johnson, 1950c, p. 17).   
Secretary Johnson eliminated many boards, but he created many joint boards and 
committees.  During his first year he created joint intelligence, joint staff, joint 
communications, joint military transportation, joint munitions allocations, joint 
meteorology, and joint civil affairs boards, as well as more unified commands (Johnson, 
1950a, pp. 39-43).  The Office of Progress Reports and Statistics was created within the 
OSD to collect and standardize data from the services to help the Secretary of Defense in 
making decisions (Johnson, 1950a, p. 100). 
Just as his predecessor did, Secretary of Defense Johnson made economy and 
efficiency his top priorities (Johnson, 1950a, p. 101), saying he wanted “more defense per 
dollar” (Johnson, 1950c, p. 51) because the national defense was a heavy burden on 
taxpayers (Johnson, 1950a, p. 9).  To determine the allocation of limited money across 
combat forces (Johnson, 1950b, p. 42), he created the Department of Defense 
Management Committee in August of 1949 (Johnson, 1950b, p. 31).  Their method of 
achieving efficiency was through “reprogramming”, which Johnson introduced in 1950 
(Johnson, 1950b, p. 45).  Reprogramming meant reducing overhead as much as possible, 
eliminating unproductive and non-essential activities, channeling funds from non-combat 
to combat activities, and establishing 1950 fiscal activities at levels sustainable in 1951 
(Johnson, 1950b, p. 48).  The Department began an enormous effort to remove personnel 
from administrative and non-combat positions and add them to combat forces, which 
included placing all personnel boards under one authority (Johnson, 1950a, p. 105).  Over 
100 “useless” boards and committees were eliminated during Johnson’s first year 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 14).  Duplicate foreign attaches and meteorology stations were 
removed (Johnson, 1950b, p. 25).  Segregation was eliminated and use of “woman-
power” was stressed, resulting in a simultaneous increase of 4400 men in combat units 
and a decrease of 20,000 men in total military personnel during 1949 (Johnson, 1950b, p. 
43-44).  In addition, 145,000 civilian employees were eliminated (Johnson, 1950b, p. 52).  
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Fifty one military bases were closed (Johnson, 1950b, p. 52), and the military 
departments were instructed to consolidate services such as transportation, cold-storage, 
telephone systems and hospitals (Johnson, 1950a, p. 103).   
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary of Defense Johnson instituted important budget changes during his 
term, continuing the push to unify the Department of Defense budget (Johnson, 1950a, p. 
94).  He started this effort by standardizing the budget request process among the services 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 96).  He required coordinated budget planning and execution 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 98) and tasked the JCS to form an advisory budget review committee 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 95).  His goals for the budgeting system included performance 
budgeting, use of working capital funds, revision of appropriation structures, refinement 
of estimating standards, and use of inventory data in determining budget requirements 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 99).  Ultimately, he wanted a working system that would provide the 
Secretary of Defense useful budgetary advice (Johnson, 1950b, p. 34).  With the gradual 
unification of the budget process, the Secretary of Defense began providing budgetary 
guidance to the services.   
Several other financial management changes were implemented under Johnson.  
With Congress' assistance and permission, the Department created comptrollers, 
implemented performance budgeting, authorized working capital funds (which were 
already in use), and created a uniform fiscal system under Title IV (Johnson, 1950b, p. 
58).  The Department began reforming the basic accounting systems used by the services 
(Johnson, 1950a, p. 100), looking to both improve the processes and create common 
procedures and language throughout the Department (Johnson, 1950a, p. 96).   
Secretary Johnson addressed personnel management issues as well.  He 
implemented a government employee suggestion system which he claimed saved millions 
of dollars in the first year (Johnson, 1950c, p. 56).  He also established business 
administration training for DoD employees, training that took place both within the 
military establishment and at outside educational institutions (Johnson, 1950a, p. 100).   
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4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Formerly all procurement had been the sole domain of the individual services, but 
Secretary Johnson began the push to increase coordination of purchases across the 
services (Johnson, 1950a, p. 50).  Johnson recognized that, as in the past, defense arsenals 
could not supply the military’s wartime needs, and therefore planning for defense 
mobilization was important (Johnson, 1950c, p. 42).  The Munitions Board received 
much attention and was given numerous responsibilities.  It continued a program to 
include civilian industry in defense mobilization planning (Johnson, 1950a, p. 66).  It 
began planning for and increasing the strategic stockpile of war reserves (Johnson, 1950a, 
p. 78).  It developed supply management programs to increase wartime efficiency 
(Johnson, 1950b, p. 99).  It also applied advanced supply management techniques 
(Johnson, 1950b, p. 105) and the use of common systems among the services (Johnson, 
1950c, p.44) to coordinate and simplify supply management (Johnson, 1950b, p. 105).  
With the start of hostilities in Korea and increased procurement of defense materiel, the 
Munitions Board conducted additional studies to identify and remove production 
bottlenecks of vital resources (Johnson, 1950c, p. 42), while the Production Allocation 
Board was established to speed the transition from peacetime to wartime production 
(Johnson, 1950b, p. 85).   
Other procurement changes were implemented.  The Department adopted a policy 
of preferential treatment toward small businesses (Johnson, 1049.2, p. 100), founding the 
Small Business Office to champion the effort (Johnson, 1950c, p. 45).  It assigned the 
purchase of specific-type items to specific military departments (Johnson, 1950c, p. 45). 
Among other things, Johnson called for a reduction in the purchase of individual items, 
and reductions in contract prices to reflect actual and anticipated lower commodity prices 
in 1949 (Johnson, 1950b, p. 47).  He also continued to expand the use of working capital 
funds for procurement of common items (Johnson, 1950c, p. 56). 
Secretary Johnson increased the role of the OSD in research and development.  
He recognized that the DOD needed to sponsor basic research (Johnson, 1950a, p. 50) as 
well as advocating “vigorous development of new weapons in any area in which 
scientific research… suggests practicability" (Johnson, 1950b, p. 64).  While he stressed 
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that each military department was responsible for its own research and development 
(Johnson, 1950c, p. 35), the previously established Research and Development Board 
oversaw the process (Johnson, 1950c, p. 36).  It was charged with several tasks, to 
include matching development projects to JCS plans (Johnson, 1950c, p. 36), eliminating 
duplicate projects (Johnson, 1950b, p. 76), and providing information on whether to 
authorize new systems or wait for further research (Johnson, 1950c, p. 34). 
With the beginning of the Korean War, Secretary of Defense Johnson’s priorities 
changed from creating an economic and efficient peacetime military to a combat-ready 
force, but he still stressed unification via joint training, joint education, joint R&D and 
common procurement (Johnson, 1950c, p. 4) and the need for an integrated defense 
budget, in which the needs of the military are balanced against the requirements of 
national defense as a whole (Johnson, 1950c, p. 17).   
D. GEORGE C. MARSHALL 
1. Background 
George C. Marshall served as the Secretary of Defense from September 21, 1950 
to September 12, 1951.  Appointed to replace the controversial Johnson and to bring 
prestige back to the office, Marshall was a career military man, having served with 
distinction from 1902 to 1945, then as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949.  He required 
a waiver from Congress to avoid a rule prohibiting a Secretary of Defense from having 
been on active duty in the previous ten years, meant to assure civilian control over the 
military.  He took office after Secretary of Defense Johnson had developed a deep rift 
between the OSD, the Navy and the Air Force (The Revolt of the Admirals) and as the 
Korean War was escalating.  He was in office (and testified extensively before congress) 
when Gen. MacArthur was relieved of command 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Having assumed his position during wartime, Secretary of Defense Marshall 
continued many of the initiatives of his predecessor.  These initiatives included 
centralizing manpower management (Marshall, 1951b, p. 19), consolidating 
responsibility to focus effort on specific problems (Marshall, 1951b, p. 45), and clarifying 
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duties and chains of command within OSD (Marshall, 1951b, p. 50).  The initiatives were 
expanded with the understanding that the focus had shifted from economy to expansion 
(Marshall, 1951b, p. 42) and that the rapid expansion increased the need for effective 
command and control (Marshall, 1951, p. 54).  He also continued to push for 
management reforms to improve the overall military management process, directing that 
each manager and employee contribute ideas to increase the efficiency of their 
organization (Marshall, 1951b, p. 50).  During his time in office he declared that the 
principles of joint action and control had been fully accepted by the military departments 
(Marshall, 1951b, p. 43). 
Secretary of Defense Marshall continued his predecessors’ efforts to reduce the 
administrative overhead of excess personnel and boards within the headquarters of the 
DoD.  He began with a blanket five percent reduction in military personnel in the 
Washington D.C. area (Marshall, 1951b, p. 19) while expanding the use of women in 
administrative positions to free up men for combat units (Marshall, 1951b, p. 23).  The 
consolidation of individual service boards into joint boards and committees further 
reduced manpower requirements and improved efficiency (Marshall, 1951b, p. 54).  
Examples include the Joint Intelligence Agency and the Joint Parachute Test Agency 
(Marshall, 1951b, p. 54).  The Division of Manpower Utilization was tasked with 
determining what military and civilian jobs were essential, and ensuring that people with 
special skills were effectively utilized (Marshall, 1951b, p. 23-24).  The Secretary also 
directly recruited personnel with industry experience in specific areas (Marshall, 1951b, 
p. 47).  Secretary of Defense Marshall made minimal changes to the planning and 
budgeting process, continuing to encourage the use of working capital funds as a way to 
simplify procedures and incentivize economy (Marshall, 1951b, p. 45). 
3. Acquisitions and Logistics 
The acquisitions and logistics focus was clearly on increasing wartime production 
while deconflicting military and civilian requirements with a minimum of economic 
controls or disturbances (Marshall, 1951b, p. 32).  Major end item production scheduling 
was overseen by the Munitions Board or the Secretary of Defense himself (Marshall, 
1951b, p. 32).  To reduce the impact of wartime production on civilian industry, contracts 
 29
were to be spread across industry as much as possible, with special preference given to 
small businesses (Marshall, 1951b, p. 34).  Additionally, those small businesses were 
encouraged to form production pools to compete for larger contracts (Marshall, 1951b, p. 
36).  Within the military, procedures for joint procurement were being put in place.  This 
started with a Standards Agency, which created and adopted equipment standards for 
military use (Marshall, 1951b, p. 37).  It expanded to the use of Joint Procurement 
Agencies, which coordinated or consolidated procurements and prevented competition 
between the services (Marshall, 1951b, p. 36).  Finally, the Secretary required 
interdepartmental sharing of stocks among the services (Marshall, 1951b, p. 52). 
E. ROBERT A. LOVETT 
1. Background 
Robert A. Lovett served as Secretary of Defense from September 17, 1951 to 
January 20, 1953.  A former navy pilot, he spent most of his life in the business 
community, working his way up from bank clerk to partner in a large firm before being 
appointed the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War in 1940, then quickly to Assistant 
Secretary of War for Air.  He served as Assistant Secretary of State then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense under George C. Marshall, who recommended him as his 
replacement for Secretary of Defense.  When Secretary of Defense Lovett took office, the 
Korean War was still in progress and much of his work revolved around mobilization 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Possibly because of his role as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary Lovett did 
not make any major changes upon assuming office.  He believed in thoughtful and 
deliberate “evolutionary” changes (Lovett, 1952b, p. 33), stating that changes should be 
made in specific areas only after “a thorough review of all factors involved” (Lovett, 
1952b, p. 33).  In line with this, he created civilian expert committees to review problems 
and recommend solutions (Lovett, 1953, p. 5). 
Lovett continued the emphasis on economy and efficiency, recognizing that there 
were great strides still to be made, especially in manpower management (Lovett, 1952b, 
p. 17).  He attempted to get maximum utilization of skills where they were most needed 
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and found ways to free up men for combat positions (Lovett, 1952b, p. 17).  He created 
manpower controls with personnel ceilings (Lovett, 1952b, p. 17) and conducted 
utilization surveys to ensure manpower was used efficiently (Lovett, 1952b, p. 19).  He 
was concerned about morale and considered “fringe-benefits” as important force-shaping 
tools (Lovett, 1952b, p. 22-23). 
3. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Secretary of Defense Lovett said that efficient management was most important 
and had the most gains to be made in the procurement field (Lovett, 1952b, p. 32).  Those 
gains in economy, however, had to be made with no sacrifice of combat effectiveness 
(Lovett, 1952b, p. 36).  He identified several problems in procurement and production, 
including design changes during development and production (Lovett, 1952b, pp. 31-32), 
component bottlenecks (Lovett, 1952b, p. 32), and the conflicting goals of obtaining the 
lowest price while maintaining social programs (Lovett, 1952b, p. 35).  The result was 
excessively long lead times for important military equipment (Lovett, 1952b, p. 31).  To 
address the problems, he created the Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
Committee to establish joint policies and procedures (Lovett, 1952b, p. 34) and the 
Defense Supply Management Agency (Lovett, 1953, p. 5).  Additionally, he encouraged 
the increased use of common items, standard parts and standard specifications (Lovett, 
1952b, p. 37).  Despite increased use of military specifications elsewhere, Lovett did 
recommend that the military remove standard packaging requirements to allow 
businesses to use their internal standard procedures (Lovett, 1952b, p. 37).  As a learning 
point from the build-up to full wartime production for Korea, Secretary Lovett 
recommended the use of “live production capacity” within the economy, rather than 
stockpiles of materiel (Lovett, 1953, p. 6). 
F. CHARLES E. WILSON 
1. Background 
Charles E. Wilson served as Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953 to 
October 8, 1957.  A life-long electrical engineer, Wilson was president of General Motors 
before being nominated Secretary of Defense.  President Eisenhower wanted him to 
refocus the OSD on defense management rather than national policy.  Secretary of 
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Defense Wilson’s time in office included the drawdown from the Korean War and the 
start of the policy of maintaining strategic forces for nuclear deterrence and conventional 
forces for limited wars (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed 
October 2006). He called it a change “from expansion to sustained readiness” (Wilson, 
1955a, p. 1). 
2. Organizational Management 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson convinced Congress to 
significantly reorganize the Department of Defense with the Reorganization Plan no. 6, 
implemented in 1953.  Among other things, this plan placed the unified commands under 
the Service Secretaries rather than the Chiefs of Staff and established six additional 
Assistant Secretaries of Defense, seeking to clarify responsibilities and the chain of 
command (Wilson, 1953, p. 10).  Wilson further moved to centralize policymaking and 
simultaneously decentralize operations (McElroy and Wilson, 1958, p. 8) by making the 
civilian Service Secretaries his principle agents (Wilson, 1953, p. 10).  This did several 
things.  First, it freed the JCS for important long-range planning (Wilson, 1953, p. 10).  
Second, it maximized the decentralization of operations (Wilson, 1955a, p. 10).  Finally, 
it maintained or even increased civilian control (Wilson, 1953, p. 11).  In addition, he 
started a review of the organization of the military departments to give the civilian 
Service Secretaries more control (Wilson, 1954, p. 2) and took the JCS out of the chain of 
command (Wilson, 1955a, p. 14).  He ensured that the Secretary of Defense’s full 
authority in the National Security Organization was understood, that he had direction and 
control, and a large enough staff to accomplish his goals (Wilson, 1955a, p. 11).  
Although Secretary Wilson implemented sweeping changes in the organization of the 
OSD, he stressed that the pace of change must be deliberate (Wilson, 1956a, p. 2) and 
orderly (Wilson, 1957a, p. 6) without “sudden shifts in emphasis” (Wilson, 1956b, p. 1).  
Interestingly, Wilson transferred some of the joint boards from the OSD and gave the 
authority back to the services (Wilson, 1953, p. 11). 
Secretary of Defense Wilson carried on his predecessors’ call for efficiency and 
economy, striving to develop maximum combat efficiency at minimum cost (Wilson, 
1956b, p. 2).  He planned to achieve his goal with better requirements determination, 
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planning, and more efficient use of manpower (Wilson, 1953, p. 4).  He introduced the 
idea that improvements in weapon systems and technology can reduce the manpower 
requirement needed to support the force (Wilson, 1954, p. 2).  Wilson also believed in 
constant improvement of management methods and procedures to make incorporating 
efficiency an ongoing process, and he continued to stress the employee suggestion 
program as an effective tool for improvement (Wilson, 1957a, p. 10).  He further reduced 
manpower overhead by eliminating 30,000 civilian employees during 1954, but increased 
pay and benefits for those who remained (Wilson, 1955b, p. 6).  Manpower reductions 
were specifically addressed toward headquarters elements, as he mandated a twelve 
percent reduction in headquarters staffs in 1957 (McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 10). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary Wilson continued to tighten his budget control over the services, saying 
that money would be spent more carefully if extra funds were not available (Wilson, 
1953, p. 6).  He recommended creating an Assistant Secretary in charge of Financial 
Management for each military department (Wilson, 1955a, p. 16).  He pushed for greater 
integration of financial systems to enable the generation of accurate performance reports 
for managers at all levels (McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 46).  He encouraged the 
development and use of a performance-type budget (Wilson, 1957a, p. 41), which used 
“indicators of cost per unit of work accomplished, focusing on workload measures rather 
than output or outcomes” (Jones & McCaffery, 2004, p. 90).  He directed that no weapon 
system would be authorized for procurement unless there was funding for the entire end 
item, including necessary spares (McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 47).  In 1957 he adopted 
his 1954 proposal that the Department use "commitment” accounting, which showed 
obligated but not executed funds (McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 47). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Most likely the result of his direction of General Motors’ production during 
WWII, Secretary of Defense Wilson made many changes in procurement, supply and 
logistics.  He increased coordination between the services, creating uniform procedures 
for transportation rate negotiations (Wilson, 1955b, p. 6).  To reduce paperwork and 
simplify processes, he increased the use of standardized forms (Wilson, 1956a, p. 40).  
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He initiated the single-manager program, which assigned total life-cycle management of 
a common good to a specific service (Wilson, 1956b, p. 8).  He created commodity 
coordination groups to identify opportunities for supply savings on the wholesale level 
(McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 36).  He substituted better material planning and 
standardization for inventory balances (McElroy & Wilson, 1958, p. 36), and identified 
the need for electronic data processing equipment in supply management (Wilson, 1957a, 
p. 41).  Excess real estate was inventoried and sold (Wilson, 1957a, p. 45), while 120 
government-owned telecommunication systems were sold to private companies (McElroy 
& Wilson, 1957.1, p. 42). 
G. NEIL H. MCELROY 
1. Background 
Neil H. McElroy served as Secretary of Defense from October 9, 1957 to 
December 1, 1959.  A Harvard educated economist, he worked for Proctor and Gamble 
Company, eventually becoming its president before he was appointed Secretary of 
Defense by President Eisenhower.  Just before he took office, the Soviets launched 
Sputnik and he was soon presiding over an ever accelerating arms race 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, passed by Congress but championed by 
Eisenhower and McElroy, changed the chain of command within the Department of 
Defense in several ways.  It strengthened the unified commands, establishing a direct line 
from the Commander in Chief (CINC) through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (McElroy, 1959, p. 23).  It gave the OSD sole responsibility for research 
and development and further strengthened the power of the Secretary of Defense 
(McElroy, 1959, p. 23).  The military departments were now “separately organized” not 
“separately administered” (McElroy, 1959, p. 27) such that ground, sea, and air forces 
would now operate under one unified command (McElroy, 1959, p. 24).   
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
McElroy made several important advances in financial management, specifically 
in accounting.  He adopted a monetary accounting system for items of supply to 
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encourage their efficient use (McElroy, 1959, p. 64).  All working-capital funds were 
required to adopt accrual accounting (McElroy, 1959, p. 64).  Finally, he had the services 
develop realistic cost and work standards (McElroy, 1959, p. 64), then use comparative 
cost studies to determine why the same operations were more costly in one department 
than in another ((McElroy, 1959, p. 63). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Both Secretary of Defense McElroy and President Eisenhower understood the 
need to increase the defensive power of the United States without significantly increasing 
the defense budget (McElroy, 1959, p. 17).  To achieve this, McElroy intended to offset 
the increasing cost of weapons systems in two ways: by establishing realistic and 
achievable priorities (McElroy, 1959, p. 17), and by increasing operational efficiency 
(McElroy, 1958, p. 9).  McElroy initiated a defense-wide study of supply management 
and organizational procedures, intending to further integrate departmental supply systems 
to achieve the twin goals of effectiveness and economy (McElroy, 1958, p. 8).  He 
created the Armed Forces Supply Support Center (McElroy, 1959, p. 50) to increase 
interservice cooperation (McElroy, 1959, p. 49) and thirty-three “commodity 
coordination groups” to identify common items for exchange between the services at the 
wholesale level (McElroy, 1959, p. 57).  The Secretary emphasized inventory 
management (McElroy, 1959, p. 57), claiming “substantial progress” in materiel 
economy and efficiency (McElroy, 1959, p. 51).  He expanded the use of single managers 
for common commodities, reporting that seventy-five percent of all procurement funds 
were being obligated under single service programs (McElroy, 1959, p. 53)  
H. THOMAS S. GATES 
1. Background 
Thomas S. Gates served as Secretary of Defense from December 2, 1959 to 
January 20, 1961.  An investment banker by trade, Gates served in the Navy during 
WWII.  Before entering the OSD as the Deputy Secretary of Defense under McElroy, 
Gates spent six years as both Under Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of the Navy, 
giving him a firm grounding in the operations of the military departments.  During his 
time as Secretary of Defense, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine 
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launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were added to the United States' arsenal, and Francis 
Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Secretary of Defense Gates recognized that “unification of purpose, rather than 
unification of things” remained the ultimate goal, and that organization was simply a 
“means to an end” (Gates, 1961, p. 50).  Coming as he did from the position of Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, he did not feel the need to effect any revolutionary changes within 
the OSD (Gates, 1960, p. 46).  Rather, he continued to clarify and strengthen the 
organization of the Department under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 which, 
among other things, had shortened the chain of command from the Secretary of Defense 
to the operating forces while increasing flexibility (Gates, 1960, p. 35).  Major policy 
decisions were made by the Secretary of Defense, while responsibility for military 
operations was decentralized to lower levels (Gates, 1961, p. 43).  Three separate groups 
now reported to the Secretary of Defense: the OSD agencies, reorganized to include a 
new Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Gates, 1960, p. 37) and a Statistical 
Services Center (Gates, 1960, p. 41); the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their military 
departments; and the unified and specified commands (Gates, 1960, p. 35).  The structure 
of the JCS was changed from a committee structure to a unified staff system and the JCS 
were given operational responsibility for the unified and specified commands (Gates, 
1960, p. 41).  The authority of the chief military officers in each service was changed 
from “command authority” to “supervisory authority” (Gates, 1960, p. 45).  This 
reemphasized that the military departments were responsible primarily for training and 
equipping their forces, rather than military operations, where the chain of command ran 
through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense (Gates, 1960, p. 45).  In 1960, Secretary of 
Defense Gates declared that the power of the Secretary of Defense had reached its zenith.  
The only tools of authority he did not have were the ability to merge or change the 
statutory functions of the military departments, the ability to establish a single chief of 
staff, or the ability to prevent a military secretary or JCS member from reporting to 
Congress (Gates, 1961, pp. 43-45). 
 36
Secretary of Defense Gates changed the managerial focus from committees to 
staffs.  He abolished 200 of the 300 joint committees in operation (Gates, 1960, p. 41), 
increased the joint staff from 210 to 400 (Gates, 1961, p. 46), and issued guidance on the 
proper use of committees and effective staff relationships (Gates, 1960, p.41).  His goal 
was to increase the speed and efficiency of combat decision making, while ensuring that 
civilian authority had the time and information required to make decisions on long-term 
policies and programs (Gates, 1961, p. 46).  To accelerate operations, he started weekly 
meetings between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense (Gates, 1961, p. 46).  Secretary 
Gates felt that the logistics community sometimes forgot that combat effectiveness was 
the ultimate goal, and must not be sacrificed for the sake of economy (Gates, 1961, p. 
48). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary Gates carried on the financial management reform programs of his 
predecessors, increasing the use of accrual accounting, accounting for property by 
monetary value, and developing better fiscal reports (Gates, 1961, p. 39).  He used the 
improved reports and more efficient staff to dig deeper into the service budget requests 
(Gates, 1961, pp. 47-48).  In 1959, Congress began budgeting by purpose (Operations 
and Maintenance, Military Construction, etc.) rather than by service for the first time 
(Gates, 1960, p. 32).  In addition, he increased the use of working capital funds (Gates, 
1961, p. 40). 
I. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA 
1. Background 
With the role and power of the Secretary of Defense firmly established, the stage 
was set for a truly revolutionary Secretary.  Robert S. McNamara served as Secretary of 
Defense from January 21, 1961 to February 29, 1968, the longest term of any Secretary 
of Defense thus far.  After serving in the Army Air Corps during WWII, he began a 
career with Ford Motor Company, becoming the first president of the company from 
outside the Ford family just weeks before leaving the company to take his post as 
Secretary of Defense.  He was appointed by President Kennedy after former Secretary of 
Defense Lovett refused the position and recommended McNamara in his place.  
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McNamara presided over the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the start 
of the Vietnam War (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed 
October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
In 1969, in his last report to Congress as Secretary of Defense, McNamara 
explained his management philosophy, saying that the Secretary of Defense did not lack 
for any authority, but rather the information and tools to make sound decisions 
(McNamara, 1968, p. 193).  He described the role a public manager could take as “either 
a judge or a leader”.  One waits for subordinates to bring him choices, the other will 
“immerse himself in the operations of the business” (McNamara, 1968, p. 193).  Clearly 
the latter, McNamara introduced new techniques for collecting, integrating and 
synthesizing information.  He made comparisons between the management environment 
in the DoD and in the private sector, recognizing that the DoD operated like multiple 
major commercial enterprises, each requiring different management techniques 
(McNamara, 1966, p. 30).  However, the Department could not evaluate management 
decisions based on a profit or loss statement like a commercial enterprise, and due to its 
large number of middle managers, it often found it difficult to “exert pressure from 
above” (McNamara, 1968, p. 199). 
Secretary of Defense McNamara did not make any significant changes in the 
defense organizational structure, but concentrated his energy on the continuous 
improvement of management activities (McNamara, 1966, p. 31).  The first important 
management change Secretary of Defense McNamara made was streamlining the 
decision making process by emphasizing the role of the individual in solving problems, 
rather than relying on committees or groups (McNamara, 1962, p. 22).  The next 
significant change was an increased reliance on scientific and technical evaluation over 
human judgment in decision making (McNamara, 1962, p. 28), to ensure that there was a 
clear and substantial benefit prior to implementing any new procedures (McNamara, 
1963, p. 26).  He initiated the use of statistical analysis techniques to identify the relevant 
factors in complex problems (McNamara, 1964, p. 34) and brought in data processing 
equipment to aid in estimating future requirements (McNamara, 1964, p. 35).  Along with 
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his goal of increasing the information flow to top-level decision makers (McNamara, 
1967a, p. 37), Secretary McNamara professed to push the responsibility for making 
decisions to the lowest level that had “the necessary ability and information to apply 
approved policy” (McNamara, 1967a, p. 37).  The weekly meetings between the JCS and 
Secretary of Defense were continued, and now included topics introduced by the 
Secretary of Defense (McNamara, 1962, p. 23).   
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary McNamara's management changes were integral to his largest 
management reform agenda, the creation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS).  Defense Comptroller Charles Hitch briefed McNamara on the PPBS in 
1961 (Trewhitt, 1971, p. 86).  The idea of programming packages came from an army 
comptroller in the early 1950s, and the Air Force was implementing it in 1959 (Borklund, 
1966, p. 216).  The PPBS was meant to integrate defense planning and budgeting 
(McNamara, 1962, p. 25) in order to “permit a more rational allocation of resources and 
facilities” (McNamara, 1963, p. 30).  The PPBS system was an analytical combination of 
long-range planning for future needs, identification of the alternative programs that 
would meet those needs, and the budget decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of the 
programs (Jones and McCaffery, 2004, p. 91).  The long-range program cost estimates 
(five years) sought to reduce the inherent, and inefficient, fluctuations caused by the 
annual congressional budget process and to evaluate programs from a defense-wide, 
rather than an individual service, perspective (McNamara, 1963, p. 30).  The military 
departments would be required to submit current and future cost projections for all of 
their programs (McNamara, 1962, p. 26) so that decision makers could then see all the 
current and future costs of a program under one integrated financial management system 
(McNamara, 1962, p. 25).  Prior to 1962, the Secretary of Defense did not have a 
significant role in the formulation of the service budgets, but McNamara and the DoD 
Comptroller Charles Hitch moved, with President Kennedy’s guidance, to introduce 
tighter planning and budget control over the services (Jones and McCaffery, 2004, p. 89).  
Under the PPBS, the long-term costs of alternative programs or program packages for 
meeting a given mission were evaluated against each other (McNamara, 1964, p. 33). 
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Throughout his tenure, Secretary McNamara continued to make improvements to 
the PPBS.  He desired to know exactly how much it costs “to operate each activity, for 
example a navy destroyer, a B-52 wing or an army division” (McNamara, 1967, p. 55).  
In 1966, project PRIME (Priority Management Efforts) was introduced to integrate the 
PPBS and the management accounting system in use at the time (McNamara, 1967b, p. 
50), with the goal of relating costs to outputs (McNamara, 1971, p. 56).  Project PRIME 
required that all of DoD adopt a system of accrual accounting and internal transactional 
payments (Thompson and Jones, 1994, pp. 66-68), while charging personnel costs to 
programs or organizations (McNamara, 1967b, p. 50).  Unfortunately for McNamara, it 
was never fully implemented due to objections from Congress (Jones and McCaffery, 
2004, p. 90).  Although Project PRIME never took off, the PPBS was successful enough 
that President Johnson mandated its use across the entire executive branch (McNamara, 
1967a, p. 41).  Additionally, the success of the PPBS as a top level management tool 
motivated McNamara to create a new program called Resource Management Systems, 
which applied the principles of the PPBS at the operational level (McNamara, 1967b, pp. 
49-50).  
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
McNamara continued to press for efficiency and economy, particularly by 
consolidating support functions (McNamara, 1967a, p. 36), but introduced a more formal 
method of analysis for determining what duplication or expenditures were unnecessary 
(McNamara, 1963, p. 22).  He created the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) as a step in 
what he called the “evolutionary process” of integrating DoD supply management 
(McNamara, 1962, p. 35), and created the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 
consolidated telephone and transportation offices (McNamara, 1962, p. 36).  To 
encourage development of more efficient processes, the Department implemented a five-
year cost savings plan and created a reporting and auditing system to track progress 
(McNamara, 1964, p. 44).  The program was based on three goals: buy only what was 
needed, buy at the  lowest sound price, and reduce operating costs (McNamara, 1964, pp. 
44-46)  The program was so successful that by 1967 it was made a permanent program 
within the Department (McNamara, 1967, p. 81).   
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The Department made other logistics improvements as well.  To finding 
innovative new solutions to his goals, Secretary McNamara created the Logistics 
Management Institute, which solicited the insight of experts from universities and private 
industry (McNamara, 1963, p. 41).  He increased the use of data processing systems 
(computers) within the DoD in order to increase the accuracy of budget estimates in 
financial management (McNamara, 1964, p. 35) and to forecast demand, requirements, 
and wear-out rates in the  logistics community (McNamara, 1968, p. 203).   
Acquisition reform was a priority under McNamara.  He started a historical 
review of twenty prior weapon systems acquisitions called Project HindSight 
(McNamara, 1967, p. 70), and a successful program to increase the base of research done 
by private universities called Project THEMIS (McNamara, 1967, p. 70).  McNamara 
created a number of important reporting systems, including the required monthly status 
reports of over 200 major systems (McNamara, 1963, p. 32).  Development Concept 
Papers (DCPs) were introduced, which created cost, schedule, and performance 
thresholds for new research projects (McNamara, 1971, p. 78).   
J. CLARK M. CLIFFORD 
1. Background 
Clark M. Clifford served as Secretary of Defense from March 1, 1968 to January 
20, 1969.  A lawyer in private practice, he served in the navy in WWII and subsequently 
as special council to the President for several years.  Returning to private practice from 
1950 to 1967, he continued to be an active advisor to the government until his 
appointment as Secretary of Defense 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Reform Agenda 
Secretary of Defense Clifford carried on the programs of his predecessor, 
including the three-pronged cost savings plan with yearly goals.  However, he 
emphasized that although great gains had been made in the past, there would always be 
room for improvement in modern business and industrial management (Clifford, 1969, p. 
144).  He continued the use of integrated product managers for supplies used by multiple 
departments, but he reduced their control to service and support only, making sure that 
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requirements determination was left to the users (Clifford, 1969, p. 151).  Secretary of 
Defense Clifford also recognized a new threat to military bases, that of forced relocation 
due to civilian encroachment (Clifford, 1969, p. 154). 
K. MELVIN R. LAIRD 
1. Background 
Melvin R. Laird served as Secretary of Defense from January 22, 1969 to January 
29, 1973.  The first congressman to serve as Secretary of Defense, Laird spent six years 
in the Wisconsin State Senate before being elected to the U.S. House of Representatives 
in 1952.  He served as chairman of the House Republican Conference and on the Defense 
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee until his appointment as Secretary 
of Defense by President Nixon.  He presided over the drawdown from the Vietnam War 
and ended the draft two days before he left office 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Secretary of Defense Laird felt that the DoD was not organized effectively or 
efficiently and that organizational and management improvements would reap 
“dividends” (Laird, 1970, p. 27).  He appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee, chaired by 
Gilbert Fitzhugh, soon after he took office to provide long range management and 
organizational solutions (Laird, 1970, p. 86) for what he termed “the largest management 
problem in the world” (Laird, 1970, p. 75).  Committed to “an orderly, step-by-step 
approach to implementing management and organizational changes” (Laird, 1971, p. 
115), he pushed for decentralization of decision making, claiming that previous 
administrations had “serious shortcomings with regard to delegation of authority” (Laird, 
1971, p. 115); in particular, he called for more reliance on people and less on “elaborate 
decision-making procedures” as a way to motivate better decision making and raise 
morale (Laird, 1971, p. 113).  His plan consisted of three prongs: participatory decision 
making, defined decentralization, and delegation of authority under specific guidance 
(Laird, 1970, p. 76).  Under this plan he called for the military departments to take a 
greater role in R&D and procurement programs (Laird, 1970, p. 77), while significantly 
reducing the power of the centralized Systems Analysis Office (Laird, 1971, p. 114). 
 42
Despite his stated trend toward decentralization of authority, Secretary of Defense 
Laird recognized the value of centralization in particular areas (Laird, 1971, p. 114).  He 
created a new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Telecommunications) 
position, the Central Security Service, Defense Investigative Service, Defense Mapping 
Agency, and the Director of Net Assessments (Laird, 1972, p. 132).  He sought 
improvements in command and control (Laird, 1972, p. 140) and in civilian control over 
the military (Laird, 1970, p. 76).  In the end it is not clear how many of the Blue Ribbon 
Panel’s management recommendations he accepted, asserting that many of them would 
decrease efficiency by increasing overhead and staff (Laird, 1971, p. 116).  Coming from 
the Congress, Secretary of Defense Laird had more perspective about Congressional 
requirements than his predecessors.  He used his influence there to try to reduce, or at 
least standardize, congressional oversight of the military, arguing that many different 
reporting requirements were expensive and time consuming (Laird, 1970, p. 17). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Although Secretary of Defense Laird was critical of the PPBS, saying that it was 
neither effective nor timely (Laird, 1970, pp. 29-30), he continued to use it, albeit with 
changes.  He wanted it to include more participation from the parties involved (Laird, p. 
1971, p. 77). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Secretary of Defense Laird continued to use the cost reduction plan, but 
emphasized the need to identify the areas that the current system was not helping (Laird, 
1970, p. 84).  To do this he created a new Logistics Performance Measurement and 
Evaluation System (Laird, 1970, p. 85).  He continued to use the DCPs, started by 
McNamara (Laird, 1970, p. 68), but he also created the Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC) to review acquisition programs at each stage of development 
(Laird, 1970, p. 82).  The new Office of Net Assessments would now provide more 
guidance for acquisitions programs (Laird, 1972, p. 146), and the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) was established to increase the accuracy of cost estimates 
(Laird, 1972, p. 147). 
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L. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON 
1. Background 
Elliot L. Richardson served as Secretary of Defense from January 30, 1973 to 
May 24, 1973.  An army officer who participated in the Normandy invasion during 
WWII, Richardson worked as a lawyer before serving in multiple positions in state and 
federal government (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/Secretary of Defense _histories, 
Accessed October 2006).  He served as Secretary of Defense for only four months before 
becoming the United States Attorney General.  During his tenure, the personnel pay costs 
in the DoD exceeded all other cost categories for the first time (Richardson, 1973, p. 48). 
2. Reform Agenda 
During the brief time he spent in office, Secretary of Defense Richardson 
generally carried on the programs of his predecessors.  He concentrated on increasing 
planning for weapons systems out beyond the five to eight years in the PPBS 
(Richardson, 1973, pp. 16-17), and in assessing future threats (Richardson, 1973, p. 16).  
To increase public confidence in the acquisitions system, he pushed for accuracy in cost 
estimating, and the appropriate use of technology and competition to reduce costs 
(Richardson, 1973, p. 16).  
M. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER 
1. Background 
James R. Schlesinger served as the Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973 to 
November 19, 1975.  Schlesinger was an academic by training, having earned a Ph.D. in 
economics from Harvard.  He spent several years teaching economics before moving to 
the Rand Corporation to direct strategic studies.  He entered public administration in 
1969 as the assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget under President Nixon, before 
moving on to lead the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency.  
At all positions, Schlesinger was considered an aggressive and capable administrator 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed November 2006). 
Schlesinger had a difficult task before him as the Secretary of Defense.  He 
intended to restore the respect for the military that had been damaged during the Vietnam 
War in several ways: use defense resources wisely; maintain a strong defense to fend off 
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potential adversaries; balance peace and deterrence with military force; and restore the 
morale and dignity of the troops.  Contrary to popular belief at the time, Schlesinger 
emphasized the importance of modernized and well-equipped conventional forces.  This 
strategy forced him to try to halt the decline in the defense budget.  The defense of the 
budget, along with his strained relationships with President Ford and Congressional 
leaders, ultimately led to his dismissal from office in 1975 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories, Accessed November 2006).   
2. Organizational Management 
Secretary Schlesinger had four areas of emphasis for management reform: 
improve planning and management guidance given to the services, improve the weapons 
acquisition process, achieve efficiencies and economies in the support structure, and 
ensure good energy management and conservation practices in light of energy shortages 
(Schlesinger, 1974, p. 217).  He initiated management by objective (MBO) to make the 
Department more results oriented (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 218).  An example of MBO was 
the attempt to account for the support costs of specific weapon systems (Schlesinger, 
1974, p. 229).  The Department reduced headquarters staffs as well (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 
228). 
In 1973 a program was established under the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Logistics) to promote productivity improvements throughout the DoD, 
foster the development and use of productivity measures, and create a good 
worker/manager environment (Schlesinger, 1974, pp. 231-132).  Focus for the program 
included workload stabilization, procedures simplification, organization realignments, 
application of human engineering, and productivity improvements through capital 
investment (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 232).  The Department also established a task force, 
headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to standardize defense 
management systems wherever possible and reduce redundancy (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 
228). 
3. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Force modernization was the driver of Schlesinger's acquisition reforms.  The 
Department was facing the critical issue of maintaining a reasonable average equipment 
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age in an era of budget cuts and increasingly costly new weapons (Schlesinger, 1974, pp. 
218-219).  To truly understand the problem, the Secretary directed the services to prepare 
"extended planning annexes" that went out past 1980 in order to estimate the impact on 
the forces of a constrained budget (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 221).  Simultaneously, the DoD 
initiated and accelerated several procurement programs to freeze the aging while leaving 
force structure unchanged (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 221).  These included: improve 
independent cost analysis by using the CAIG, implement the design-to-cost concept, 
implement the "Fly before Buy" concept requiring operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E) before purchase, establish the position of Deputy Director of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, pursue prototype programs with no obligation to buy, and 
focus on low cost systems development (Schlesinger, 1974, pp. 221-222). 
Long-range planning was essential to new systems development.  The DoD 
prepared experimental Mission Concept Papers (MCP) covering strategic offense, 
continental air defense, and theater are defense, which defined the functional and fiscal 
context within which new systems must be developed.  They included the threat, 
projected resources available, potential needs, and major deficiencies (Schlesinger, 1974, 
p. 222).  Those MCPs were used for early identification of new technology, setting cost 
targets and determining affordability, planning use of the industrial base, estimating 
resource allocation and availability, and scheduling weapon system development and 
replacement (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 223).  A plan for logistics support became a 
requirement in every new weapon system development plan (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 229). 
With falling budgets, cost reduction was absolutely necessary for the acquisitions 
community.  The Department began using Development Concept Papers (DCP) reviewed 
by the DSARC to distinguish between must-have systems and those that were desired but 
not critical (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 223).  A "Hi-Low" strategy was implemented, where 
the DoD would have a few very advanced pieces of equipment to counter the enemy's 
best equipment, but predominantly lower cost equipment that met the basic performance 
requirements.  Developing high-tech for the sake of high-tech was discontinued, as funds 
were directed toward more mature technologies (Schlesinger, 1974, pp. 223, 225).  To 
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support this concept, design-to-cost became the new standard, while schedule and 
performance were adjusted as needed (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 224). 
Other changes to acquisitions were implemented as well.  New contracts were 
used to encourage fewer military-specific characteristics, promote off-the-shelf products 
and dual-use technologies, and ensure flexibility in contractor designs (Schlesinger, 1974, 
p. 224).  Services began screening program managers more closely, giving them longer 
tenures, equating project managers with major commands for promotion purposes, 
granting more responsibility and authority, and giving them direct communications with 
senior leaders (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 226). 
Integration of logistics systems was the top logistics priority for the 
administration.  It began the process of merging the various service-specific logistics 
systems into a unified structure and integrating the management of all subsistence stocks 
worldwide (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 230).  To consolidate property disposal, it expanded the 
responsibility of the Defense Property Disposal Service, begun in 1973, to dispose of all 
old DoD equipment (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 230).  The Department began standardizing 
basic items that had previously been carried in a multitude of sizes, types, and varieties 
(Schlesinger, 1974, p. 231).  Capital investment improvements were initiated as well 
(Schlesinger, 1974, p. 232). 
4. Facilities and Energy 
Improved efficiency in the support structure of the Department was a priority.  
The Department tried to get further reductions in the base system to reduce overhead.  
Schlesinger pushed to allow the services to use any cost savings from improved base 
support functions for their own operating forces (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 227).   
In 1973 a Defense Energy Task Group was established to study DoD energy 
requirements and strategy.  The position of Director for Energy was created and put 
under Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 233). The Defense 
Fuel Supply Center was given control of all bulk petroleum fuels, except "on base" 
stocks, during 1973, and did well at distributing those stocks, especially to forward 
deployed units, during the oil embargo (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 233). 
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To reduce fuel consumption, DoD began reducing flying hours, ship speed and 
overall operating hours, reducing energy requirements through R&D programs, and 
decreasing heating, lighting and fuel use DoD wide (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 233).  These 
efforts reduced petroleum consumption to the lowest level in 16 years (Schlesinger, 1974, 
p. 234).  However, to maintain minimum operational capabilities, the Secretary requested 
the temporary activation of Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 at Elk Hills, California to 
contribute 100,000 barrels per day to U. S. output (p. 234). 
N. DONALD H. RUMSFELD 
1. Background 
Donald H. Rumsfeld served as the Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975 
to January 20, 1977.  A career politician, Rumsfeld held posts throughout Washington. 
His only positions outside politics were as an aviator in the U. S. Navy for three years 
and at an investment banking firm for two years.   He served four terms in the House of 
Representatives, was an advisor to Nixon and headed his Office of Economic 
Opportunity and the Cost of Living Council, and was the U. S. Ambassador to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Under President Gerald Ford, he headed up the 
transition team, directed the White House Office of Operations, and coordinated the 
White House Staff, becoming one of Ford's closest advisors 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
Although he only served fourteen months as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld left 
his mark on the Department.  His highest priorities included reversing the decline in 
defense spending, updating aging weapon systems (especially strategic assets such as 
bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]), and working with NATO and 
allies to address the Soviet arms buildup.  He did institute some management reforms 
while in office, such as consolidation of OSD, but his emphasis at the time was elsewhere 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
During his short tenure, Rumsfeld carried forward many initiatives from his 
predecessor and started several of his own.  One of his first acts was to direct a review of 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and the Planning, Programming, and 
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Budgeting System (PPBS).  The intent was to improve the information provided to 
management while increasing the Department's ability to implement the requirements of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 235).  He also included the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) earlier in the budgeting process, during the 
Summer Program Review, as recommended by the Murphy Commission (Rumsfeld, 
1976, p. 236).  His review of the planning system concentrated on four areas: 
mobilization and deployment plans, the connection between PPBS assumptions and 
operational planning, ways to simplify and shorten the planning cycle, and actions needed 
to adhere to the Congressional Budget Act (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 303). 
Rumsfeld's management initiatives emphasized improving efficiency and 
effectiveness while enhancing the Department's ability to coordinate and control 
activities (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 303).  To increase productivity, and to adhere to the 
Presidential Management Initiative, Rumsfeld established a goal of two percent 
productivity improvement for the Department (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 311).  To reach that 
goal, the Department continued to reduce internal Department reports, forms, and 
directives (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 242). 
Although he did believe they served a valuable function, Rumsfeld reduced the 
use of advisory groups and tightened internal controls over the remaining ones 
(Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 236).  He continued using management by objective (MBO), as it 
had been effective thus far for the Department (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 235).  Standardization 
of management systems was beginning to take hold, but at this point most of the changes 
were in Installations and Logistics, and Financial Management (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 241).  
He did, however, help create a systematic program of internal audits designed to identify 
areas of additional savings (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 303). 
Consolidation of management functions and a flattening of the various 
Headquarters elements (OSD and the Services) was a priority.  Rumsfeld consolidated 
the offices of the OSD and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) to eliminate 
redundancy (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 304).  This change, among others, contributed to the 
reduction of OSD staff by thirty percent since 1969 and the OJCS staff by fifteen percent 
in one year and thirty-seven percent since 1969 (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 305). 
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3. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Acquisitions reform continued to be a major area of emphasis under Rumsfeld.  
To improve acquisitions efficiency, Rumsfeld and the senior leaders within the 
Department now increasingly used DCPs, the DSARC, the CAIG, Production Readiness 
Reviews, the Design-to-Cost concept, and Life Cycle Cost (LCC) programs (Rumsfeld, 
1978, p. 307).  The Department implemented the use of three milestone reviews by the 
DSARC.  Those reviews occurred prior to a program entering into advanced 
development, prior to entering full scale development, and prior to proceeding with 
production and deployment (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 237).  The Department created Milestone 
0, which allowed each service to identify requirements, submit them to OSD, and 
commence concept studies (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 308).  The intent was to ensure that 
technologies and systems were mature enough to continue on to the next phase, thus 
preventing cost and schedule slippages and weapon systems that would never materialize.   
As in every administration, studies were continually being conducted to identify 
and implement changes to acquisitions.  Under Rumsfeld, the DoD had reviewed and 
began implementing changes recommended by the Commission on Government 
Procurement, the Acquisition Advisory Group, and internal service review 
recommendations (Rumsfeld, 1976, pp. 238-239).  One of the studies, called "Forward 
Look", assessed existing management policies and identified opportunities to streamline 
the acquisition and contract management process (p. 239).  As a result, 32 policy changes 
were implemented that forced the DoD to rely more on contractors for product 
performance and involve less government oversight in corporate management procedures 
(Rumsfeld, 1978, pp. 308-309).   
The continual growth in the cost of new weapon systems required several changes 
to the way the acquisitions community operated.  "Design-to-Cost" became a trend, as 
did the inclusion of accurate operations and support (O&S) cost estimates (Rumsfeld, 
1976, p. 240).  Because of repeated cost overruns, it was necessary to develop 
independent cost estimates for major weapon systems.  The CAIG was given the lead on 
this and their estimates carried more weight than those of the program managers 
(Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 237).  Rumsfeld continued the push to reduce the use of military 
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specifications, another contributing factor to weapons systems cost growth (Rumsfeld, 
1976, pp. 239-240).  The Department now required that, whenever possible, new systems 
have lower O&S costs than the systems they replaced.  This was to be achieved through 
reduced manpower support requirements, warranties, and better logistics supportability 
(Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 311).  Rumsfeld emphasized the use of "off-the-shelf" products 
where possible in order to reduce costs (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 308).  He also pushed for 
standardized specifications (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 313).  A greater emphasis was placed on 
the importance of program managers as well.  A concerted effort was made to increase 
their tenure, give them more responsibility, and keep the PMs competitive for promotion 
within their services. 
Industrial preparedness and the maintenance of the industrial base were of vital 
concern to Rumsfeld.  Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP) had been initiated by prior 
administrations, which looked at the impact the Department's major procurement 
decisions had on industry, but Rumsfeld extended it down to the component/part level.  
He was starting to see a serious erosion of capability and competition, especially at the 
sub-contractor level (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 244).  At the same time, he directed a review of 
all government-owned facilities to determine which ones were critical and should be 
modernized, and which ones were unneeded (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 244).  The Department 
emphasized the use of technology to reduce the cost drivers of new equipment and 
accelerate the repair of older equipment (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 244).  
In 1975 the Deputy Secretary launched a program called "Profit '76" that was 
meant to encourage contractors to invest in modern production assets while ensuring they 
would earn a fair, but not excessive, profit.  The DoD had contracted a consortium of 
certified public accountants to analyze the profits of over 100 companies and report the 
results, with the objective of establishing profit criteria (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 245).  This 
shifted policy from a strict cost focus to one that accounted for effort, risk, and 
investment by the contractor, and allowed the imputed cost of capital for capital 
investment to be considered in contract negotiations (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 310).  He also 
established the Investment Policy Study Group to further study ways to increase 
contractor capital investment (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 310).    
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The Department wanted to improve the industrial base, but it also had to be 
cautious of corruption in both contractors and government acquisitions personnel.  One of 
the problems that the DoD was having was that contractors, mostly in shipbuilding, 
would incur enormous cost overruns due mostly to poor management or low-ball 
estimates.  They turned to the government for reimbursement, but the Department often 
ended up in court fighting the claims.  To expedite the process, Congress directed that all 
claims against the Navy be settled expeditiously by a three-man board (Rumsfeld, 1978, 
p. 312).  As for internal corruption, Rumsfeld confronted the issue of misconduct within 
the acquisitions community by aggressively preventing the transfer of gratuities between 
contractors and DoD personnel, and requiring that any potential conflicts of interest be 
addressed (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 306). 
The recognition of support costs as a main driver of program cost growth caused 
the DoD to try to create a standard cost accounting system for use at depot maintenance 
facilities (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 241).  Another cause of high support costs was the 
management of secondary repairable items.  While the total number of repairables had 
already been reduced from 4.1 million in 1965 to 3.7 million in 1975 (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 
242), much more could be done.  Rumsfeld started three new programs to help manage 
those repairables: the Defense War Reserve Computation, improved management of 
repairables, and development of standard base-level policies (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 242).   
4. Facilities and Energy 
Donald Rumsfeld continued the practice of base realignments that had begun in 
1974.  He knew that money spent on extra infrastructure was money not available for 
more urgent operations and acquisitions.  Unfortunately for him, state and local 
communities were starting to fight downsizing and base closures by this time, often tying 
up the cases in court (Rumsfeld, 1976, p.240).  One way that this problem was addressed 
in the past was by relocating many defense operations from the National Capital Region 
(NCR) to underutilized bases elsewhere.  This solution met with resistance as well 
(Rumsfeld, 1976, p.240). 
The oil crisis had a dramatic impact on the Department of Defense.  Donald 
Rumsfeld continued the programs started in prior years, but further reduced operational 
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tempo and overall energy consumption to a bare minimum.  The Department reduced 
energy consumption by seven percent in FY 1976 (Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 309).  
Additionally, the Department expanded research and development to reduce energy 
consumption.  Rumsfeld recognized the importance of ensuring adequate petroleum 
supplies to U. S. forces around the world (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 245).  To facilitate this, he 
helped get the Naval Petroleum Reserve Production Act of 1976 passed, which directed 
the maximum efficient production of oil from the Naval Petroleum Reserve for six years 
(Rumsfeld, 1978, p. 309).  
O. HAROLD BROWN 
1. Background 
Harold Brown served as the Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1977 to 
January 20, 1981.  Unlike his predecessor, Brown was less a politician and more a 
scientist.  He held a Ph.D. in physics and worked in the scientific community most of his 
career.  In 1952, Brown began working for the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and rose 
to director within eight years.  Throughout the 1950s, he served on several boards and 
scientific bodies, and acted as a consultant in the area of nuclear testing and proliferation.  
Brown was the Director of Defense Research and Engineering under Robert McNamara, 
then Secretary of the Air Force from 1965 to 1969.  From 1969 until he assumed office as 
the Secretary of Defense, Brown was the president of the California Institute of 
Technology (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 
2006). 
Although Harold Brown was a scientist by training, he made solid efforts to 
reform the business practices of the Department, consistent with President Carter's 
objective of reorganizing the federal government.  His greatest efforts were in 
modernizing the strategic forces, especially nuclear weapon delivery platforms, and he 
gave the go-ahead for the development of stealth technology.  He believed it was critical 
to maintain the same capabilities as the Soviet Union, and to offset deficient areas with 
greater capabilities in other areas.  Brown also understood that to achieve these goals the 
Department would need to increase funding, even as President Carter was promising 
defense cuts of $5 to $7 billion.  He was ultimately successful at fending off the cuts, 
 53
ending his administration with a generally increased defense budget in constant dollar 
terms.  Harold Brown realized through his years in office that the Department of Defense 
was an organization unlike any other, that implementing management reform was a task 
of enormous proportions.  This belief was articulated in a speech he gave shortly after 
leaving office in 1981: 
I want to note again the basic limitation of any attempt to manage the 
Defense Department in an idealized textbook fashion.  The pull of the 
need to be able to fight a war, if necessary, will always limit the peacetime 
efficiency of the defense establishment… 
The pull of conflicting domestic interests represents democratic 
government....To manage defense efficiently and at the lowest possible 
cost along presumed business lines of management and organization is a 
useful standard.  But there are prices we cannot afford to pay for meeting 
it exactly.  One is the abandonment of democratic control.  Another is the 
loss of a war.  Defense cannot be "managed" like a business.  But it can be 
led so as to preserve most effectively our national security interests 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 
2006).    
Harold Brown may have made greater changes to the management of the 
Department had it not been for international events at that time.  The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks II were being conducted, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the 
treaties addressing the control and neutrality of the Panama Canal were being discussed, 
the Iranians occupied the U. S embassy in Tehran, and the involvement of allies and 
NATO countries in creating a global defensive posture was being formulated 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
2. Organizational Management 
Harold Brown made management reform a priority, as he wanted to maximize the 
defense dollar by streamlining organizational and management relationships (Brown, 
1978, p. 348).  The Department initiated the Defense Reorganization Study to evaluate 
organizational and management arrangements (Brown, 1978, p. 351).  The intent of the 
study was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department (Brown, 1979, 
p. 310)  The results of the study suggested improvements in four areas: the appropriate 
source, content, and quality of military advice (roles of CJCS, JCS, and unified and 
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specified commanders); the appropriate National Military Command Structure (NMCS); 
the appropriate organization and functions of OSD; and the appropriate organization and 
functions of the military department headquarters (Brown, 1979, p. 310).   
The Department continued its reduction in headquarters staffs at both the OSD 
and service levels (Brown, 1978, p. 351). Brown's intent was to have the headquarters 
focus on policy development, resource management, program evaluation, and long-range 
planning and leave all other tasks to subordinate commands.  Most personnel reductions 
were the result of transferring people to those lower level commands (Brown, 1979, p. 
306).  Brown reduced his own OSD staff by twenty-six percent and required subordinate 
headquarters reduce their manpower by twenty-two percent (Brown, 1978, p. 355).  
Major staff offices within OSD were reduced from fourteen to nine (Brown, 1978, p. 
351).  Brown reduced the number of personnel reporting directly to him and had them 
report to various Undersecretaries, while eliminating one of the two Deputy Secretaries 
of Defense in order to avoid confusion in the chain of command (Brown, 1978, p. 353).  
Five of the twenty-two Assistant Secretaries authorized by Congress were eliminated 
(Brown, 1979, p. 304).  To provide more independent OT&E results to the Secretary, the 
Director, Planning and Evaluation was made an Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Program Analysis and Evaluation (Brown, 1978, p. 352).   
Movement of activities away from the NCR continued to be important (Brown, 
1979, p. 302).  The purpose was to decentralize non-headquarters Defense activities from 
NCR, reduce costs of GSA-provided spaces in NCR, and increase use of existing, 
underutilized installations elsewhere (Brown, 1979, p. 308). The goal under Brown's 
administration was to eliminate two million square feet of space over five years, affecting 
5,400 people (Brown, 1979, p. 308).   
The Department initiated the DoD Productivity Program to increase productivity 
(Brown, 1979, p. 316).  One of the key elements to this was the implementation of 
automated data processing (ADP) in many of the support functions of the DoD (Brown, 
1981, p. 301).  The Secretary encouraged the use of ADP in health care through the use 
of the Tri-service Medical Information System (Brown, 1979, p. 316).  In addition the 
Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS), a personnel database, was 
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being tested to help reduce fraud and expedite claims payments for health care services 
(Brown, 1981, p. 302).  The Department also entered into several contracts with private 
hospitals to provide surge capacity during wartime, known as the Civilian-Military 
Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS) (Brown, 1979, p. 316). 
To improve the planning process within the DoD, the following changes were 
made: early Secretary of Defense and Presidential involvement, development of a single 
Consolidated Guidance document as the basis for creation of all DoD programs, 
preparation by the JCS of a Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and Joint Program 
Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) in lieu of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and 
Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM), and development of an annual Study Plan that would 
identify problems in developing the Consolidated Guidance (Brown, 1979, p. 303). 
In FY 1981, the Secretary created the Defense Resource Board to better integrate 
programming and budgeting by supervising the OSD review of Service Program 
Objective Memorandums (POMs) and budget submissions (Brown, 1980, p. 284).  The 
Department also moved to zero-based budgeting to improve the responsiveness of the 
PPBS (Brown, 1978, p. 348). 
In FY 1981, Brown added two more objectives to his administration: better 
support function integration, and more cost reductions (Brown, 1980, p.282).  The 
integration of support functions was tasked to the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) and the initial results appeared positive 
(Brown, 1980, p. 284). 
A Defense Science Board Task Force was created to review the process by which 
the DoD specified, planned, and procured command and control systems.  While the 
report recommended more commander involvement, the three specific recommended 
changes were the creation of a Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
(C3I) Directorate within OJCS, integration of the World-Wide Military Command and 
Control System Engineering Organization into the Defense Communications Agency, 
and the reorganization of Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) (Brown, 
1980, p. 286). 
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Departmental management reform had the following objectives: increase 
responsiveness to national security objectives, ensure policy implementation, improve 
direction and control of combat forces, improve resource management, and increase 
responsiveness to changing conditions.  To reach the objectives, the DoD focused top-
level management on policy development, resource management, and program 
evaluation; consolidated related functions; separated the staff resource consumers from 
the resource developers/acquirers; considered views from all levels before adopting 
policy; and elevated special interest areas (e.g. NATO) (Brown, 1981, p. 295). 
By FY1982, the DoD had phased in most changes required by the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978.  It converted most executives to SES, used a new performance 
appraisal system, awarded financial awards for performance to executives, and awarded 
merit pay to lower supervisors (Brown, 1981, p. 301).  There was also an emphasis on 
clarifying and simplifying the thousands of regulations within the Department (Brown, 
1981, p. 304).  
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary Brown was frustrated at having to pay too much for many things, 
including payroll, facilities, and equipment, as mandated by the Davis-Bacon Act and the 
Service Contract Act.  By his estimates, the Department was overpaying by 15% on 
construction alone (Brown, 1979, p. 313).  For personnel overpayment, the Department 
pushed Congress to pass the Federal Employees Compensation Reform Act.  This act 
would reduce personnel costs by equating them with comparable private sector wages 
(Brown, 1981, p. 306).  The DoD took over the management and funding of the overseas 
military banking program which provided banking services and disbursing officers to 
assist military and civilian personnel (Brown, 1978, p. 360). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
The DoD initiated a pilot program, the Commercial Commodity Acquisition 
Program (CCAP), to encourage the use of commercial off-the-shelf products where 
possible (Brown, 1978, p. 359).  Secretary Brown issued the Defense Production 
Management directive, pushing production management responsibilities down to the 
services and incorporating production management considerations as part of the major 
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milestone reviews (Brown, 1978, p. 359).  The Department continued to encourage 
contractor investment in cost-reducing capital assets by writing capital investment 
incentives into contracts.   
New, more cost effective procurement policies expected to save $250 million 
annually included: the use of more commercial products, elimination of unnecessary 
government specifications, use of commercial distribution channels, multi-year contracts 
to reduce unit cost, encouraging contractors to invest in cost saving equipment, and 
buying at the most efficient production rates (Brown, 1979, p. 311).  The Department also 
emphasized the use of high-technology materials, equipment, and processes to improve 
performance and reduce the cost of new systems (Brown, 1979, p. 312).  The acquisitions 
workforce, considered by many as too large, was reduced by 15,000 positions (Brown, 
1979, p. 312).  Other steps the department took to improve the acquisition process 
included: development of a new mission area structure for material acquisition, methods 
of increasing contractor competition including parallel development and leader/follower 
production, greater use of concurrent development for competing systems, modifying 
rather than replacing exiting systems when possible, consolidating similar programs, 
earlier examination of system affordability, emphasizing acquisition schedules based on 
operational needs rather than technological opportunities, cancelling low-payoff 
programs, increasing NATO joint development, improving efficiency of the industrial 
base, and earlier and more detailed consideration of reliability and maintenance factors 
(Brown, 1979, p. 314). 
The DSARC process was being streamlined to reduce paperwork and focus on 
addressing major issues at milestone decisions (Brown, 1980, p. 285).  It also emphasized 
early industry participation in the concept phase of a program, while stating program 
objectives in terms of mission requirements rather than specific technological 
requirements (Brown, 1980, p. 285). Secretary Brown issued an instruction that all new 
acquisitions contracts include the Parts Control program, a program intended to use as 
many existing parts as possible for standardization purposes and reduced storage costs 
(Brown, 1981, p. 305). 
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The Secretary wanted to realign the logistics system to achieved potential savings 
of $100 million annually (Brown, 1979, p. 312).  In addition to changing the material 
distribution system, a new emphasis was placed on standardizing parts and acquiring 
commercial products in place of military-specific ones.  The Department created the 
Secondary Item Stockage Policy Analysis Working Group to find and implement better 
stock handling methods (Brown, 1981, p. 306).  The Department looked to contract out 
more commercial and industrial functions as well (Brown, 1980, p. 289).  Secretary 
Brown was placing more emphasis on reducing fraud and waste (Brown, 1979, p. 312).  
In addition, by FY 1982, foreign policy and arms control had become additional 
considerations for all new major weapon acquisitions (Brown, 1981, p. 299). 
5. Facilities and Energy 
Energy conservation continued to be very important.  The Secretary's four 
priorities for energy management were petroleum supply assurance, an energy research 
and development plan for mobility fuels, energy technology demonstration projects with 
the Department of Energy (DOE), and facilities energy conservation (Brown, 1979, p. 
315).  From 1973 to 1976, the DoD reduced energy consumption by thirty-two percent.  
The Department continued this conservation trend through numerous programs.  The 
Energy Conservation Investment Program, started in 1976, was expanded to include even 
more buildings.  The program involved the retrofit of existing buildings to be more 
efficient.  Alternative energy programs were emphasized as well (Brown, 1978, p. 358).  
One of the biggest savings came from the reduction in flight, steaming, and operating 
hours for the operating forces (Brown, 1978, p. 358). The Department also continued to 
reduce its base structure to save costs.  The Secretary created the Office of Economic 
Adjustment (OEA) to help communities that were affected by base and manpower 
realignments (Brown, 1980, p. 287). 
P. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
1. Background 
Caspar W. Weinberger served as the Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1981 
to November 23, 1987.  He enlisted in the U. S. Army in 1941 and worked his way up to 
captain in the pacific theater under General Douglas MacArthur.  Weinberger had a 
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military background and an appreciation for military life.  Following the war, Weinberger 
used his law degree and interest in politics to facilitate his election and appointment to 
several political positions in California.  He was appointed by Governor Reagan to 
numerous state positions in the 1960s before moving on to Washington, where he served 
as the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.  
Weinberger's last position before assuming office as the Secretary of Defense was as vice 
president and general counsel for the Bechtel Group 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
Caspar Weinberger led the rebuilding of the military under President Reagan.  He 
was known as a good administrator and cost cutter, but he also aggressively pushed the 
readiness, sustainability, and modernization of the Department and helped grow the 
budget significantly.  He created solid relationships with the Service leaders by giving 
them more authority, while simultaneously maintaining centralized policy formation and 
decentralized execution (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed 
October 2006). 
Just as his predecessor did, Weinberger had many international situations to 
address.  He had to deal with the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization fighting and Marine Corps involvement in Beirut in 
1982, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the conflicts with Libya from 1981 to 1986, and 
other issues in the Middle East involving Iran, Iraq, and others.  He also spent a great deal 
of time establishing and improving relationships with China and Japan 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).       
2. Organizational Management 
Upon assuming his position as Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger defined 
his business management initiatives with five broad purposes: provide the best strategic 
thinking in order to adapt to changing threats and use our capabilities to the fullest; 
reduce costs and improve resource efficiency; streamline PPBS to reduce paperwork and 
redundancy; improve acquisitions by reducing costs, time delays, and unneeded 
regulations while incentivizing industry to invest in more economical production 
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processes; and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-43).  The 
Secretary also placed great emphasis on centralized policy development but decentralized 
execution (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-46). 
The Secretary was not alone in his desire to change the management of the 
Department.  President Reagan had three major management initiatives that affected the 
Department.  In 1982 he established the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, also 
known as the Grace Commission, to review government management practices 
(Weinberger, 1984, p. 108).  In 1985 he established the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management to review the Department's management practices (Weinberger, 
1986, p. 116).  He also initiated "Reform '88”, a government-wide review of 
administrative practices (Weinberger, 1984, p. 108).  Congress was concerned with 
defense management issues as well, and in October 1985, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) published a report called Defense Organization: The Need for 
Change that recommended far reaching changes (Weinberger, 1986, p. 116).   
While the Department agreed with most of the Grace Commission 
recommendations, it disagreed with the projected three-year cost savings of $93 billion 
from implementing those changes (Weinberger, 1984, p. 108).  It believed that many of 
the assumptions were unrealistic, that double counting had occurred, and that many of the 
recommended changes would require a much longer timeline to implement (Weinberger, 
1984, p. 108).  Further, it believed that eighty percent of the recommendations could not 
be changed by the Department alone but required Congressional action to implement 
(Weinberger, 1984, p. 108).  The Department did implement many of the initiatives laid 
out in "Reform '88", mostly by improving internal controls, reducing fraud, improving 
the handling of revenues and disbursements and collection of debts, and looking for 
additional opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness (Weinberger, 1984, p. 
109). 
 Secretary Weinberger's response to the many management reform studies was the 
development of the Program for Management Improvement.  This program had five 
objectives: develop and implement a Management Improvement Plan (MIP); oversee 
management accomplishments through the DoD Council on Integrity and Management 
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Improvement (DCIMI); aggressively audit contracts; reduce fraud, waste, and abuse 
though greater use of the Inspector General (IG); and implement recommendations from 
external sources (Weinberger, 1987, p. 99).  The MIP had 27 initiatives focused in four 
areas: procurement reform, financial management, productivity improvement, and 
internal management controls (Weinberger, 1987, p. 100). 
One of the first priorities for change was the reorganization of the senior offices 
within the Department.  The Department began using the newly promoted Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) to work more closely with Congress 
(Weinberger, 1982, p. III-205).  The Department created the position of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) to ensure the DoD was in 
compliance with the national security strategy (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-205).  It also 
restored five Assistant Secretary positions that had been eliminated in previous 
administrations (Weinberger, 1982, p. 205).  During FY 1984, two additional Assistant 
Secretary of Defense positions were created, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (Weinberger, 1984, p. 107), and the 
Office of Test and Evaluation was created (Weinberger, 1984, p. 107).  To implement 
management innovations and improvements, the Directorate for Management 
Improvement was established (Weinberger, 1984, p. 107). 
Productivity and efficiency improvements continued to be implemented.  
Productivity improvements were made via the Efficiency Review Program, the issuance 
of the DoD Productivity Goals Statement, the use of Productivity Enhancing Capital 
Investment (PECI), emphasis on worker safety, and employee idea feedback 
(Weinberger, 1987, pp. 107-108).  The DoD began using the Efficiency Review Program 
to apply industrial engineering techniques to manpower management (Weinberger, 1986, 
p. 109).  It expanded investment in the PECI program to increase output, resulting in a 
$20 savings for each dollar invested (Weinberger, 1986, p. 109).  A cornerstone of the 
PECI program was investment in microcomputers, with a movement toward buying 
rather than leasing ADP equipment (Weinberger, 1986, p. 110).  The Department also 
encouraged "participatory management techniques" so that employees could creatively 
solve their own problems (Weinberger, 1986, p. 109).  As of 1986, four additional 
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productivity improvement programs had been started, including a suggestion program, a 
productivity excellence award program, a quality circles program, and a productivity gain 
sharing program (Weinberger, 1986, p. 109). 
The Department continued many productivity improvement programs initiated 
under previous administrations.  It continued to review, reduce, and improve its 
regulations throughout the Department (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-210).  It expanded 
improvements to health care (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-208), focusing on cost reduction 
through new data systems, eligibility screening, and more accurate manpower 
assessments (Weinberger, 1984, p. 109).  It emphasized cost reduction across the DoD by 
reducing travel, purchase, payroll, overhead, and consulting costs (Weinberger, 1982, p. 
I-45), and dramatically expanded the use of competitive contracting.  From FY 1980 to 
FY 1986, competitive contracts increased thirty-seven percent and in FY 1986 accounted 
for seventy-two percent of all contracts (Weinberger, 1986, p. 103). 
 The Department focused on reorganizing the DRB and streamlining the PPBS in 
order to more effectively translate policy into programs and budgets (Weinberger, 1982, 
p. I-44).  The DRB was enlarged to include the Service Secretaries and the input of the 
unified and specified commanders (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-47) and the PPBS was revised 
and streamlined to reduce the paperwork by half and make it less top-heavy (Weinberger, 
1982, p. I-46).  The Secretary's Performance Review was created to incorporate periodic 
reviews of major programs by senior leaders, while participatory management was 
encouraged and management responsibilities were clarified at all levels (Weinberger, 
1982, p. III-198). 
The Department created the Advanced Procurement Planning System for Security 
Assistance (APPSSA) to facilitate co-development of weapons with allies and manage 
foreign military sales (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-208).  It also created the Foreign Military 
Sales Financial Management Improvement Program (FFMIP) Office to manage the 
dramatic growth in foreign military sales (Weinberger, 1984, p. 108). 
Secretary Weinberger continued to address the fraud, waste, and abuse problems 
that had plagued the Department.  The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense 
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(Review and Oversight) was established to coordinate all efforts in this area (Weinberger, 
1982, p. I-47), and the Department established a fraud, waste, and abuse hotline that 
anyone could call to report illegal activity (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-47).  The greatest 
fraud, waste, and abuse cases were in health care and acquisitions (Weinberger, 1985, p. 
91), often the result of poor internal controls.  The DoD established the Defense Internal 
Management Control Program to identify and correct those internal management 
weaknesses before they cause further problems (Weinberger, 1985, p.94).  DCIMI was 
established (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-197), similar in structure to an executive committee 
in a private company (Weinberger, 1987, p. 99), and the Department encouraged more 
aggressive investigating and prosecuting of fraud cases by the DoD IG (Weinberger, 
1984, p. 106).  To address contractor misdeeds, the Department gave the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) more power and greater scope in its review of contracts 
(Weinberger, 1984, p. 106).   
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Many financial management initiatives carried over from the previous 
administration.  Of those, the consolidation of financial systems was the top priority 
(Weinberger, 1987, p. 105).  Consolidation served two purposes: it reduced costs by 
eliminating redundant offices and system across departments, and it was the critical first 
step in preparing financial reports for Congress (Weinberger, 1986, p. 110).  Under 
Weinberger, the DoD tried to get al.l of its 105 accounting systems approved by the 
Comptroller General (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-211).  Other financial management 
improvements included more aggressive credit management and debt collection 
operations (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-210). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
In 1981, shortly after assuming office, Secretary Weinberger ordered a complete 
review of the acquisition process (Weinberger, 1985, p. 82).  The review confirmed that 
the Department's acquisition process still had many areas that needed dramatic 
improvement and costs reduction.  Weinberger initiated the Defense Acquisitions 
Improvement Program (DAIP) as the roadmap to improving acquisitions (Weinberger, 
1985, p. 82).  The DAIP emphasized six areas: program stability, multi-year 
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procurement, economic production rates, realistic budgeting, improved readiness and 
integrated logistic support, and competition (Weinberger, 1985, pp. 83-87). 
A major goal of the Department's cost reduction plan was to evaluate the relative 
value of the acquisition programs currently under development and retain only the most 
beneficial and economical ones.  The Department began eliminating marginally useful 
programs and delaying others (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-45), eventually reducing the 
number of new programs from fifteen to three between FY 1983 and FY 1987 
(Weinberger, 1986, p. 106).  For the systems that were kept, the Department attempted to 
order in economic order quantities when possible, and buy systems that were generally 
lower cost (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-45).   
Weinberger stressed long-range planning to arrive at more realistic and accurate 
cost estimates (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-46).  One of main reasons the Department shifted 
its focus to long-range planning was to create program stability.  It found that year-to-
year changes in planned order quantities and budget al.locations dramatically affected 
program and unit costs.  The Department took several steps to implement stability:  it 
gave more power to the PM's (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-46), and it increased use of multi-
year contracts.  In FY 1985, the Department estimated cost savings from using multi-year 
contracts to be $4.4 billion (Weinberger, 1984, p. 101).  More accurate cost estimation 
was critical as well, and was implemented in two ways: internally, the Department placed 
greater reliance on independent cost estimates (Weinberger, 1985, p. 86), and externally, 
fixed-price contracts became the standard in an effort to reduce the occurrence of low-
ball bids by contractors (Weinberger, 1985, p. 86) who would try to profit later through 
change proposals.       
The Department recognized the competition was critical to reducing costs and 
improving quality (Weinberger, 1985, p. 87), so it actively encouraged more contractors 
to bid for jobs and be innovative in their operations (Weinberger, 1982, p. I-46). It 
continued to focus on using minimal specifications and standards essential to meet 
program objectives (Weinberger, 1985, p. 83).  To spread the benefits among more 
contractors, the DoD increased the use of dual sourcing for major weapon systems 
(Weinberger, 1986, p. 104). 
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The Department made several changes at the senior levels to further implement 
reform.  The Department established the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions) and 
created a Senior Acquisition Executive in each service to be responsible for all 
acquisitions programs (Weinberger, 1987, p. 114).  To prevent redundant development of 
similar systems by separate services, the DoD started using the Joint Requirements and 
Management Board (JRMB) to discover and implement opportunities for joint system 
development (Weinberger, 1986, p. 107).  The Department also began requesting that 
Congress revise the statutory thresholds and increased funding flexibility in the 
acquisitions process (Weinberger, 1984, p. 101).  These requests were partially answered 
in FY 1986, when Congress doubled the dollar threshold that defined major weapon 
systems, allowing senior leaders to focus on the most important programs (Weinberger, 
1985, p. 83).  To further streamline the development process, the Department reduced the 
number of milestone decision reviews to two (Weinberger, 1985, p. 83). 
Improved spare parts management continued to be a priority under Secretary 
Weinberger.  The Department created the Spares Management Improvement Program to 
increase spares competition, use the DoD's purchasing power as customer leverage, and 
improve price control (Weinberger, 1986, p. 107).  To head up all aspects of spares 
management, the Department created the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Spares Program Management) (Weinberger, 1986, p. 107).  The Department 
established a program to end spare parts price abuse by contractors (Weinberger, 1984, p. 
104) and began using competitive sourcing to foster price competition (Weinberger, 
1985, p. 89).  It also required mandatory use of the existing Spare Parts Program to 
standardize the parts used in the design of new equipment (Weinberger, 1984, p. 105).  
The Department purchased parts control software and began training parts procurers in 
both the use of the software and in sound buying practices (Weinberger, 1984, p. 105).    
Additional improvements in logistics management included improved inventory 
record accuracy, greater use of the Defense Reutilization and Marketing System, logistics 
application of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS), adoption of 
automated memory cards, and increased use of commercial transportation (Weinberger, 
1986, p. 111).  Personal property shipping offices were combined to improve efficiency 
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and reduce cost (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-209).  The DoD created the Aeronautical Depot 
Maintenance Task Force to oversee depot maintenance, and centralized the management 
of 200,000 items under the Defense Logistics Agency (Weinberger, 1982, p. III-209). 
5. Facilities and Energy 
The Department of Defense created an experimental Model Installations Program 
to encourage base commanders to try new cost-saving measures and allow them to keep 
the savings for use elsewhere on their bases (Weinberger, 1986, p. 112).  Part of those 
savings came from the expanded energy conservation program (Weinberger, 1986, p. 
111).  Another source of substantial savings came from the continued outsourcing of base 
functions via contract competitions (Weinberger, 1986, p. 112). 
Q. FRANK C. CARLUCCI 
1. Background 
Frank C. Carlucci served as the Secretary of Defense from November 23, 1987 to 
January 20, 1989.  He started his career in the Navy, then worked for twelve years at the 
State Department with assignments all around the world.  After he left the State 
Department in 1969, he held leadership positions in several government agencies, 
including the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Management and Budget, 
and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  At the latter two positions he 
worked directly for Caspar Weinberger.  Carlucci also served as the deputy director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency before assuming the post of Deputy Secretary of Defense 
under Weinberger.  Carlucci entered the private sector for four years as the chairman and 
chief executive officer of Sears World Trade, but ultimately ended up back in politics, 
first as an advisor to the President, then as Secretary of Defense 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
While his tenure as Secretary was short, Carlucci did attempt to make significant 
management reforms, especially in the areas of budgeting, procurement, weapons 
systems, and down-sizing.  On assuming office, he was forced to prioritize Department 
funding and slash expenditures anywhere he could.  The administration and Congress 
proposed dramatic budget cuts in defense for the FY 1989 budget, nearly $33 billion less 
than Reagan's original request.  He recommended personnel reductions, the elimination 
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of lesser acquisition programs, the early retirement of numerous weapons platforms, and 
a down-sizing of the base and support structure.  Carlucci also attempted to implement 
dramatic changes to acquisitions in response to the "Ill Wind" procurement fraud.  In 
addition, he significantly improved relations between the Pentagon and Congress, 
relations that had been strained under Weinberger's administration 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
Significant global events affected the time Carlucci could dedicate to management 
reform.  Carlucci continued talks with both Japan and China.  He emphasized the 
strengthening of NATO and allied nations.  He tried to reestablish open shipping lanes in 
the Middle East, resulting in several clashes with Iran.  He and President Reagan 
established more open communications with the Soviet Union, but still pushed for more 
work on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a precaution.  The Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 had been signed, and Carlucci had to fend off the 
State Department's push for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that might 
impair the development of SDI (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, 
Accessed October 2006).  Of note, during Secretary of Defense Carlucci’s time in office 
the term Continuous Improvement first appeared and the term Streamlining continued to 
be used regularly. 
2. Organizational Management 
Secretary Carlucci believed that the Department of Defense management process 
had two objectives: create an environment that would encourage managers to manage 
creatively, and establish sufficient rules and control mechanisms to identify poor 
management (Carlucci, 1989, p. 91).  To attain those objectives and implement 
management improvements, he continued to use the DCIMI and MIP tools created in 
earlier administrations (Carlucci, 1988, p. 133).  Carlucci used the MIP to establish 
priorities and ensure accountability and progress, while he used the DCIMI to coordinate 
and integrate the plan (Carlucci, 1988, p. 133).  Carlucci's MIP had seven goals: simplify 
and improve the acquisition process; link mobilization and surge capabilities of the U.S. 
industrial base with the nation's warfighting requirements; strengthen financial 
management direction, coordination, and oversight; strengthen health program 
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management; improve force manpower and personnel programs; improve productivity; 
and improve the mechanisms for efficient and effective program management (Carlucci, 
1988, p. 134).   
The internal management control programs and fraud prevention activities 
initiated under the previous administration carried over and were expanded (Carlucci, 
1989, p. 97).  The DCAA developed a Contractor Risk Assessment Guide (CRAG) to 
improve contractor internal controls and encourage self-governance (Carlucci, 1989, p. 
98).  The IG created the Voluntary Disclosure Program where contractors could report 
suspected internal criminal wrongdoing and other problems before the government 
discovered them (Carlucci, 1989, p. 99) and Executive Order 11222 was issued, stating 
what was and was not ethical behavior (Carlucci, 1989, p. 97).  To reinforce this, the 
DoD created the Standards of Conduct Program (Carlucci, 1989, p. 97).  Finally, all 
employees with decision making responsibility were required to disclose financial 
interests in order to identify and prevent and possible conflicts of interest (Carlucci, 1989, 
p. 97).     
To improve productivity, the Department implemented several new ideas.  It set a 
target of three percent annual productivity improvement (Carlucci, 1988, p. 145).  It 
began implementing productivity and quality (P&Q) teams, cross-functional teams at all 
levels that could quickly solve productivity and quality improvement issues (Carlucci, 
1988, p. 145).  The Department adopted a "total quality management approach" (TQM) 
while continuing the use of the Efficiency Review process and PECI (Carlucci, 1988, p. 
146).  It also provided financial incentives for workers who saved the Department money 
(Carlucci, 1988, p. 146). 
As computer use was becoming more widespread, additional policies were 
needed.  The Department created the Department of Defense Automated Information 
System (AIS) Strategic Planning Policy that required DoD components to develop annual 
strategic AIS plans, and to use those plans as the basis for annual budget requests 
(Carlucci, 1988, p. 144).  It also attempted to limit the number of programming languages 
and promoted the use of the Ada programming language (Carlucci, 1988, p. 144).   
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The financial management reforms from the previous administration were carried 
over.  These include consolidation of finance and accounting systems, improved cash 
management, more aggressive debt collection, tighter internal management controls, and 
expanded auditing by the DCAA and IG (Carlucci, 1988, pp. 139-143).  
3. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Many of the initiatives begun under previous administrations were adopted by 
Carlucci's administration.  The Department continued to implement changes required 
under the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization and Acquisition Improvement Acts of 
1986.  The Department minimized unnecessary requirements, increased contractor 
flexibility as to how they executed contracts, and minimized government involvement in 
contractors' internal processes (Carlucci, 1988, p. 135).  It continued moving to non-
governmental standards, while procuring non-developmental items (NDI) and "off-the-
shelf" products to reduce costs (Carlucci, 1988, p. 135).  It also emphasized the 
modernization of contractor facilities and the support of key materials and production 
capabilities within the industrial base (Carlucci, 1989, pp. 121-122). 
Program stability initiatives started under Weinberger continued, with particular 
emphasis on multi-year procurement, baselining (the creation of specific objectives, 
deviations from which trigger management review), and milestone authorization that 
granted full funding for an entire phase of development (Carlucci, 1988, p. 137).  
Emphasis on joint program management and competition reform carried over as well.  As 
of 1988, 150 joint programs were in development and being screened by the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (Carlucci, 1988, p. 137). 
While many acquisition programs were already in place, Carlucci did effect 
several changes in acquisition reform.  The Department began streamlining flag-level 
advocates in each Department, while requiring key people to attend streamlining training 
courses (Carlucci, 1988, p. 135).  The concept of "value engineering" first appeared 
during Carlucci's administration.  This idea was to analyze the function of systems, 
equipment, facilities, services, and supplies to achieve essential functions at the lowest 
life-cycle cost consistent with required performance, reliability, quality, and safety 
(Carlucci, 1988, p. 135).  Total quality management (TQM) was adopted as well.  In the 
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DoD application, this concept had five key pillars: prevent rather than correct defects, 
focus on improving the process more than the output, continuously improve, foster 
teamwork within DoD and between DoD and industry, and apply TQM to all personnel at 
all levels (Carlucci, 1989, p. 120).  The spare parts reforms, known as the Spares 
Management Improvement Program, initiated under the previous administration in 1983, 
were carried over and expanded (Carlucci, 1988, p. 139). 
4. Facilities and Energy 
Under Carlucci, the Department planned to dramatically expand military 
construction (Carlucci, 1988, p. 177).  It needed to repair the facilities that had been 
neglected during the 1970s, build new facilities to support new weapon systems, and 
greatly expand family housing to accommodate the all-volunteer force (Carlucci, 1988, p. 
177).   
In May of 1988, the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was 
created to develop the process and evaluation criteria for identifying and eliminating 
unneeded bases (Carlucci, 1989, p. 115).  As part of the BRAC process, the Department 
was required to consider four key issues: environmental impact of base cleanup and 
closures, reuse or disposal of the properties, impact on the surrounding communities, and 
possible alternate use of excess facilities by other federal and state agencies (Carlucci, 
1989, pp. 115-116).   
R. RICHARD B. CHENEY 
1. Background 
Richard B. Cheney served as the Secretary of Defense from March 21, 1989 to 
January 20, 1993.  A career politician, Cheney moved up through the political ranks of 
both the executive and legislative branches.  Early in his career he worked in the Office 
of Economic Opportunity, on the White House staff, and as White House Chief of Staff.  
He then served six terms as a Republican in the House of Representatives before 
becoming the Secretary of Defense under President George H. W. Bush 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
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Richard Cheney left the daily management of the Department to his Deputy, 
while he focused most of his efforts on external matters.  His political background served 
him well in maintaining close and positive relations with the President, other executive 
departments, and Congress.  He had severe budget cut issues, just as Carlucci had, and 
maintained two overriding priorities when making budget decisions; protect manpower 
programs such as pay, training, housing allowance, and health care; and favor proven 
equipment over unproven technologies.  When force cuts were required, he preferred to 
cut conventional forces over strategic ones 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).     
International events occupied much of Cheney's time, most notably the end of the 
Cold War.  One of his biggest concerns was the control of nuclear weapons once held by 
the former Soviet Union.  He had to address the coup in the Philippines and orchestrated 
the ousting and arrest of General Noriega in Panama for drug trafficking.  He withheld 
the use of ground troops in the Bosnian civil war, while he dispatched thousands of 
troops to Somalia to deal with that civil strife.  Cheney's largest military involvement 
came in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the U. S. responded with Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, 
Accessed October 2006).  It was during this time that the term Employee Empowerment 
first appeared. 
2. Organizational Management 
The 1989 Defense Management Report to the President laid out the plan to 
implement the findings of the Packard Commission (Cheney, 1990, p. 14).  Specifically, 
it identified the following areas for improvement: forging better links among national 
policy, military strategy, force structure, resources, and programs; enhancing 
programmatic and technical input during resource allocation discussions; reducing 
significantly the number of programs that overrun their budgets, are late, or are 
technically deficient; reducing overhead costs while maintaining military strength; 
establishing and enforcing high ethical standards of conduct in DoD and the defense 
industry; reducing micromanagement and simplifying the laws and regulations governing 
DoD; reversing the decline in the industrial base; and improving relations among 
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Congress, the DoD, and the defense industry (Cheney, 1990, pp. 15-17).  Cheney 
concurred with many of those recommendations and either carried over existing 
initiatives or created new ones to implement those findings. 
During Cheney's administration, centralized policy planning and decentralized 
execution became even more popular and expanded across the entire Department 
(Cheney, 1992, p. 31).  The Defense Planning and Resource Board was reorganized to 
concentrate on effective planning; specifically, to create closer ties among national 
policy, military strategy, force structure, resources, and programs (Cheney, 1990, p. 14).  
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and Under Secretary of Defense 
(Planning) were given more power and became more involved in the PPBS (Cheney, 
1990, p. 15).  In all planning decisions, efficient use of resources was emphasized 
(Cheney, 1990, p. 14). 
The Department continued to emphasize reducing overhead costs, improving 
quality, and streamlining operations.  One measure it implemented was the consolidation 
of the Contract Administration Service organizations (Cheney, 1990, p. 16).  Another was 
the competitive sourcing of even more positions, facilitated by the Defense Management 
Improvement Act, the result of requests by the DoD for legislative changes (Cheney, 
1991, p. 34).  As an extension of the Standards of Conduct program that Carlucci started, 
the Department created the Ethics Council to develop ethics programs (Cheney, 1990, p. 
16). 
The Department continued the effort to standardize and automate management 
information systems, giving it the new title of Corporate Information Management (CIM) 
(Cheney, 1990, p. 16).  The purpose of CIM was to reduce non-value added work and 
costs while improving business processes (Cheney, 1993, p. 31).  CIM simplified 
processes, used economic analysis and benchmarking, used common systems, 
infrastructure, data definitions, and standards, and it centralized security control (Cheney, 
1993, p. 32).  The Department established the Center for Information Management within 
the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to centralize information management 
policy making, and appointed a Director of Defense Information to lead the effort 
(Cheney, 1992, p. 32).  To ensure compatibility and expandability for its information 
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systems, the Department emphasized open systems architecture (Cheney, 1992, p. 33).  
The backbone of this concept was the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), 
established in 1992, which was to provide end-to-end information support (Cheney, 1993, 
p. 32).  DISA initiated several programs as well: the DoD Data Administration Program, 
technical integration management, the DoD open systems architecture, the DoD Software 
Reuse Program, and the Defense Information Technology Service Organization (DITSO) 
(Cheney, 1993, pp. 32-33). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Secretary Cheney's most significant financial management initiative was the 
creation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) in 1991 (Cheney, 1992, 
p. 32).  While previous administrations had attempted to consolidate financial systems 
with limited success, DFAS was the broadest and most successful product of the 
consolidation effort.  Following its introductions, DFAS expanded the types of financial 
operations it conducted while consolidating more functions from all Defense Department 
organizations (p. 32).  As part of the consolidation effort, DFAS tried moving to a single 
system for payroll, travel payments, transportation, debt management, and Defense 
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) accounting (Cheney, 1993, p. 34).  It also began a 
program to streamline all financial management regulations into a single set of fifteen 
volumes, reducing the number of pages by seventy-two percent (Cheney, 1993, p. 33).  
An additional effort was to create a standard travel system (Cheney, 1992, p. 32).   
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Just as in previous administrations, the dual goals of acquisitions reform under 
Cheney were efficiency and effectiveness (Cheney, 1991, p. 29).  Changes were made at 
all levels, starting with the responsibilities of senior leaders.  The JROC was given a 
larger role prior to the DAB, and the DAB began reviewing all programs to ensure they 
were mature enough to advance to the next phase (Cheney, 1990, p. 15).  The DoD 
continued to give program managers more authority and longer tenures (Cheney, 1990, p. 
15).  Their chains of command were shortened as well, with the PM now reporting the 
Program Executive Officer (PEO), who reported to the Service Acquisition Executive  
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(SAE), who reported to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions) (Cheney, 1991, p. 
29).  Additionally, the acquisitions field within the military was turned into a full-time 
career field (Cheney, 1990, p. 15). 
The Department attempted to limit reporting requirements for acquisitions 
programs by revising or cancelling 400 of the 500 acquisitions-related directives and 
instructions (Cheney, 1991, p. 30).  It began the use of "zero-based review" of acquisition 
programs (Cheney, 1991, p. 30) and it continued emphasis on reducing the use of 
government standards and specifications (Cheney, 1991, p. 30).  It completed a full 
rewrite of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), reducing it 
in size by fifty-two percent (Cheney, 1993, p. 38). 
To further reduce cost overruns, prototyping and extensive testing of new systems 
was expanded (Cheney, 1990, p. 16) and risk reduction was given greater importance 
(Cheney, 1993, p. 37).  The Department developed an official Science and Technology 
(S&T) strategy and created the Defense Technology Board to ensure S&T programs 
supported strategy (Cheney, 1993, p. 38).  Testing and Evaluation (T&E) was centralized, 
and each service was assigned a lead role for specific T&E areas (Cheney, 1993, p. 38).  
The Department placed greater emphasis on technological superiority through increased 
research and development (Cheney, 1993, p. 37).  However, to pass beyond the S&T 
phase, a program had to answer three questions: do we need it, does it work, and can we 
afford it (Cheney, 1993, p. 37).  It is interesting to note that even with a greater emphasis 
on S&T, the Department planned to retain equipment for longer periods (Cheney, 1993, 
p. 36) and use non-developmental items whenever possible (Cheney, 1993, pp. 39-40).  
Streamlining contract management was another important initiative for the 
administration (Cheney, 1992, p. 28).  The Department consolidated the Contract 
Administration Services (CAS) under the newly created Defense Contact Management 
Command (DCMC) within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (Cheney, 1991, p. 31).  
Within DCMC, emphasis was placed on employee empowerment, continuous 
improvement, and fulfilling customer requirements (Cheney, 1993, p. 35). 
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Program stability measures implemented in previous administrations were 
retained (Cheney, 1990, p. 15), while additional emphasis was given to arresting the 
decline in the industrial base.  The DoD expanded the use of multi-year contracts, but 
severely limited the use of cost-sharing contracts for system development and the use of 
fixed-price contracts for high-risk development efforts (Cheney, 1990, p. 17).  
Additionally, it began limiting late design changes and using broad performance 
specifications (Cheney, 1990, p. 17).  The Department continued the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program and CRAG, and began weighing more favorably contractors with 
good self-governance records (Cheney, 1990, p. 17).  CRAG participation expanded 
significantly, reducing government audit time by 20,000 and 40,000 hours in 1989 and 
1990, respectively (Cheney, 1991, p. 34).  By 1990, $117 million had been recovered 
under the Voluntary Disclosure Program (Cheney, 1991, p. 34). 
To improve the efficiency and quality of the workforce, the Department created 
the Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Policy (Cheney, 1991, p. 
31).  It began implementing private sector lessons learned such as reducing unneeded 
management layers, consolidating related functions, and concentrating on core functions 
(Cheney, 1991, p. 31).  The Defense Acquisitions Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) was passed in 1991 and the Department began formulating its implementation 
policies (Cheney, 1992, p. 30).  Additionally, the Defense Acquisitions University (DAU) 
was created from the numerous educational and defense institutions that had to that point 
provided acquisition education (Cheney, 1992, p. 31).   
Under Cheney's administration, the Department adopted a three-pronged approach 
to improving logistics: improved logistics management and organization, use of ADP to 
manage logistics, and use of the Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) to manage material 
(Cheney, 1992, p. 33).  Estimated savings from logistics reform was $20 billion (Cheney, 
1992, p. 33). 
Organization of support functions changed significantly under Cheney.  The 
Department established the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) to allow 
managers to formulate a cost per unit of output and make investment decisions based 
upon that information (Cheney, 1992, p. 35).  The structure identified each business area, 
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the products or services produced, and the total cost of operations (Cheney, 1992, p. 35).  
This structure, focused mainly on supply management, distribution, and depot 
maintenance, emphasized the actual cost of providing the service, thereby creating 
incentive to reduce costs and order parts wisely (Cheney, 1993, pp. 30-31). 
More efficient management of the depots was one change under the DBOF 
structure.  The Department established the Defense Depot Maintenance Council to 
manage the realignment and streamlining of the depot maintenance operations and 
facilities (Cheney, 1991, p. 32), with the objective of increasing utilization of and 
competition among existing facilities and contractors (Cheney, 1992, p. 34).  It 
consolidated all general supply depot material distribution functions in CONUS under a 
single manager, with additional departments being considered (Cheney, 1991, p. 32).   
To better manage parts, the DoD continued to transfer almost all consumables to 
DLA (Cheney, 1991, p. 32).  Inventory Control Points (ICPs) were consolidated to 
provide supply support at the right place and time (Cheney, 1992, p. 35) and during this 
time, the concept of Total Asset Visibility (TAV) was being adopted in the supply chain 
(Cheney, 1992, p. 33). 
The Department introduced several initiatives in hopes of reducing transportation 
costs.  These initiatives included: the Guaranteed Traffic Program, the establishment of 
regional freight consolidation centers, the modification of issue priority group policies so 
that the Department would send non-critical materials by cheaper ground transportation 
rather than air, the expansion of direct shipments from vendors to users, and the conduct 
of prepayment audits of transportation bills (Cheney, 1992, p. 35).  The DoD continued 
the consolidation of all Service commissaries under the Defense Commissary Agency 
(DeCA) (Cheney, 1992, p. 33).  DeCA began adopting commercial practices such as 
centralized buying, just-in-time inventory, regional sales planning, and electronic 





5. Facilities and Energy 
Facilities management continued to be important under Secretary Cheney.  The 
Department consolidated base engineering services under Public Works Centers (PWC) 
in order to reduce maintenance costs, create installation master plans, and conduct 
economic analysis on all large projects (Cheney, 1993, p. 43).   
S. LES ASPIN 
1. Background 
Les Aspin served as the Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1993 to February 
3, 1994.  Prior to his life in politics, Aspin had been a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and held 
a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  After a short tour 
as an army officer under Robert McNamara, he finally entered into politics.  Aspin spent 
over twenty years in the House of Representatives and developed a strong interest in and 
knowledge of defense issues, serving many years on the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) before becoming its chairman in 1985 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
Les Aspin believed that the US needed a smaller military capable of operating in a 
changing security environment.  He believed in creating a smaller military that was more 
sensitive to service members' issues, creating more opportunities for women as well as 
establishing the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for sexual orientation.  While he wanted to 
shrink the Navy and the overall force structure, he understood the value and necessity of 
maintaining the industrial base and "a strong peacetime presence of U.S. forces around 
the world", capable of fighting two simultaneous regional conflicts if necessary.  To 
achieve this Aspin ordered a bottom up review of the entire Department.  He also 
intended to cut the defense budget and the SDI program significantly, although not as 
much as President Clinton would have liked 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
While Les Aspin had fewer international events to deal with during his time in 
office, the events that he did oversee were significant.  He attempted to address political 
unrest in Haiti.  The North Korean's continued their pursuit of nuclear weapons, causing 
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problems in the withdrawal of troops from the Korean peninsula.  Iraq and Bosnia 
continued to be problems for the administration, although they did not require a 
commitment of American ground forces.  The biggest international problem for Aspin 
was the loss of eighteen soldiers and injury of seventy-five more in Mogadishu, Somalia 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).  It was 
during Secretary Aspin’s tenure that the terms reengineering, best practices, world class, 
lean production, excellence, and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) first appear in a 
Secretary of Defense Annual report. 
2. Organizational Management 
The DoD created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic 
Security) (Aspin, 1994, p. 91) to manage economic issues that impacted the DoD.  It 
began using Process Action Teams (PAT), groups that were both cross-functional and 
cross-service, to address various management issues (Aspin, 1994, p. 108).  One of the 
earliest applications of these teams was in the electronic commerce field, as two PATs 
were formed to deal with implementation of numerous Electronic Commerce/Electronic 
Data Interchange (EC/EDI) programs (Aspin, 1994, p. 110).  Separately, the Department 
created the Armaments Cooperation Steering Committee to encourage joint weapons 
development, interoperability, and economic security (Aspin, 1994, p. 96). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
According to Secretary Aspin, the Department's financial management was in 
disrepair because there was a legacy of vertically oriented disparate organizations, 
emphasis had been placed on combat over support, physical rather than financial controls 
predominated, and there was a general complacency in the Department over financial 
management issues (Aspin, 1994, p. 98).  To address those problems, the Department 
implemented a six-element blueprint for financial management reform: strict compliance 
with current requirements; reengineering of business practices; standardization of 
definitions, concepts, and practices; design of modern finance and accounting systems; 
alignment of financial controls with management incentives; and practicing candor and 
engendering confidence (Aspin, 1994, p. 99). 
 79
To implement the blueprint, the Department used several tools.  It generated a 
DBOF Improvement Plan to improve DBOF (Aspin, 1994, p. 100).  It created the Senior 
Financial Management Oversight Council which provided the framework for 
reengineering and enforced accountability (Aspin, 1994, p. 101).  It continued to 
consolidate and streamline financial management functions under DFAS using 
benchmarks from the civilian sector, while focusing on improved customer service 
(Aspin, 1994, p. 101).  It created and submitted to OMB a Chief Financial Officer Master 
Plan to comply with the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act of 1990 (Aspin, 1994, p. 
102) which had challenged the Department to integrate its financial management systems 
and produce auditable financial statements (Aspin, 1994, p. 102).  Finally, the 
Department created the Defense Business Management University (DBMU) to train the 
finance and accounting workforce (Aspin, 1994, p. 102).  
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Under Secretary Aspin, the Department focused on adopting "best practices of 
world-class customers" (Aspin, 1994, p. 102).  One of those best practices was the 
concept of reengineering, in this case reengineering acquisitions.  The reengineering of 
the acquisitions process focused on improving requirements determination and resource 
allocation, the actual acquisitions process, and contract terms and conditions (Aspin, 
1994, p. 105).  Requirements were to be stated in terms of performance desired (Aspin, 
1994, p. 106), and evolutionary development and strict technology screening would be 
used to acquire the latest technology (Aspin, 1994, p. 106).  Contractors would be 
brought in earlier in the process and they would use lean production to build the systems 
(Aspin, 1994, p. 106).  The entire acquisitions process was to become simplified, more 
agile, and continuously improved (Aspin, 1994, p. 106).   
One of Aspin's guiding documents in his acquisition reengineering effort was the 
National Performance Review (NPR).  It provided the DoD with the following 
guidelines: move from rigid rules to guiding principles; remove bureaucracy; give line 
managers more authority and accountability; expand competitive sourcing; and foster 
competition, commercial practices, and excellence of vendor performance (Aspin, 1994, 
p. 106).  The DoD established the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group to lead the 
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change effort (Aspin, 1994, p. 108).  In conjunction with that, the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition Reform) began conducting town hall meetings at various field 
organizations to get feedback and hear issues concerning acquisition reform (Aspin, 
1994, p. 108).  Once problems or ideas were identified, the Department created PATs to 
analyze and improve those various processes (Aspin, 1994, p. 109).   
The Department placed great emphasis on development of dual-use technologies 
(Aspin, 1994, p. 91).  It believed that dual-use provided numerous benefits, to include the 
use of superior commercial technologies, cost reduction, a shortened acquisition cycle, 
and an expanded industrial base (Aspin, 1994, pp. 92-93).  The DoD created the 
Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) and Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program to encourage small businesses to develop dual-use technologies (Aspin, 
1994, p. 91).  It also limited the patent and technical data that it acquired from 
contractors, assuring the contractors that the Department would not take that data and 
turn it over to a competitor for actual production (Aspin, 1994, p. 92). 
The Department took additional measures to reengineer acquisitions.  It sought to 
create less rigid regulations while increasing judgment and risk-taking among decision 
makers (Aspin, 1994, p. 105).  It continued to weigh past contractor performance more 
heavily in contractor selections (Aspin, 1994, p. 107) and it also began moving from a 
cost-based system to a price-based system in structuring contract terms (Aspin, 1994, p. 
107).  The Department recognized that with the end of the cold war the defense industrial 
base was too large and took the position that it would allow market forces to reshape the 
industry except in special circumstances (Aspin, 1994, p. 93). 
The Department emphasized three efforts for both facilities and logistics: 
consolidation, privatization, and better business practices (Aspin, 1994, p. 123).  Depot 
maintenance facilities continued to be consolidated and many operations were 
competitively sourced (Aspin, 1994, p. 127).  Logistics operations were consolidated, and 
new logistics concepts such as In-Transit Visibility (ITV) were introduced.  It used 




applied best commercial practices, especially technological advances such as the 
Logistics Corporate Information Management (CIM) program, across logistics operations 
(Aspin, 1994, pp. 125-129). 
5. Facilities and Energy 
Reduction of installations continued under Aspin.  In 1993, the President 
announced an initiative to speed the transition of BRAC bases and assist the local 
communities affected by those closures (Aspin, 1994, p. 94).  The Department expanded 
the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to provide that assistance (Aspin, 1994, p. 
95). 
To improve installation management, Aspin pushed for base commanders to have 
more authority in the operation of their facilities (Aspin, 1994, p. 130) and he allowed the 
Department to give incentives to installations that operated more efficiently (Aspin, 1994, 
p. 130).  As part of this, base commanders were required to create long-term base master 
plans with input from subordinates (Aspin, 1994, p. 130).   
Energy management became an important issue under Aspin (Aspin, 1994, p. 
133).  To comply with the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 and President Clinton's 
Energy 2005 initiative, the DoD set several targets for energy use reductions (Aspin, 
1994, p. 133) and it also allowed the Services to retain two-thirds of their energy cost 
savings, half of which could be used at the discretion of base commanders (Aspin, 1994, 
p. 133).    
T. WILLIAM J. PERRY 
1. Background 
William J. Perry served as the Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1994 to 
January 23, 1997.  Perry had a strong background in science and technology, serving as 
the director of the Electronic Defense Laboratories of Sylvania and GTE, as well as 
helping found an electronics company, ESL, Inc.  He was the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering for four years before going back to the private sector to 
work in investment banking and academia.  Perry was the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
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under Les Aspin before assuming the post in 1994 following Aspin's resignation 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
Secretary Perry was actively involved in the internal operation of the department 
as well as external and international issues.  He worked closely with the Service 
Secretaries on internal issues while maintaining a good rapport with Congress and the 
defense industry.  His defense policy rested on the premise of a "preventive defense", the 
three core tenets of which included keeping threats from emerging, deterring those threats 
that already surfaced, and using military force when the first two fail.  Perry continued 
the downsizing of the military, mostly in manpower and facilities, but increased emphasis 
on modernization and dramatic acquisitions reform that would ensure a ready force and 
an economically stable industrial base 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).   
Internal restructuring and acquisition reform highlighted Perry's administration, 
but international issues also commanded his attention.  He involved himself extensively 
with foreign policy and pushed for stronger support of NATO, other nations in the 
Americas, and the newly democratized former communist countries, especially Russia.  
He orchestrated the reduction of forces in Japan following several crimes committed by 
U. S. service members and he committed air and ground forces to continue the 
peacekeeping actions in Bosnia, while still dealing with continued aggression by both 
Iraq and Iran.  The terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at the Khobar Towers in 
Saudi Arabia demanded a review of force protection procedures, reiterating the view that 
terrorists would now become a major threat in place of the former Soviet Union 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).  
2. Organizational Management 
Globalization was a key business management consideration under Secretary 
Perry.  With falling budgets and the loss of the Soviet Union as a competing superpower, 
the Department recognized that it was a smaller customer than in the past and its needs 
were changing (Perry, 1995, p. 93).  The Department also acknowledged that with the 
globalization of companies, it too would have to rely more on international suppliers 
(Perry, 1995, p. 93).  With the spread of networked computers and the internet, computer 
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security and fraud detection became an increasing concern for the Department (Perry, 
1996, p. 108).  The Department continued many business management initiatives from 
previous administrations.  The Department actively addressed fraud, waste, and abuse 
prevention and reporting (Perry, 1995, p. 126), while privatization and outsourcing of 
various functions continued to be emphasized (Perry, 1996, p. 75). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Consolidation of financial management functions under DFAS continued.  One of 
the benefits of the Chief Financial Officers Act was that it forced the Department to focus 
on financial management issues and define the metrics by which progress could be 
measured (Perry, 1995, p. 127).  In 1994, the Department believed it could reduce pay 
systems from eighteen to two or three by 1996 (Perry, 1995, p. 123).  The DoD continued 
the effort to standardize data, definitions, and concepts for its finance and accounting 
systems (Perry, 1995, p. 127).  It also tried to adopt a standard general ledger and a 
standard budget and accounting classification architecture (Perry, 1995, p. 127). 
The Department expanded the use of pre-validation for disbursements in order to 
prevent unmatched disbursements (Perry, 1995, p. 123).  As part of the reengineering 
effort, DFAS expanded the use of EDI for most payments to and dealings with 
contractors (Perry, 1995, p. 124).  DCAA and DCMC began working together to help 
contractors build solid internal controls, thus allowing less oversight (Perry, 1995, p. 
129). 
Successful programs from previous administrations expanded under Perry.  
Government credit and travel cards use continued to grow (Perry, 1995, p. 125) and the 
multitude of financial management regulations were consolidated (Perry, 1995, p. 128).  
To reengineer the travel effort, the Department created the Task Force to Reengineer 
Travel (Perry, 1995, p. 129).  In response to the National Performance Review, the 
Department granted managers at lower levels the authority to solve financial management 
problems on their own (Perry, 1995, p. 129).  In response to the Federal Managers' 
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), the DoD created the Annual Statement of 
Assurance that identified internal control issues and what was being done to address them 
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(Perry, 1995, p. 128).  To create lasting change, the Department began using the 
management techniques of consensus building and collaboration (Perry, 1996, p. 109).   
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
Under Secretary Perry, the Defense Acquisition Reform vision was "That DoD 
will become the world's Smartest (use of best practices), Most Responsive Buyer (timely 
and flexible) of Best Value Goods and Services that meet our Warfighters' needs" (Perry, 
1996, p. 111).  In working toward this vision, Secretary Perry issued a paper titled 
Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change in February of 1994 (Perry, 1995, p. 101).  
In it, he established several reform goals: enhance the needs (requirements) determination 
process by integrating them in the PPBS and reducing DoD-unique products and 
processes; improve the systems acquisition process through commercial practices and 
better information collection in support of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
decisions; improve the procurement process by maximizing the use of technology and 
reducing non-value adding activities; improve contract administration through less 
intrusive process control monitoring; improve contract terms and conditions in legal, 
pricing, and financial areas; change the culture by improving the workforce; and define 
measures of success through metrics (Perry, 1995, pp. 102-106).  Additionally, the DoD 
focused on improving the following areas: achievement of acquisition reform, increased 
emphasis on dual-use and commercial technologies, encouraging rationalization of the 
defense industry, recognizing commercial imperatives, and improving communication 
with the business community (Perry, 1995, p. 94).  Part of the DoD's strategy was to 
insert commercial technology into defense systems, integrate defense and commercial 
production, and increase R&D of dual-use technologies (Perry, 1995, p. 94).  Two 
examples include the Flat Panel Display Initiative and the National Shipbuilding 
Initiative (Perry, 1995, p. 94). 
The position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) was 
created to head up the reform effort (Perry, 1995, p. 97).  To advise him, the Acquisition 
Reform Senior Steering Group (ARSSG) was created (Perry, 1995, p. 101).  The DoD 
established the Acquisition Reform Communications Center (ARCC) under the DAU to 
prepare and disseminate information about acquisition reform (Perry, 1996, p. 116). 
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Secretary Perry placed great emphasis on relations with the defense industrial 
base.  He believed that the downsizing and consolidation of defense contractors would 
mean lower costs for the Department from improved efficiency and reduced overhead 
(Perry, 1995, p. 93).  The Department went so far as to offer reimbursement to companies 
for their restructuring activities which benefited the Department (Perry, 1995, p. 95).  
However, he also recognized that fewer contractors meant less competition, so he created 
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry 
Consolidation to actively review mergers and acquisitions activities of defense 
contractors (Perry, 1995, p. 95).  The Department revised and restructured the Defense 
Policy Advisory Committee on Trade to improve communications with industry (Perry, 
1995, p. 96).  To strike a balance between maintaining the industrial base and allowing 
market forces to shape the industry, the Department decided it would only actively 
maintain those industries that were unique and truly at risk of being lost or moving 
oversees (Perry, 1995, p. 96).  The Department created the Defense Industrial Base 
Oversight Council to examine industrial base issues, while it started the Industrial Base 
Review to ensure that impacts on the industrial base would be considered in acquisitions, 
logistics, and budget decisions (Perry, 1995, p. 97).  During 1995, the DoD developed 
assessment methods for identifying and dealing with required industrial capabilities and 
published the results in a how-to handbook titled Assessing Defense Industrial 
Capabilities (Perry, 1996, p. 72).  Also during 1995, the Department actually assessed 
numerous industries and found that very few were indeed endangered by the reduced 
level of military spending (Perry, 1996, p. 73).  A growing problem that the acquisitions 
community dealt with was bid protests from contractors who had not won contract 
competitions.  To minimize this, the Department began pushing to reduce the number of 
competitors for some contracts, specifically those contractors that had no chance of 
winning the contract (Perry, 1996, p. 112). 
In 1994 the Secretary of Defense issued a policy that required the DoD to state 
system requirements as performance specifications and let industry figure out the best 
way to achieve them.  This covered new programs but did not help programs already 
being executed.  To address this, he issued the Single Process Initiative (SPI) in 
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December 1995, allowing the DoD to start eliminating contractors' multiple, government-
directed processes, narrowing down to a single process where possible.  This reduced 
government costs, allowed contractors to survive budget fluctuations, and allowed the 
DoD access to more advanced technologies (Cohen, 1997, p. 107). 
Cost control and reduction continued to be an issue with all new defense systems.  
The Department began testing a new concept called Cost As an Independent Variable 
(CAIV) in 1995 (CAIV means that once the system performance and target costs are 
decided on the basis of cost-performance tradeoffs, the acquisition process will make cost 
more a constraint, and less a variable, while nonetheless obtaining the military capability 
of the system) (Perry, 1996, p. 111).  To help reduce system development costs and lead 
times, the DoD expanded the use of Intergrated Product Teams (IPTs) and EC/EDI 
systems (Perry, 1996, p. 115) and it continued to use PATs as well (Perry, 1995, p. 101).  
During 1994, the acquisitions threshold that required greater review and paperwork was 
raised to $100,000 (Perry, 1996, p. 112). 
To maintain the country's technological advantage, and with the influence of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the Department expanded the Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program, which was begun in 1992 under Cheney 
(Perry, 1995, pp. 107-108).  This program attempted to rapidly insert new technologies 
into the operating forces through an expedited process of addressing user needs and 
having the users conduct field tests of potential systems (Perry, 1995, p. 108).  
Section 5001(b) of Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
required an annual reporting of achievement toward the ninety percent of cost, schedule 
and performance goals for major and non-major programs, and decreasing by fifty 
percent or more the average period for converting emerging technology into initial 
operational capability (IOC) (Perry, 1996, p. 115).  As of September 30, 1995, all but 
four programs met the ninety percent threshold (Perry, 1996, p. 115).  Additionally, as of 
September 30, 1995, the average conversion time from emerging technology to IOC had 
fallen from 115 to 113 months.  To achieve this, the DoD had increased the use of 
commercially available technologies, expanded performance specifications in lieu of  
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design-specific military specifications, focused on CAIV to determine tradeoffs early on, 
expanded the use of ACTD, streamlined internal acquisition oversight and review (Perry, 
1996, p. 115). 
The Department continued most logistics efforts begun during the previous 
administration.  These included: reduce excess capacity in the distribution system via 
BRAC, reduce inventory (down to $77.5 billion through FY 1993), continue the Defense 
Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Initiative to improve customer support and asset 
management, and implement the best commercial practices and latest technologies 
(Perry, 1995, pp. 139-140).  The Department continued to implement the DBOF 
Improvement Plan (Perry, 1995, p. 126).  As part of the asset visibility effort, the 
Department began work on Intransit Visibility (ITV) through a prototype Global 
Transportation Network (Perry, 1995, pp. 144-145).  The goals for this effort were to 
reduce stocks, increase responsiveness, reduce costs, and improve customer support 
(Perry, 1995, p. 145) and it also incorporated modern computerized information systems 
to help manage logistics flow (Perry, 1995, p. 143). 
While depot maintenance consolidation continued (Perry, 1995, p. 98), the 
Department created a Government/Industry Task Force on Depot Maintenance to analyze 
and make recommendations for further improving depot maintenance.  The task force 
made the following recommendations: replace the 60/40, government/contractor work 
split with something more in line with CORE, implement CORE, eliminate public-private 
and public-public competition and just focus on improving the depots, and let the private 
sector handle the entire process for upgrades from design through installation (Perry, 
1995, p. 142).  In response, the Department implemented a CORE methodology when 
reviewing facilities and personnel.  This methodology identified critical depot capabilities 
and skills and ensured they would continue on at various facilities, while others were 
considered for outsourcing (Perry, 1995, p. 141).  Additionally, the Department expanded 
the use of interservice depot support (Perry, 1995, p. 142).  Interoperability and joint 
development of systems (Perry, 1995, pp. 97-98), and reducing military specifications 
and standards continued to be important (Perry, 1996, p. 114). 
 
 88
5. Facilities and Energy 
BRAC remained a prominent topic, with emphasis on the following issues: jobs-
centered property disposal for economic development and job creation, fast-track 
cleanup, transition coordinator use, redevelopment help, fostering community economic 
adjustment, and reinventing the homeless assistance process (Perry, 1995, p. 98). 
U. WILLIAM S. COHEN 
1. Background 
William S. Cohen served as the Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1997 to 
January 20, 2001.  President Clinton appointed Cohen to replace Perry for Clinton's 
second term in office.  Cohen, a lawyer by education, spent most of his career as a 
Republican in the House of Representatives and the Senate.  He served on several 
defense and intelligence committees, while helping write numerous laws concerning 
those two subjects.  Clinton appointed him to carry on the changes that Perry had begun, 
and he did just that upon assuming the post 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006). 
William Cohen continued many of the policies that Perry had put in place.  
Advanced weapons procurement and acquisition reform continued to be important, 
financed by a halt in DoD budget reductions and possible further manpower cuts if 
needed.  His dilemma in preparing future budgets was the balance required between 
operations and maintenance funding, and modernization procurement, with the prospect 
of a flat defense budget in the next decade.  Additionally, the defense industrial base had 
constricted dramatically and vertical integration became the norm for many defense 
contractors, a reasonable action by the contractors in response to years of budget and 
program cuts.  Cohen worked with the Pentagon and Congress to address this concern 
hoping to ensure sufficient competition for future defense programs 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/, Accessed October 2006).   
2. Organizational Management 
On November 10, 1997, Secretary Cohen announced a sweeping program called 
the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) to reform the business processes of the DoD.  The 
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savings from the reforms would be used to fund the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) (Cohen, 1998, p. 149).  The DRI focused on improving four areas.  1) 
Reengineer: adopt modern practices to achieve world-class performance, 2) consolidate: 
streamline to remove redundancy and maximize synergy, 3) compete: apply market 
mechanisms to lower cost, increase quality and customer service, 4) eliminate: reduce 
excess support structure (Cohen, 1998, p. 149-150).  The DoD created the Defense 
Management Council, a combination of DoD leaders and Chief Executive Officers from 
private industry, to carry out the reform initiatives (Cohen, 2000, p. 137). 
For reengineering, the Department had several objectives.  By January 1, 2000, all 
contracting for major systems would be paperless.  By FY 2000, ninety percent of all 
sub-$2500 purchases would be by government credit card.  Regulations would no longer 
be printed in mass, but distributed electronically via compact disk and the World Wide 
Web.  The travel system and household goods shipment systems would be reengineered.  
The "just-in-case" logistics mindset would be replaced by just-in-time delivery (Cohen, 
1998, p. 150).  Finally, across all Department functions, best business practices would be 
adopted (Cohen, 1998, p. 150). 
To foster electronic commerce, the Department created the Joint Electronic 
Commerce Program Office (JECPO) in 1998 (Cohen, 1999, p. 148).  The Department 
continued to implement more electronic commerce initiatives including electronic data 
management (EDM), electronic funds transfer (EFT), electronic data interchange (EDI), 
and digital signatures (Cohen, 1999, p. 153).  Some notable accomplishments include the 
DoD electronic mall, which was a one-stop shop for all DoD electronic and commercial 
catalogs, and the Business Opportunities Home Page, which contractors use to view, bid 
on, and interact with possible DoD work projects (Cohen, 2000, p. 138).  It created the 
Central Contractor Registration to automate payments to contractors (Cohen, 2000, p. 
139).  It also began to address the pending issue of the Year 2000, or Y2K, compliance of 
legacy computer systems (Cohen, 1999, p. 154).  The term Electronic Business (EB) 
surfaced in 2000 as the framework within which all electronic business process initiatives 
were coordinated (Cohen, 2001, p. 196).  As EB grew within the Department, so did 
computer security and fraud detection efforts (Cohen, 1997, p. 99). 
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The DoD began implementing "lessons learned" from the business community 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 195).  The Department established an electronic forum called the 
Commercial Advocates Forum to accelerate the adoption of commercial items and best 
practices (Cohen, 1997, p. 106).  It continued to adopt "best business practices", 
specifically in the areas of performance measurement, performance contracts, financial 
management reform, and electronic business (Cohen, 2001, p. 195).  Ten agencies began 
developing annual performance contracts agreed to by the organization, its customers, the 
Defense Management Council, and OSD (Cohen, 2001, p. 195).  The Department began 
acting on General Accounting Office (GAO) recommendations to establish performance 
scorecards and metrics to track the achievements of business practice reform (Cohen, 
2000, p. 141).  It was believed that this would help institutionalize the reform measures 
(Cohen, 2000, p. 141).  By 2000, the DoD had created forty-one performance measures 
that focused on cost savings, process efficiency, and improved customer service (Cohen, 
2001, p.195).   It also began studying civilian business models to identify a useable 
change management model (Cohen, 2000, p. 151).  The use of PATs continued to grow 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 107).  
For consolidation, the Department established three guiding principles: The 
Department headquarters should be flexible, OSD should focus on corporate level tasks, 
and operational management should be executed at the lowest level possible through 
employee empowerment (Cohen, 1998, p. 150).  Specifically, the Department set targets 
to dramatically reduce most headquarters (Cohen, 1998, p. 151). 
For competition, the Department adopted the use of OMB Circular A-76, 
originally issued in 1966 and subsequently revised, as its governing document in making 
outsourcing and competitive sourcing decisions (Cohen, 1998, p. 151).  The Department 
continued its move toward outsourcing, privatization, and competitive sourcing.  
Secretary Cohen established three core tenets for the Department to abide by when 
making those types of decisions: the DoD would not outsource core capabilities, a 




Department the best value and be better than what the Department could do internally 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 119).  The Competitive Sourcing and Privatization Directorate was 
established to monitor this initiative (Cohen, 1999, p. 149).   
The Department expanded its use of competitive sourcing for support functions 
and expected savings of twenty percent (Cohen, 2001, p. 197).  As of 2000, it was 
reviewing an additional 279,600 positions for possible competitive sourcing with an 
expected savings of $12.4 billion (Cohen, 2001, p. 198).  Interestingly, the Department 
had already reallocated those expected savings to other programs (Cohen, 2001, p. 198).  
Also in 2000, the Department created several pilot programs to test the possibility of 
outsourcing the entire household goods shipment process and expedite payment to 
shippers (Cohen, 2001, p. 197). 
For elimination, the Department focused on the following to reduce overhead:  
request two more rounds of BRAC, consolidate and regionalize support agencies, 
privatize family housing, privatize utilities, and integrate energy management (Cohen, 
1998, p. 152).  The Department created the Defense Working Capital Task Force to 
identify potential problems in current business operations and propose remedies for them 
(Cohen, 1999, p. 148).  The Department created the Office of Chancellor for Education 
and Professional Development to assist the civilian workforce (Cohen, 1999, p. 149). 
The Department planned to institutionalize continuous improvement or change 
management throughout the DoD enterprise to ensure a virtual learning environment 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 214).  The DoD intended to implement proven enterprise change models 
by ensuring leaders were committed to change, establishing action acceleration 
workshops, initiating rapid improvement teams for specific processes, expanding the 
support provided by the change management center, ensuring accountability of managers, 
and using outcome driven performance scorecards (Cohen, 2001, p. 214). 
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
Most of the financial management programs initiated under previous 
administrations were continued, while improvements were made to the Defense Civilian 
Pay System (DCPS), Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS), Marine Corps Total 
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Force System (MCTFS), Defense Transportation Payment System (DTRS), the Defense 
Retiree and Annuitant System, and the Defense Debt Management System (Cohen, 1997, 
pp. 96-97).  Garnishment operations, government purchase card use, and standardization 
of data all continued to grow (Cohen, 1997, pp. 100-102).  To reengineer travel, the 
Department created a Program Management Office to design and acquire a new Defense 
Travel System (DTS).  The all-electronic system was to be paperless and seamless while 
reducing costs and improving customer service (Cohen, 1997, p. 101).  The Defense Cash 
Accountability System reduced the Department's disbursing cycle time from over ninety 
days to two days in 2000 (Cohen, 2001, p. 202). 
The Department continued its pursuit of auditable financial statements by 
consolidating finance and accounting systems, and trying to make them compatible with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Cohen, 1997, p. 97).  In attempting 
to consolidate financial management systems, the Department began to recognize an 
enormous problem: that financial data fed into the finance systems came from a multitude 
of legacy feeder systems that were incompatible and difficult to change (Cohen, 2000, pp. 
144-145).  To address the problem, the Financial and Feeder System Compliance Process 
was created (Cohen, 2001, p. 201).  The Department had reduced the number of finance 
and accounting systems from 324 in 1991 to 76 in 2000, with a goal of 37 by 2005 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 200).  The consolidation and automation of systems already 
accomplished by 2000 had allowed the average civilian payroll technician to handle 
2,200 accounts, compared to 380 in 1991 (Cohen, 2001, p. 200). 
DFAS continued to implement the U. S. Government Standard General Ledger to 
provide a clear audit trail for financial transactions (Cohen, 2001, p. 200).  Another core 
requirement for auditable financial statements is an accurate accounting of real property 
and inventory.  Thus, the Department created and began loading all capital assets into the 
Defense Property Accountability System (Cohen, 1997, p. 99). 
The DoD continued to reduce problem disbursements and overpayments through 
tighter internal controls (Cohen, 1997, p. 98).  Part of those controls included the 
Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), which standardized the distribution of 
funds (Cohen, 1997, p. 98).  To streamline the contractor payment process, the 
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Department expanded the use of direct submission of vouchers to DFAS (Cohen, 1997, p. 
99).  It created the Central Contractor Registration (CCR) as a central registration point 
for all contractors (Cohen, 2001, p. 202).  The CCR held contractor data required for 
business dealings, specifically payment information, and worked in conjunction with the 
Defense Procurement Payment System to expedite the payments (Cohen, 2001, p. 202).  
DCAA continued to expedite the auditing process as well (Cohen, 1999, p. 154). 
In 1999, DFAS was working to develop the DFAS Corporate Information 
Infrastructure (DCII) as the underlying infrastructure that would tie all financial 
management systems and data together (Cohen, 2000, p. 146).  As part of this, Electronic 
Funds Transfer (EFT) became the standard method for paying contractors and personnel 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 99).  To improve document production and sharing while reducing 
costs, the Department began testing of several EDI, Electronic Data Management (EDM), 
and Electronic Data Access programs (Cohen, 1997, p. 100).  One of the critical obstacles 
to any of the electronic initiatives was how to capture signatures.  In response, the 
Department began a dedicated effort to create an acceptable method of digital signatures 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 160).  The Department began a concerted effort to create financial 
controls that properly incentivized managers at all levels (Cohen, 1997, p. 102).  
Consensus and collaboration continued to be critical to ensuring lasting change (Cohen, 
1997, p. 102). 
Secretary Cohen adopted or initiated other programs as well.  The Department 
expanded competitive sourcing of services to improve customer service and reduce cost 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 156), identifying eighty-five percent of all positions as available for 
competitive sourcing.  DFAS created a Fraud and Internal Control Office to reduce fraud 
and improve information assurance (Cohen, 2000, p. 144).  It also appointed a Director of 
Internal Review to oversee the effort (Cohen, 2001, p. 200).  Additionally, the 
Department created the Certified Defense Financial Manager Program to train and certify 
financial managers (Cohen, 2001, p. 203). 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
In FY 1998, Secretary Cohen laid out twelve acquisition reform goals for the year 
2000:  1) Deliver MDAPs in twenty five percent less time.  2) Achieve ninety pecent 
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visibility of material assets and reduce order to receipt time by fifty percent.  3) Use 
government credit card for ninety percent of all micropurchases.  4) Create world-class 
learning organization by offering over fourty hours of education to acquisition workforce.  
5) With no topline budget change, increase procurement to at least $54 billion.  6) 
Dispose of fifty percent of surplus property and privatize 30,000 family housing units.  7) 
Decrease paper transactions by fifty percent.  8) Reduce toxic chemical release by twenty 
percent.  9) Eliminate management layers and reduce acquisitions workforce by fifteen 
percent.  10) Establish a good cost accounting system for life-cycle costs.  11) Reduce 
National Defense Stockpile by $3 billion and excess supply by $12 billion.  12) Minimize 
cost growth to no greater than one percent annually (Cohen, 1998, p. 153). 
Acquisitions reform required a review of all acquisitions regulations.  The review 
led to a complete rewrite of the DoD 5000 series, which emphasized minimizing 
mandatory direction, policy integration, decentralized policy execution, 
institutionalization of new ways of doing business (such as IPTs), regulatory 
streamlining, streamlining paperwork, simplifying the acquisition decision process, and 
encouraging innovation (e.g. ACTDs and rapid prototyping) (Cohen, 1997, p. 105). 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was a driving force behind acquisition 
reform, so the Department created the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) to meet the 
RMA objectives (Cohen, 2001, p. 205).  The three top goals of RBA were: field high-
quality defense products quickly and support them responsively, with the objective of 
reducing average acquisition cycle time (measured from initial start to IOC) for all 
MDAPs since FY 1992 by 25% and by 50% for all programs started after FY 2001 and 
reduce logistics response time from 36 days in FY 1997 to 18 days by FY 2000; lower 
total operating costs in order to minimize cost growth to no more than 1% per year and 
reduce annual logistics support costs by 10% from FY 1997; reduce overhead costs of 
logistics and acquisition infrastructure from 64% of total obligational authority (TOA) in 
FY 1997 to 60% in FY 2001 (Cohen, 2001, p. 206). 
As of September 30, 2000, progress on the above objectives was underway.  All 
but nine MDAPs were meeting 90% of cost, schedule, and performance goals; conversion 
of new technology took 99 months (vs. 115 month baseline); spare parts delivery took 18 
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days and there was 94% asset visibility, reducing supply inventory from $67 billion in 
FY 1996 to $58.9 billion in FY 1999; MDAP average cost growth was between -.3 and 
3.1 %; weapon system logistics costs were $77.9 billion in FY 2000, just behind the 
$76.7 billion target; and logistics and infrastructure costs were 60% of TOA in FY 2000 
(Cohen, 2001, pp. 206-207).   
As part of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, the 
Department began testing simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) for commercial items 
between $100,000 and $5 million, streamlining the acquisition process by eliminating 
non-value-adding activities, and facilitating the use of EC/EDI programs (Cohen, 1997, 
p. 104).  In order to ensure timely access to affordable cutting edge technologies in the 
commercial sector, the Department started the Commercial Technology Insertion 
Program (CTIP) (Cohen, 1997, p. 114).  This avoided the time and expense of research, 
development, and testing for systems that would never materialize (Cohen, 1997, p. 114). 
The DoD gave more power to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) in order to promote early involvement by the operational tester, leverage 
developmental test and evaluation and training events for operational assessments, 
increase the use of modeling and simulation to supplement testing, and expand 
participation by operational testers in Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD) programs (Cohen, 2000, p. 155).  The Department emphasized the 
cost/performance tradeoff, incremental systems development, and evolutionary 
acquisitions in the design and procurement of new systems (Cohen, 2001, p. 211).  The 
adoption of dual-use technologies grew under the Dual-Use Applications Program 
(DUAP) (Cohen, 1997, p. 105). 
Management and education of the acquisitions workforce became a high priority 
for Cohen.  Under his leadership, the Department created a pilot program to test a better 
way to manage the civilian workforce, one that encouraged flexibility, innovation, and 
risk management (Cohen, 1998, p. 168).  It began using satellite broadcasts to train 
workers on a multitude of new systems, including FASA implementation, SAT and 
Federal Acquisitions Computer Network (FACENET), Single Process Initiative (SPI), 
the Overarching and Working-level IPT Process, and EC/EDI (Cohen, 1997, p. 106).  On 
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May 31, 1996, all acquisitions personnel stopped work and discussed institutionalizing 
acquisition reform initiatives.  It was called Acquisition Reform Day (Cohen, 1997, p. 
106).   
Continuous process improvement became the new buzzword in acquisition reform 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 106).  The Department created the Electronic Process Initiatives 
Committee (EPIC) to focus senior level management on the use of electronic systems 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 108).  The Department adopted email, internet homepages, satellite 
broadcasts, and hardcopy publications to distribute acquisition reform information 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 162).  It also emphasized continuous learning (Cohen, 2000, p. 156), 
with a proposed requirement for at least eighty hours of education for each employee 
every two years (Cohen, 2001, pp.213-214).  The Department created the Defense 
Acquisition Deskbook, an electronic reference tool that presented current acquisitions 
information to people at all levels and provided a means of communication between the 
front line workers and senior level decision makers (Cohen, 1997, p. 106). 
The Department carried over many programs that concerned relations with the 
defense industry.  These included reducing military specifications, reviewing mergers and 
acquisitions, preserving essential industrial capabilities, and reducing domestic source 
restrictions (Cohen, 1997, pp. 111-113).  The SPI program initiated by Secretary Perry 
was expanded, reducing the compliance and reporting burden imposed on contractors by 
the Department (Cohen, 1997, p. 107).  Program stability continued to be important, and 
the Department established an outyear acquisitions program stability reserve to offset the 
cost increases caused by technical difficulties in weapon system development (Cohen, 
1998, p. 169).  To further encourage contractors to compete for government contracts and 
to make their dealings with the Department easier, the Department expedited movement 
toward standard business practices and reports that were being use in the private sector 
(Cohen, 1999, p. 157).  It also used the Past Performance Information (PPI) in contractor 
selection (Cohen, 2000, p. 154).  Performance-based contracting became the preferred 
contracting method, as it is based upon stated performance requirements rather than 
specific design details (Cohen, 1998, p. 168). 
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The encouragement of small businesses continued to be important, especially as a 
means of developing and acquiring new technologies (Cohen, 1997, pp. 108, 116).  
Awards to small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses (SDB), and women owned 
small businesses (WOSB) grew rapidly (Cohen, 1997, pp. 115-116).  Also, the 
mentor/protégé program that matched experience larger contractors with inexperienced 
smaller ones continued to be successful (Cohen, 1997, p. 117). 
As required under section 5001 (b) of FASA passed in 1994, Secretary Cohen 
began reporting on the status of MDAP programs.  In 1996, all but two MDAPs met the 
90% threshold for cost, schedule, and performance, and the average time to IOC was 115 
months (Cohen, 1997, pp. 108-109).  The average time for programs started since 1992 
was 88 months (Cohen, 1997, pp. 108-109).  By 2000, all but nine MDAPs met the 90% 
threshold, but the average time to IOC fell to 113 months (Cohen, 2001, p. 206).  The 
average time for programs started since 1992 rose to 99 months (Cohen, 2001, p. 207).   
On April 1, 1998, Secretary Cohen submitted a report to Congress that identified 
acquisitions streamlining actions the Department had initiated: a smaller workforce, 
fewer organizations, manage suppliers, focus on total ownership cost (TOC), establish 
and execute budgets, reduce cycle times, simplifying contracting (Cohen, 1999, pp. 164-
165).  As of 2000, DoD had reduced the acquisition and technology workforce by fifty 
percent since 1990 (Cohen, 2001, p. 208). 
The Department emphasized holding PMs accountable for reducing life cycle 
costs (LCC) (Cohen, 2000, p. 155).  It established the following objectives for reducing 
TOC: for systems in acquisition, surpass or achieve aggressive CAIV unit cost and TOC 
targets that are 20 to 50% below historical norms, for fielded systems, reduce logistics 
support cost per weapon system per year compared to FY 1997 baselines as follows: 
seven percent by FY 2000, 10% by FY 2001, 20% by FY 2005, with an FY 1997 baseline 
of $82.5 billion (Cohen, 2000, p. 154). 
In 1997, the Department began integrating environmental impacts into program 
acquisition decisions, since acquisition programs account for 80% of all Department 
hazardous material (Cohen, 1998, p. 170).  The Joint Group on Acquisition Pollutions 
 98
Prevention (JG-APP) was created to lead the effort (Cohen, 1998, p. 170).  The 
Department also required that every weapon system program implement environment, 
safety, and occupational health (OSH) into the acquisitions process (Cohen, 1999, p. 
165).  The Department created the Institutionalization of Pollution Prevention to Achieve 
Compliance program and the Joint Acquisition Sustainment Pollution Prevention Activity 
to reduce hazardous waste the production and operation of weapon systems (Cohen, 
2000, p. 156). 
The DoD believed it needed to take advantage of the benefits of globalization 
from both a cost perspective and an alliance perspective, but manage the possible reliance 
on foreign countries for critical supplies (Cohen, 2000, p. 164).  Encouraging competition 
at all levels, both domestically and globally, was one of the key initiatives (Cohen, 2000, 
p. 164).  The Department actually encouraged contractors to share technology globally, 
especially through trans-Atlantic industrial linkages, and to compete in foreign markets 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 235).  International cooperation continued to be important, both for 
interoperability of systems and to help shoulder the development costs (Cohen, 2000, p. 
168).  In 1998, the Department stated that it would focus on managing suppliers rather 
than supplies, and engineering systems, rather than components (Cohen, 1999, p. 164).   
Secretary Cohen's proposed improvements to the logistics system were part of 
what he called a "logistics transformation" (Cohen, 2000, p. 139).  The objective was to 
create a "seamless logistics system" that would provide responsive reach back for 
logistics support from anywhere in the world (Cohen, 1997, p. 138).  A vital part of this 
was the implementation of just-in-time and lean logistics programs (Cohen, 1997, p. 
137).  Additionally, the Department adopted a policy of selectively outsourcing weapon 
system support and functions, as well as encouraging the direct shipment of items from 
suppliers to the end users (Cohen, 2000, p. 140).  To track all of the parts within the 
system, it looked at using automated identification technology to create total asset 
visibility (Cohen, 2000, p. 140). 
Most logistics initiatives begun under previous administrations were continued 
(Cohen, 2000, p. 139).  These existing programs included reducing life-cycle costs of 
weapon systems, streamlining the logistics infrastructure, reducing logistics response 
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times, creating total asset visibility, privatizing and outsourcing functions, consolidating 
depot activities but maintaining CORE capabilities, modernizing logistics business 
systems, and reengineering transportation (Cohen, 1997, pp. 137-140).  To reduce total 
ownership costs (TOC), the Department emphasized better planning in the development 
of weapon systems, improved logistics support of fielded systems, and improved 
reporting of total ownership costs for decision making purposes (Cohen, 1998, p. 170).  
As part of transportation reengineering, the Department streamlined the documentation 
and finance processes and appointed a full-time Reengineering Team to champion the 
effort (Cohen, 1998, p. 170).     
5. Facilities and Energy 
As part of the Acquisition Year 2000 goals, the Department set a target for 
disposing of 50% of surplus property and privatizing 30,000 housing units (Cohen, 1998, 
p. 176). Additionally, the Department set a goal of eliminating inadequate housing by 
2010 (Cohen, 2000, p. 160). 
The Department continued to use BRAC to downsize its infrastructure (Cohen, 
1999, p. 171).  In the FY 2000 report, the Department declared BRAC to be the single 
most important reform initiative because of the enormous cost savings involved (Cohen, 
2000, p. 140).  The Department wanted two additional rounds of BRAC to eliminate the 
estimated 23% excess base capacity (Cohen, 2001, p. 220).  Some of the duties of the 
newly created Installations Policy Board included the integration and coordination of 
various installation initiatives (Cohen, 2000, p. 157), in particular expediting the turnover 
of former bases to civilian use and encouraging job development in the surrounding 
communities (Cohen, 1999, p. 171).   
While BRAC was used to reduce the amount of infrastructure, better management 
practices were implemented to make more efficient use of existing facilities.  With fewer 
bases, joint use of facilities and regional contracting to support base functions were 
encouraged (Cohen, 2000, p. 158). The Department privatized much of the utility 
infrastructure and focused instead on managing the energy demands of the bases (Cohen, 
2000, p. 160).  To ensure adequate investment in the remaining infrastructure, the 
Department created the Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM) to forecast annual funding 
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requirements to sustain the inventory level and the Facilities Aging Model (FAM) to 
understand the relationship between capital investment in a facility and its remaining 
useful life (Cohen, 2001, pp. 228-229).  It also demolished old buildings and began 
leasing out excess space in underutilized ones (Cohen, 2000, p. 140).  Force protection 
measures were incorporated into new construction and existing facilities were modified 
to be more protected (Cohen, 2000, p. 158).  The Department continued to focus on 
conserving energy and began implementing sustainable designs in all new buildings to be 
built after FY 2000 (Cohen, 1999, p. 169).  The DoD began creating a database of all 
leased property in order to improve management of those facilities (Cohen, 1999, p.168). 
V. DONALD H. RUMSFELD 
1. Background 
Donald H. Rumsfeld served his second term as the Secretary of Defense from 
January 20, 2001 until announcing his resignation on November 8, 2006.  After his first 
term as Secretary, Rumsfeld moved into the private sector.  From 1977 to 2001, he served 
in numerous senior positions at two pharmaceutical companies and a broadband 
technology company.  He also continued his public service while in the private sector by 
serving on a multitude of commissions, boards, and panels 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html,  Accessed October 2006). 
Donald Rumsfeld formulated several significant initiatives during his term as the 
twenty-first Secretary of Defense.  Following the September 11, 2001 attack on the 
World Trade Center, Rumsfeld led the development of the war on terror strategy.  He 
orchestrated the war efforts for both Afghanistan and Iraq.  He reorganized the defense 
command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan, which added two new 
combatant commands and disestablished others.  He also reorganized the forward 
deployment of forces, moving some away from Europe and Korea 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html, Accessed October 2006).  Rumsfeld 
tried to insert many management and acquisitions reforms, often based upon the 




2. Organizational Management 
Rumsfeld claimed that the DoD lagged behind the commercial sector in its 
business management activities, that it encouraged risk avoidance, and that it had no 
overarching strategy for improving business practices (Rumsfeld, 2002, pp. 105-106).  
Under Rumsfeld, the Department's goals for the revitalization of the Defense 
establishment included the following: reduce cycle time for decisions on weapons 
development and logistics support, shorten and bring realism to program budgeting, 
reduce inefficiencies, attract good people, maintain technological advantage, properly 
size and modernize the defense infrastructure, and develop performance metrics 
(Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 106).  He intended to create "excellence" in everything the 
Department did (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 52). 
Several management themes prevailed within Rumsfeld's reform agenda, known 
as "transformation" (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 105).  He emphasized minimizing institutional 
risk to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 105).  
He placed heavy emphasis on the creation and use of measurements and metrics to 
quantify performance improvements (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 105).  He planned to remove 
stovepipes, share data rapidly, accelerate and institutionalize change, share and 
implement best practices, encourage innovation and risk-taking, and remove non-value-
adding layers of bureaucracy (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 107).  To focus the Department's 
resources on core defense functions, DoD planned to outsource non-core functions based 
on the success of outsourcing military housing and utility systems (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 
108).  To reduce overhead and direct costs, and to associate investments with the returns 
they provide, the department began linking defense resources to key performance goals 
(Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 54).  The Department introduced the National Security Personnel 
System to implement information-age best practices for personnel management 
(Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 43).  Electronic data systems continued to proliferate throughout the 
Department and were lumped under the overarching theme of "e-government" (Rumsfeld, 
2004, p.44).  In addition to Rumsfeld's transformation goals, the Department also had to 
comply with President Bush's Management Agenda of 2001.  This agenda included:  
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strategic management of human capital, improved financial performance, competitive 
sourcing, e-government, and budget and performance integration (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 
43).   
Secretary Rumsfeld implemented numerous changes, starting with the senior 
levels of the Department.  To streamline the overhead structure and flattening the 
organization, the Department planned to reduce headquarters staffs by 15% from FY 
1999 to FY 2003, as well as realign and consolidate OSD and the services (Rumsfeld, 
2002, p. 107).  He created the Senior Executive Council (SEC), the Business Initiative 
Council, and the Defense Business Practices Implementation Board (DBPIB) to improve 
business processes (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 106).   
The SEC was tasked with reviewing the business practices of defense agencies 
and comparing them to similar private sector operations (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 109).  In 
2002, the SEC recommended several actions to improve business processes.  These 
included: institutionalize performance management; improve business practices by 
pooling unused cell phone minutes, recovery auditing, web-based invoicing, and 
improved financial management (FM) practices and management of Defense Working 
Capital Funds (DWCF); implement net-centric business transformation and e-
government; pursue commercial activities and competitive sourcing programs; reengineer 
the personnel security program by transferring investigations to OPM; outsource 
document automation and production service away from DLA (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 64). 
The DBPIB, composed of senior executives and experts from the business community, 
was intended to help the DoD maximize management reform efforts by advising the SEC 
(p. 110).    
3. Budgeting and Financial Management 
The Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions, Technology, and 
Logistics), and Chief Information Officer (CIO) initiated a $100 million program called 
the Financial Management Modernization Program to modernize the financial reporting 
systems (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 109).  Within it, the Business Financial Management 
Modernization Program Office was created to champion the transformation (Rumsfeld, 
2003, p. 51).  While consolidation of financial management systems (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 
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109) and competitive sourcing (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 44) of support functions continued, 
the Department began work on the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) 
plan that laid out how the Department would achieve an unqualified audit opinion 
(Rumsfeld, 2005, p. 18).  One of the long-term goals of financial management reform 
was to receive a favorable audit opinion by 2007 (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 49).  The FIAR, 
along with the Business Management Modernization Plan (BMMP), relied on three core 
principles: clear standards, clear lines of authority, and tiered accountability (Rumsfeld, 
2005, p. 18). 
The Department used the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) to provide explicit 
guidance for budget and program management (Rumsfeld, 2004, pp. 45-46).  It also 
issued the first Strategic Planning Guidance (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 46).  The Department 
combined the programming and budgeting data of all the Services to streamline the 
process and reduce paperwork by one third (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 46).  It also adopted a 
two-year budgeting cycle to free up manpower and reduce redundant work (Rumsfeld, 
2004, p. 46) 
The Department used budget and performance indicators to exercise performance-
based budgeting (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 52).  It also began using a balanced scorecard to 
measure performance within financial management (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 47).  As a critical 
component of this, the Department emphasized accurate and timely reporting by the 
services and the sharing of that information across the DoD to all decision makers 
(Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 55) 
4. Acquisitions and Logistics 
In his FY 2003 report, the Secretary established the following acquisition 
excellence goals: achieving credibility and effectiveness through the revision of DoD 
5000.1 and 5000.2 and utilizing CAIG estimates for full life cycle costs; revitalizing the 
acquisition workforce through performance based pay and promotion system pilots; 
improving the industrial base by using "price-based" acquisitions (paying the market 
price) to encourage smaller companies to compete; rationalizing the defense systems 
infrastructure with the defense strategy (BRAC, joint facilities and equipment); and 
initiating high-leverage technologies (by using ACTD to get weapons quickly) 
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(Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 54).  The following year, in his FY 2004 report, the Secretary 
established the following acquisition transformation goals: acquisition excellence with 
integrity, logistics integration and efficiency, systems integration and engineering for 
mission success, technology dominance, resource rationalized, industrial base 
strengthening, and motivating an agile workforce (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 52)  
In an effort to achieve acquisition and technology excellence, the Department 
placed emphasis on accelerating the fielding of systems through new development 
techniques and the use of benchmarking (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 42) and best business 
practices (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 110).  To do this, it emphasized rapid acquisition of 
demonstrated technology, time-phased requirements and evolutionary development, and 
integrated test and evaluation (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 111).  The Department continued to 
use the ACTD programs to quickly field new technologies (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 116).  The 
Department set a goal of reducing MDAP cycle time to sixty-six months for all programs 
started after FY 2001 (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 61).   
The control of cost and schedule growth in acquisitions programs received much 
attention during Rumsfeld's administration. The Department stated in its FY 2002 report 
that the FY 2003 budget would fund acquisition programs at realistic levels, unlike 
previous practices (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 110).  The Department focused on measuring and 
reducing MDAP acquisition cost growth and O&S cost growth in an attempt to be on a 
downward trend by the end of FY 2003, then no cost growth thereafter (Rumsfeld, 2003, 
pp. 61-62).  It also adopted new processes that focused on mature technology and 
evolutionary acquisitions to reduce the average program development time from nine 
years (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 110). In order to further increase competition among defense 
contractors and entice new competitors into the market, the Department planned to lower 
the barriers to entry and improve the profitability of contracting with the Department 
(Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 116). 
The Department of Defense continued reviewing how to improve the PPBS and 
acquisitions systems, and had eliminated thirty-one of seventy-two acquisitions-related 
advisory boards through 2001 (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 108).  The Department emphasized 
increased visibility of trade space, the tradeoff between investment and risk (Rumsfeld, 
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2003, p. 54).  As of September 30, 2001, all but eleven MDAPs met the 90% of cost, 
schedule, and performance goals (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 111).  New technology conversion 
since 1992 was down to 95 months in 2001 (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 112). 
The logistics transformation that Rumsfeld envisioned required several changes to 
current operations.  The Future Logistics Enterprise was created to improve logistics 
operations through enterprise integration and end-to-end customer service, while 
remaining flexible enough to respond to any challenge (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 113).  To 
measure performance and focus improvements, the Department created a Logistics 
Balanced Scorecard (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 63).  The scorecard was then submitted to the 
Joint Logistics Board to process the results and recommend changes (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 
63).  The Department began using the best business practice of Customer Wait Time 
(CWT) to measure logistics effectiveness (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 63).  While the concept of 
total asset visibility had been initiated in previous administrations, the implementation of 
it improved significantly with the adoption of radio frequency identification (RFID) tags 
(Rumsfeld, 2005, p. 23) 
5. Facilities and Energy 
The Department created a Facilities Strategic Plan which ensured facilities were 
the right size and in the right location, maintained and funded properly, and their 
improvements were measured with the right metrics (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 114).  To 
improve facilities management and reduce the estimated twenty to twenty-five percent 
excess base capacity, the Department created the Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) 
(Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 113).  EFI had three components: obtain an additional round of 
BRAC, improve the base closure process, and develop tools for efficiently operating 
enduring facilities (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 113).  During 2002, the Department established 
the process for BRAC 2005 (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 60).  The Department began measuring 
the share of the defense budget spent of infrastructure and using it as the metric for 
measuring infrastructure reductions (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 55).   
Management of existing facilities was of great importance to the administration. 
The Department continued to develop a real property inventory system to track all real 
property owned by the Department and measure the facilities readiness (Rumsfeld, 2004, 
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p. 58).  DoD began using the Facilities Recapitalization Metric (FRM) to measure the rate 
at which facilities were being recapitalized, with the target being 67 years by 2007 and 
the current level in 2003 at 136 years, down from 200+ years in 1999 (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 
58).  It also used the Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM) to determine how much to 
spend on facilities (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 56).  The DoD continued using housing 
privatization, competitive sourcing initiatives, and best business practices to operate more 
efficiently (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 113).  It also planned to continue leasing excess facility 
space (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 114). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT REFORM WITHIN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Analysis Techniques 
Chapter III presented a narrative history of the management reform projects of the 
secretaries of defense.  In this chapter we will attempt to categorize those reform efforts 
in order to discover trends, much as Paul Light defined categories and then used them to 
evaluate legislative reforms (Light, 1997).   
The first category we use is the Type of Initiative.  Is it the introduction of a new 
concept, like Total Quality Management; the creation of a new plan or program, like the 
Cost-Reduction Plan; the creation of a new organization, such as a new Undersecretary of 
Defense; or is it a report or legislation, like a National Security Act Amendment?  Some 
laws are included as Secretary of Defense management reform initiatives because they 
were requested or tailored by the Secretary of Defense but required legislation to 
implement.   
The second category we will use is Area of Change.  Those areas are: 
Organizational Structure; Budgeting, Planning and Programming; Financial 
Management; Acquisition and Logistics; and Facilities and Energy.   
Next we will subjectively evaluate the magnitude of that change, by putting each 
one identified into one of the categories described below.  Because of the peculiarities of 
defense management reform these definitions were synthesized into the following 
categories based on an understanding of the literature described in Chapter II. 
Revolutionary Change: The new organization, process or concept is a new, 
distinct entity from the old.  It is a “zero-based” reorganization where there was a distinct 
leap from one state to another without passage through identifiable middle-states (states 
that are somewhat like the old state and somewhat like the new state).  Indicators of a 
revolutionary change may be creation of organizations with new names, made up of new 
groups of people, or implementing processes that seek to achieve new goals that did not 
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exist before.  Things are “created” in a revolutionary change and they are likely to be 
isolated and episodic.  A good example of a revolutionary change is the introduction of 
the PPBS system to replace several old systems. 
Evolutionary Change: The new organization, plan or concept is a logical off-shoot 
of the old organization, plan or concept.  It is an incremental change, or modification to 
the previous state.  Indicators of an evolutionary change may new reporting requirements 
or chains of command but with the same people or departments, process changes that do 
not change the basic inputs and goals of the process, or new ways of doing the same 
thing.  Organizational name changes, or mission modifications where most employees or 
tasks remain unchanged are probably evolutionary.  Things are “updated” in an 
evolutionary change, and they may be episodic or continuous.  A good example of an 
evolutionary change is Secretary of Defense Richardson’s increase in the future weapons 
planning projections in the PPBS from five-to-eight years. 
No Change Observed:  For our purposes this means that we did not observe a 
revolutionary or evolutionary change in a particular organization or process in our 
research of Secretary of Defense annual reports.  Change may have occurred, but it was 
not reported in the Secretary of Defense reports in a way that fit into one of the above 
categories.  A good example of no change is when a secretary re-stresses economy and 
efficiency, but does not implement any specific measures to increase economy or 
efficiency. 
Finally, we will subjectively categorize each reform effort into one or more of 
Paul Light’s four “tides”: Scientific Management, which espouses efficiency, analysis, 
chain of command changes; War on Waste, which seeks economy; Watchful Eye, which 
institutes inspection, oversight, or reporting requirements, and Liberation Management, 
which lets managers manage, stresses decentralization, or incorporates best practices 
(Light, 1997, p.1).  
2. Introduction to the Data 
We pulled 514 concepts, plans, programs, reports and organizations from the 
narrative history presented in Chapter 3.  Each item was rated in each of the four 
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categories presented previously, as well as a fifth describing whether the initiative was 
new.  Our purpose was not to analyze any individual reform initiatives, but rather to look 
at a large set of data to identify possible trends for further study.  Therefore we have not 
studied individual initiatives in depth and it may be the case that we have incorrectly 
categorized one or more initiatives in one or more categories.  We do not believe that 
errors of this type will skew the overall trends.  The results are displayed in Appendix A. 
Figure 1 shows the total number of new initiatives introduced by each Secretary 
of Defense, regardless of the magnitude or nature of the changes.  There is a clear upward 
trend in the number if initiatives introduced by each administration, with a few significant 
outliers. Secretary of Defense Johnson, for example, was a prolific reformer, possibly 
because he had the benefit of observing Secretary Forrestal’s administration and the 
problems it had initially.  Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Cohen’s high level of 
reforms seems to correspond with the overall emphasis placed on governmental reform in 





































































































Figure 1. Reform Initiatives of each Administration 
 
It might not be correct, however, to assume that later Secretaries of Defense were 
significantly busier than their predecessors.  Figure 2 shows the number of management 
reform initiatives per month in office for each Secretary of Defense.  There is still an 
upward trend, but it is not nearly as steep.  Of note, Secretaries Johnson and Cohen still 

































































































Figure 2. Reform Initiatives per Month in Office 
  
B. DETAILED ANALYSIS 
1. Type of Change 
There were several major ways in which change initiatives were introduced.  We 
split them into four categories: Concepts, Plans or Programs, Creation of New 
Organizations, and Reports or Legislation.  Figure 3 shows the relative use of each type 
of initiative during each administration.  The early Secretaries almost all concentrated on 
the introduction of new Concepts.  While the later ones used a more mixed agenda, most 









































































































Figure 3. Relative Initiative Types 
 
2. Area of Change 
Figure 4 shows the number of reform initiatives each Secretary of Defense made 
in each of the areas: Organizational Structure; Financial Management; Acquisition and 
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Logistics; Budgeting, Plans and Programs; Financial Management; and Facilities and 
Energy.  The early secretaries of defense concentrated their energy on reforms in 
organizational structure.  Because the separate military departments were just coming 
together, these organizational structure reform initiatives generally consisted of 
centralization of command and decision making, elimination of separate boards and 
committees and creation of joint boards and committees.  Financial Management comes 
to the fore for the first time under Secretary McElroy, who introduced accrual 
accounting, cost and work standards and comparative cost studies.  In the latter part of 
the century, Acquisition and Logistics reform took center stage, peaking under Perry and 






































































































Figure 4. Initiatives by Area 
 
 Another way to consider the areas of concentration for each Secretary of Defense 
is to look at the number of initiatives in each area as a percentage of the total number of 
initiatives that he introduced.  Figure 5 shows that the Secretaries varied widely in their 
areas of concentration.  Secretaries Forrestal and Johnson spread their efforts across the 
spectrum, but Secretary Marshall concentrated almost exclusively on Organizational 
Structure, as did Secretary Laird later.  Secretary Richardson spent his energies on 
Budgeting Planning and Programming.  Many of the later secretaries seemed less likely 
to concentrate in one particular area than the early ones.  Of note, Secretary Rumsfeld 
concentrated on Acquisition and Logistics during his first term and Organizational 
Structure in his second.  Although most reform initiatives dealt with Organizational 
Structure or Acquisitions and Logistics, there are no long periods in which any one area 
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of reform dominates.  Many Secretaries of Defense seem to leave the reform initiatives of 
their immediate predecessors in place when they take office, and concentrate their efforts 










































































































Figure 5. Relative Areas of Concentration 
 
3. Magnitude of Change 
Another important consideration is the magnitude of each reform.  In some cases 
a Secretary of Defense may have made a few large reforms, while another may have 
made many small reforms.  In some cases a claimed reform may not have been a reform 
at all.  Figure 6 shows the number of Revolutionary changes made by each Secretary of 
Defense.  The overall trend is slightly upward, however a few early Secretaries of 



































































































Figure 6. Revolutionary Changes 
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 While some Secretaries made more Revolutionary changes than others, it may be 
important to look at the relative mix of the magnitudes of the changes that each one 
made.  Figure 7 shows the percentage of Revolutionary, Evolutionary and Not Observed 
changes that each Secretary of Defense made.  This gives a little insight into the reform 
initiatives that the total numbers given in Figure 6 do not.  Although Secretary Johnson 
made more Revolutionary changes than anyone else except Gates, they actually made up 
only a small part of his total changes, the majority of which were Evolutionary.  The 
same is true of Secretary Cohen.  On the other hand, the majority of the changes made by 








































































































Figure 7. Relative Mix of Initiative Magnitudes 
 
4. Tides of Reform 
Paul Light defined the four Tides of Reform for use in evaluating legislated reform 
initiatives (Light, 1997, p.1); however, they are applicable to reforms in the Department 
of Defense as well.  The Scientific Management Tide, which seeks efficient management 
practices, is dominant in every administration, but there are other trends as well.  Figure 8 
shows the relative mix of reform Tides in each administration’s reform agenda.  The 
early Secretaries concentrate on economy and efficiency, which translates to War on 
Waste and Scientific Management.  Starting with Gates and McNamara we begin to see 
some Watchful Eye-type reforms, increasing oversight and control.  More recently we 
begin to see the emergence of Liberation Management reforms, using modern 





































































































Figure 8. Relative Mix of Tides of Reform 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
 Management reform has been the subject of much debate and effort within the 
Department of Defense and in legislative and academic circles for the past six decades.  
The findings of this study reveal that in all probability, future administrations will attempt 
management reforms for years to come.  The findings also suggest that the many of those 
future management reforms will simply be the same old ideas wrapped in the 
terminology of the latest management fad.  Regardless of their titles, the objectives will 
likely remain unchanged.  Those common objectives include the following: 
• Maximize the efficient use of assets, whether they are capital, human, or 
fiscal assets, through increased productivity and reduced costs. 
• Apply those assets effectively toward attaining goals. 
• Measure the progress toward those goals. 
• Remove non-value added activities, to include management layers, 
management systems, redundant processes, and financial and logistics 
systems. 
Several trends became evident in the analysis of data.  The structure of the 
Department was the highest priority in the earlier years, but tapered off in the later ones.  
It appears that once the areas of responsibility and chain of command had matured and 
been exercised through numerous global crises, a sound organizational framework was 
gradually developed that has endured the last few decades with only incremental changes.  
The focus on acquisitions has accelerated in recent years, perhaps because of the total 
dollar value of acquisitions, or because of the dramatic costs and schedule growth of 
high-technology systems.    Since Forrestal began the drawdown of the support structure 
following World War II, the elimination of excess base capacity and the more efficient 
use of facilities has been an unstoppable progression.  The establishment of the BRAC 




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 Defense management reform is, by its very definition, broad-scoped.  This project 
has identified general management reform trends across 21 Secretaries of Defense and 58 
years of annual reports.  The volume of information, as well as its diversity in format and 
substance, did not lend itself to in-depth analysis of any particular reform trend or 
functional area given the scope of this report.  As such, several additional studies are 
recommended to expand upon those trends identified herein.  
 In Chapter III, the data were presented in four broad categories.  Those categories 
include organizational management, budgeting and financial management, acquisitions 
and logistics, and facilities and energy.  The authors used the categories merely to present 
related data in a logical manner.  However, the data could just as easily be presented and 
analyzed in a variety of other ways.  Additionally, each category was a collection of 
numerous sub-categories, each of which could be analyzed as stand alone subjects.  
Additionally, the data we used were pulled only from the Annual Reports of the 
Secretaries of Defense, so they only included those reform initiatives that the Secretaries 
chose to brief the Congress on.  It seems likely that they would tend to emphasize their 
successes and downplay their failures.  It would be interesting to look at internal OSD 
documents to try to find initiatives that were not as publicized. 
 The Analysis in Chapter IV was based on a very broad look at each reform 
initiative.  To gain deeper insight into whether a given change was really revolutionary or 
evolutionary would require an in-depth study of the conditions and situation prior to, 
during and after a change.  We also did not attempt to determine whether or not a given 




Type Codes Area Codes 
Magnitude 
Codes Tide Codes 
    
1-Organization 1-Organizational Structure 
1-
Revolutionary 1-Scientific 
2-Concept 2-Financial Management 2-Evolutionary 2-War on Waste 
3-Plan/Program 
3-Budgeting, Planning and 
Programming 
3-None 







 5-Facilities and Energy   
 
Secretary Term Type Area Magnitude Tide New 
Forrestal Economy and efficiency 2 1 2 1,2 Y 
Forrestal Standardized procedures 2 1 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Reporting of obligations and funds available to Congress 2 3 2 1 Y 
Forrestal 
Grouping all costs (except personnel) related to an 
identifiable program, then grouping those programs by 
primary function 2 3 1 1 Y 
Forrestal Unified theater commands 1 1 1 1 Y 
Forrestal Joint Committee on Accounting Policy 1 2 2 1 Y 
Forrestal 
Interdepartmental Forms Standardization and Control 
Board 1 3 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Committee on Civilian Components 1 1 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Committee on Service Pay 1 1 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Committee on Medical and Hospital Services 1 1 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Research and Development Board 1 4 2 1 Y 
Forrestal Munitions Board 1 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Coordination of foreign policies and military policies via 
the National Security Council (NSC) 2 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson Physically rearranged the Pentagon offices 2 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
No service can be permitted to exercise exclusive 
judgment on how much money it should get or how it 
should be spent 2 3 1 1 Y 
Johnson 
Eliminated many boards, but he created many joint boards 
and committees. 2 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Economy and efficiency 2 1 3 1,2 N 
Johnson Reprogramming 2 3 3 1 Y 
Johnson Use of “woman-power” was stressed 2 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Standardizing the budget request process among the 
services 2 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson Coordinated budget planning and execution 2 3 2 1 Y 
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Johnson 
Performance budgeting, use of working capital funds, 
revision of appropriation structures, refinement of 
estimating standards, and use of inventory data in 
determining budget requirements 2 3 1 1 Y 
Johnson Began providing budgetary guidance to the services.   2 3 1 1 Y 
Johnson Coordination of purchases across the services 2 4 1 1 Y 
Johnson Planning for defense mobilization 2 3 2 1 N 
Johnson Include civilian industry in defense mobilization planning 2 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson Advanced supply management techniques 2 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson Common systems among the services 2 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Identify and remove production bottlenecks of vital 
resources 2 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson Preferential treatment toward small businesses 2 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Assigned the purchase of specific-type items to specific 
military departments 2 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
The use of working capital funds for procurement of 
common items 2 5 2 1 Y 
Johnson DOD needed to sponsor basic research 2 4 3 1 Y 
Johnson 
Each military department was responsible for its own 
research and development 2 4 3 1 Y 
Johnson Joint intelligence board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint staff board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint communications board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint military transportation board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint munitions allocations board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint meteorology board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson Joint civil affairs board 1 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson More unified commands 1 1 2 1 N 
Johnson Office of Progress Reports and Statistics 1 1 1 1 Y 
Johnson Department of Defense Management Committee 1 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Tasked the JCS to form an advisory budget review 
committee 1 3 2 1 Y 
Johnson Production Allocation Board 1 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson Small Business Office (SOB) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson 
Enormous effort to remove personnel from administrative 
and non-combat positions and add them to combat forces 3 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson 100 “useless” boards and committees were eliminated 3 1 2 2 Y 
Johnson Duplicate foreign attaches removed 3 1 2 2 Y 
Johnson Meteorology stations were removed 3 1 2 2 Y 
Johnson Segregation was eliminated 3 1 2 1 Y 
Johnson 145,000 civilian employees were eliminated 3 1 2 2 Y 
Johnson 51 military bases were closed 3 5 2 2 Y 
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Johnson 
The military departments were instructed to consolidate 
services such as transportation, cold-storage, telephone 
systems and hospitals 3 4 2 2 Y 
Johnson 
Continuing the push to unify the Department of Defense 
budget 3 3 2 1 N 
Johnson 
Created comptrollers, implemented performance 
budgeting, authorized working capital funds (which were 
already in use), and created a uniform fiscal system under 
Title IV 3 3 1 1 Y 
Johnson Government employee suggestion system 3 4 2 1 Y 
Johnson Business administration training for DoD employees 3 4 1 1 Y 
Marshall Centralizing manpower management 2 1 1 1 Y 
Marshall 
Consolidating responsibility to focus effort on specific 
problems 2 1 3 1 N 
Marshall Clarifying duties and chains of command within OSD 2 1 2 1 Y 
Marshall 
Each manager and employee contribute ideas to increase 
the efficiency of their organization 2 1 2 1 N 
Marshall 
Expanding the use of women in administrative positions 
to free up men for combat units 2 1 2 2 N 
Marshall 
The consolidation of individual service boards into joint 
boards and committees 2 1 3 1 N 
Marshall 
Directly recruited personnel with industry experience in 
specific areas 2 1 3 1 N 
Marshall Working capital funds 2 5 3 1 N 
Marshall Deconflicting military and civilian requirements 2 4 3 1 N 
Marshall Interdepartmental sharing of stocks among the services 2 4 2 1 N 
Marshall 
Joint Intelligence Agency and the Joint Parachute Test 
Agency 1 1 3 1 N 
Marshall The Division of Manpower Utilization 1 1 3 1 N 
Marshall Standards Agency 1 4 2 1 N 
Marshall Joint Procurement Agencies 1 4 2 1 N 
Marshall 
Blanket five percent reduction in military personnel in the 
Washington D.C. area 3 1 2 2 N 
Lovett Thoughtful and deliberate “evolutionary” changes 2 1 2 1 Y 
Lovett Economy and efficiency 2 1 3 1 N 
Lovett Manpower controls with personnel ceilings 2 1 2 1 N 
Lovett 
Conducted utilization surveys to ensure manpower was 
used efficiently 2 1 2 1 Y 
Lovett 
Conflicting goals of obtaining the lowest price while 
maintaining social programs 2 4 3 1 Y 
Lovett Military remove standard packaging requirements 2 4 2 1 N 
Lovett 
Live production capacity within the economy, rather than 
stockpiles of materiel 2 4 1 1 Y 
Lovett Created civilian expert committees 1 1 2 1 N 
Lovett Armed Services Procurement Regulations Committee 1 4 2 1 N 
Lovett Defense Supply Management Agency 1 4 2 1 N 
Wilson 
Centralize policymaking and simultaneously decentralize 
operations 2 1 1 1 Y 
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Wilson 
Making the civilian service secretaries his principle 
agents 2 1 1 1 Y 
Wilson Increased civilian control 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson 
Review of the organization of the military departments to 
give the civilian service secretaries more control 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson Took the JCS out of the chain of command 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson 
Transferred some of the joint boards from the OSD and 
gave the authority back to the services 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson Efficiency and economy 2 1 3 1 N 
Wilson 
That improvements in weapon systems and technology 
can reduce the manpower requirement needed to support 
the force 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson 
Constant improvement of management methods and 
procedures to make incorporating efficiency an ongoing 
process 2 1 2 1 Y 
Wilson Tighten his budget control over the services 2 3 2 1 N 
Wilson 
Generation of accurate performance reports for managers 
at all levels 2 2 2 1 Y 
Wilson Performance-type budget 2 3 3 1 N 
Wilson 
No weapon system would be authorized for procurement 
unless there was funding for the entire end item, including 
necessary spares 2 3 2 1 Y 
Wilson Commitment accounting 2 2 2 1 Y 
Wilson Uniform procedures for transportation rate negotiations 2 1 2 1 N 
Wilson 
Substituted better material planning and standardization 
for inventory balances 2 4 3 1 N 
Wilson 
Need for electronic data processing equipment in supply 
management 2 4 2 1 Y 
Wilson Six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense 1 1 1 1 Y 
Wilson 
Assistant Secretary in charge of Financial Management 
for each military department 1 2 2 1 Y 
Wilson Reorganization Plan no. 6 3 1 1 1 Y 
Wilson Employee suggestion program 3 1 3 1 N 
Wilson A 12% reduction in headquarters staffs 3 1 2 2 N 
Wilson Single-manager program 3 4 2 1 N 
Wilson 
Assigned total life-cycle management of a common good 
to a specific service 3 4 2 1 N 
Wilson 
120 government-owned telecommunication systems were 
sold to private companies 3 5 2 2 Y 
McElroy Monetary accounting system for items of supply 2 4 1 1 Y 
McElroy 
Working-capital funds were required to adopt accrual 
accounting 2 2 2 1 Y 
McElroy Realistic cost and work standards 2 2 2 1 Y 
McElroy Comparative cost studies 2 2 2 1 Y 
McElroy 
Increase the defensive power of the United States without 
significantly increasing the defense budget 2 3 2 1 Y 
McElroy Armed Forces Supply Support Center 1 4 3 1 N 
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McElroy 33 commodity coordination groups 1 4 3 1 N 
McElroy 
A defense-wide study of supply management and 
organizational procedures 3 4 2 1 N 
McElroy Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 4 1 2 1 Y 
Gates 
Unification of purpose, rather than unification of things” 
remained the ultimate goal 2 1 3 1 N 
Gates Organization was simply a “means to an end” 2 1 3 1 N 
Gates 
Structure of the JCS was changed from a committee 
structure to a unified staff system 2 1 1 1 Y 
Gates 
JCS were given operational responsibility for the unified 
and specified commands 2 1 1 1 Y 
Gates 
Authority of the chief military officers in each service 
was changed from “command authority” to “supervisory 
authority 2 1 1 1 Y 
Gates Power of the Secretary of Defense had reached its zenith. 2 1 3 1 N 
Gates Changed the managerial focus from committees to staffs 2 1 1 1 Y 
Gates 
Used the improved reports and more efficient staff to dig 
deeper into the service budget requests 2 3 2 3 Y 
Gates 
Congress began budgeting by purpose (O&M, MILCON, 
etc) rather than by service for the first time 2 3 1 1 Y 
Gates Director of Defense Research and Engineering 1 1 2 1 N 
Gates Statistical Services Center 1 3 1 1 Y 
Gates Abolished 200 of the 300 joint committees in operation 3 1 2 2 N 
Gates 
Started weekly meetings between the JCS and the 
Secretary of Defense 3 1 1 1 Y 
McNamara Continuous improvement of management activities 2 1 2 1 N 
McNamara 
Streamlining the decision making process by emphasizing 
the role of the individual in solving problems 2 1 1 1 Y 
McNamara 
Increased reliance on scientific and technical evaluation 
over human judgment in decision making 2 3 1 1 Y 
McNamara 
The use of statistical analysis techniques to identify the 
relevant factors in complex problems 2 3 2 1 N 
McNamara 
Data processing equipment to aid in estimating future 
requirements 2 4 2 1 N 
McNamara 
Push the responsibility for making decisions to the lowest 
level that had “the necessary ability and information to 
apply approved policy 2 1 3 1 N 
McNamara Efficiency and economy 2 1 3 1 N 
McNamara Consolidated telephone and transportation offices 2 5 3 1 N 
McNamara Defense Supply Agency (DSA) 1 4 3 1 N 
McNamara Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 1 4 3 1 N 
McNamara Logistics Management Institute 1 4 2 1 Y 
McNamara Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 3 3 1 1 Y 
McNamara Project PRIME (Priority Management Efforts) 3 1 2 1 Y 
McNamara Resource Management Systems 3 4 2 1 N 
McNamara Five-year cost savings plan 3 4 2 1 Y 
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McNamara Project HindSight 3 4 2 1 Y 
McNamara Project THEMIS 3 4 2 1 N 
McNamara Monthly status reports of over 200 major systems 3 4 2 3 Y 
McNamara Development 2 Papers (DCPs) 3 4 2 3 Y 
Laird 
Orderly, step-by-step approach to implementing 
management and organizational changes 2 1 3 1 N 
Laird 
More reliance on people and less on elaborate decision-
making procedures 2 1 2 1 Y 
Laird 
Participatory decision making, defined decentralization, 
and delegation of authority under specific guidance 2 1 2 1 Y 
Laird 
Reduce, or at least standardize, congressional oversight of 
the military 2 1 2 1 Y 
Laird 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and 
Telecommunications) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Central Security Service 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Defense Investigative Service 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Defense Mapping Agency 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Director of Net Assessments 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Laird 
Logistics Performance Measurement and Evaluation 
System 3 1 2 1 Y 
Laird Blue Ribbon Committee, chaired by Gilbert Fitzhugh 4 1 2 1 Y 
Richardson 
Increasing planning for weapons systems out beyond the 
five-to-eight years in the PPBS 3 3 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger 
Improved planning and management guidance given to 
the services 2 3 2 1 N 
Schlesinger Introduced management by objective (MBO) 2 1 1 1 Y 
Schlesinger Introduced extended planning annexes 2 3 2 2 Y 
Schlesinger Introduced design to cost 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger "Fly before Buy" 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger 
Required operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before 
purchase 2 4 3 1 N 
Schlesinger Started prototype programs with no obligation to buy 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Focused on low cost systems development 2 4 2 1 N 
Schlesinger Created a Hi-Low strategy 2 4 1 1 Y 
Schlesinger Emphasized fewer military-specific characteristics 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Emphasized off-the-shelf products 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Encouraged development of dual-use technologies 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Emphasized flexibility in contractor designs 2 4 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Reduced flight, steaming, and operating hours to save fuel 2 5 1 2 Y 
Schlesinger 
Created a task force, headed by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) to standardize defense 
management systems wherever possible and reduce 
redundancy 1 2 2 1 Y 
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Schlesinger 
Created Deputy Director of Defense for Research and 
Engineering 1 1 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Defense Property Disposal Service 1 4 2 2 N 
Schlesinger 
Created Defense Energy Task Group to deal with energy 
management in light of the oil embargo 1 5 1 2 Y 
Schlesinger Created the Director for Energy 1 1 2 2 Y 
Schlesinger 
Established a program under the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics) to promote 
productivity improvements throughout DoD, foster the 
development and use of productivity measures, and create 
a good worker/manager environment 3 1 2 1 Y 
Schlesinger Implemented Mission 2 Papers (MCP) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Included Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
earlier in budgeting 2 3 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld Emphasized efficiency and effectiveness 2 3 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Increased productivity to comply with Presidential 
Management Initiative 2 1 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Reduced the use of advisory groups and tightened internal 
controls over the remaining ones 2 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld Expanded Design-to-Cost 2 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld Expanded the use of Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Created three milestone reviews to be used by the 
DSARC 2 4 1 1 Y 
Rumsfeld Conducted "Forward Look" study 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Relied more on contractors for product performance and 
involve less government oversight in corporate 
management procedures 2 4 1 4 Y 
Rumsfeld Included operations and support (O&S) costs in programs 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld Independent cost estimates for major weapon systems 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld First addressed corruption 2 4 1 3 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Required standard cost accounting system use at depot 
maintenance facilities 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Implemented changes recommended by the Commission 
on Government Procurement 1 4 3 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Implemented changes recommended by the Acquisition 
Advisory Group 1 4 3 1 N 
Rumsfeld Expanded Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP 1 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld Established Investment Policy Study Group 1 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Made changes to the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) and PPBS 3 3 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Required 2% productivity improvement for the 
Department 3 1 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld Used Production Readiness Reviews 3 4 3 1 N 
Rumsfeld 
Made incremental budgeting changes to comply with 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 4 3 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld Created Profit '76 to incentivize industry 4 4 1 1 Y 
Rumsfeld 
Pushed for the Naval Petroleum Reserve Production Act 
of 1976 4 5 2 1 Y 
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Brown Introduced zero based budgeting 2 3 1 1 Y 
Brown Used capital investment incentives 2 4 3 1 N 
Brown 
Used multi-year contracts to reduce unit cost and bought 
at the most efficient production rates 2 4 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Encouraged parallel development and leader/follower 
production, greater use of concurrent development for 
competing systems, modifying rather than replacing 
exiting systems when possible, consolidating similar 
programs, earlier examination of system affordability, 
emphasizing acquisition schedules based on operational 
needs rather than technological opportunities, cancelling 
low-payoff programs, increasing NATO joint 
development, improving efficiency of the industrial base; 
and earlier and more detailed consideration of reliability 
and maintenance factors 2 4 2 1 N 
Brown Streamlined the DSARC process 2 4 2 1 N 
Brown 
Involved industry participation in the 2 phase of a 
program 2 4 2 1 N 
Brown 
Stated program objectives in terms of mission 
requirements rather than specific technological 
requirements 2 4 1 1 Y 
Brown Reduced fraud and waste 2 1 2 2 N 
Brown 
Included foreign policy and arms control considerations 
in new programs 2 4 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Made improvements to the National Military Command 
Structure (NMCS) 1 1 2 1 N 
Brown 
Director, Planning and Evaluation was made an Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and 
Evaluation 1 1 2 1 Y 
Brown Created the Tri-service Medical Information System 1 1 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Created the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting 
System (DEERS) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Established the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital 
System (CMCHS) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Brown Created the Defense Resource Board 1 3 2 1 Y 
Brown Defense Science Board Task Force 1 3 2 1 Y 
Brown C3 Directorate within OJCS 1 3 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Integrated the World-Wide Military Command and 
Control System Engineering Organization into the 
Defense Communications Agency 1 1 2 1 Y 
Brown Reorganized OASD (C3I) 1 1 2 1 N 
Brown 
Phased in changes to comply with the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 1 1 1 1 Y 
Brown 
Created the Commercial Commodity Acquisition 
Program (CCAP) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Created the Secondary Item Stockage Policy Analysis 
Working Group 1 4 2 1 Y 
Brown Created the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) 1 5 2 1 Y 
Brown Initiated the DoD Productivity Program 3 1 2 1 Y 
Brown Created a Consolidated Guidance document 3 3 2 1 Y 
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Brown 
Established a Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) 
and Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) in 
lieu of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and Joint 
Forces Memorandum (JFM) 3 3 2 1 Y 
Brown Expanded the Energy Conservation Investment Program 3 5 2 2 N 
Brown Conducted the Defense Reorganization Study 4 1 2 1 Y 
Brown 
Helped create the Federal Employees Compensation 
Reform Act 4 1 1 2 Y 
Brown Issued the Defense Production Management directive 4 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Streamlined PPBS 2 3 2 1 N 
Weinberger 
Centralized policy development but decentralized 
execution 2 1 2 1 N 
Weinberger Emphasized worker safety 2 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Encouraged employee idea feedback 2 1 2 4 N 
Weinberger Used participatory management techniques 2 1 2 4 Y 
Weinberger Gave DCAA more power 2 1 2 3 N 
Weinberger 
More aggressive credit management and debt collection 
operation 2 2 2 3 N 
Weinberger Made a complete review of the acquisitions process 2 4 2 1 N 
Weinberger Focused on program stability to stop cost growth 2 4 1 1 Y 
Weinberger Expanded multi-year procurement, baselining 2 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Started dual sourcing for major weapon systems 2 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Reduced the number of milestone decision reviews to two 2 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Outsourced base functions via contract competitions 2 5 3 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Implemented changes recommended by the Private Sector 
Survey on Cost Control Grace Commission 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Helped create the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the DoD Council on Integrity and Management 
Improvement (DCIMI) 1 1 2 3 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative 
Affairs 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Restored five Assistant Secretary positions 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Office of Test and Evaluation 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Directorate for Management Improvement 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Implemented Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment 
(PECI) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Foreign Military Sales Financial Management 
Improvement Program (FFMIP) Office 1 2 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Review 
and Oversight 1 1 2 3 Y 
Weinberger 
Established the Defense Internal Management Control 
Program 1 1 2 3 Y 
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Weinberger Established Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created a Senior Acquisition Executive in each service 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Joint Requirements and Management Board 
(JRMB) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Spares Program Management 1 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Expanded the Defense Reutilization and Marketing 
System 1 4 2 2 N 
Weinberger Created the Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Task Force 1 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Program for Management Improvement 3 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Management Improvement Plan (MIP 3 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Began the Efficiency Review Program 3 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Issued DoD Productivity Goals Statement 3 1 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Secretary's Performance Review 3 1 2 3 Y 
Weinberger 
Created the Advanced Procurement Planning System for 
Security Assistance (APPSSA) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger 
Initiated the Defense Acquisitions Improvement Program 
(DAIP) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Spares Management Improvement Program 3 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Increased use of the Spare Parts Program 3 4 2 1 N 
Weinberger 
Adopted the Automated Marking and Reading Symbols 
(LOGMARS 3 4 2 1 Y 
Weinberger Created the Model Installations Program 3 4 1 1 Y 
Weinberger Expanded the energy conservation program 3 5 2 1 N 
Weinberger Helped implement Reform '88 4 1 2 2 Y 
Carlucci 
Encouraged managers to manage creatively, and establish 
sufficient rules and control mechanisms to identify poor 
management 2 1 2 4 Y 
Carlucci Introduced total quality management (TQM) 2 1 1 1 Y 
Carlucci Adopted ADA as the standard programming language 2 1 2 1 Y 
Carlucci 
Encouraged non-developmental items and "off-the-shelf" 
products 2 4 3 1 N 
Carlucci Used multi-year procurement, baselining 2 4 3 1 N 
Carlucci Introduced value engineering 2 4 2 1 Y 
Carlucci Created the Contractor Risk Assessment Guide (CRAG) 3 4 2 3 Y 
Carlucci Created the Voluntary Disclosure Program 3 4 2 3 Y 
Carlucci Created the Standards of Conduct Program 3 1 2 3 Y 
Carlucci Targeted 3% annual productivity improvement 3 1 2 1 N 
Carlucci Created productivity and quality (P&Q) teams 3 1 1 1 Y 
Carlucci Used Efficiency Review process 3 1 3 1 N 
Carlucci 
Created financial incentives for workers who saved the 
Department money 3 1 2 4 N 
Carlucci 
Developed the Department of Defense Automated 
Information System (AIS) Strategic Planning Policy 3 1 2 1 Y 
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Carlucci 
Created the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
Commission 3 5 1 2 Y 
Carlucci Issued Executive Order 11222 4 1 2 3 Y 
Cheney Centralized policy planning and decentralized execution 2 1 2 1 N 
Cheney Encouraged open systems architecture 2 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Began technical integration management 2 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Emphasized efficiency and effectiveness 2 1 2 1 N 
Cheney Did a zero-based review of acquisition programs 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Emphasized Non-Developmental Items (NDI 2 4 3 1 N 
Cheney Limited late design changes 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Introduced Total Asset Visibility (TAV) 2 4 1 1 Y 
Cheney Reorganized the Defense Planning and Resource Board 1 3 2 1 N 
Cheney 
Consolidated the Contract Administration Services 
organizations 1 1 2 2 Y 
Cheney Created the Ethics Council 1 1 2 2 Y 
Cheney 
Created the Center for Information Management within 
the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney 
Created the Defense Information Technology Service 
Organization (DITSO) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney 
Created the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS) 1 2 1 1 Y 
Cheney Created the Defense Technology Board 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Consolidated Contract Administration Services (CAS) 1 4 2 1 N 
Cheney 
Created the Defense Contact Management Command 
(DCMC) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Defense Acquisitions University (DAU) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Consolidated Inventory Control Points (ICPs) 1 4 2 1 N 
Cheney Consolidated the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney Created Public Works Centers (PWC) 1 5 2 1 Y 
Cheney Created the Corporate Information Management (CIM) 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Started the Defense Information Infrastructure 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Started the DoD Data Administration Program 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Started the DoD Software Reuse Program 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney Created the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF 3 2 1 1 Y 
Cheney 
PM's now reported to Program Executive Officer (PEO) 
then Service Acquisitions Executive 3 4 2 1 N 
Cheney Emphasized the Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) 3 4 2 2 Y 
Cheney 
Implemented the 1989 Defense Management Report to 
the President 4 1 2 1 Y 
Cheney 
Competitively sourced positions via Defense 
Management Improvement Act 4 1 2 1 N 
Cheney 
Rewrote the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) 4 4 2 1 N 
Cheney 
Created an official Science and Technology (S&T) 
strategy 4 4 2 1 Y 
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Cheney 
Started the acquisition Education, Training, and Career 
Development Policy 4 4 2 1 Y 
Cheney 
Helped develop DAWIA, the Defense Acquisitions 
Workforce Improvement Act 4 4 1 1 Y 
Aspin Introduced Reengineering 2 1 1 1 Y 
Aspin Introduced Best Practices 2 1 2 4 Y 
Aspin Introduced Lean Production 2 1 2 1 Y 
Aspin 
Emphasized Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data 
Interchange (EC/EDI) 2 1 2 1 N 
Aspin Adopted benchmarking 2 1 2 4 Y 
Aspin Encouraged evolutionary development 2 4 2 1 N 
Aspin Emphasized continuous improvement 2 1 2 4 N 
Aspin Emphasized dual use technologies 2 4 3 1 N 
Aspin Consolidated logistics operations 2 1 2 1 N 
Aspin Privatized logistics and facilities functions 2 1 2 1 N 
Aspin Introduced In-Transit Visibility (ITV) 2 4 2 1 Y 
Aspin Created Process Action Teams (PAT), 1 1 2 1 N 
Aspin 
Created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic 
Security 1 1 2 1 Y 
Aspin Created the Armaments Cooperation Steering Committee 1 1 2 1 N 
Aspin 
Created the Senior Financial Management Oversight 
Council 1 2 2 1 Y 
Aspin Started the Business Management University (DBMU) 1 2 2 4 Y 
Aspin Created the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group 1 4 2 1 Y 
Aspin Expanded BRAC 1 5 2 2 N 
Aspin 
Created a six-element blueprint for financial management 
reform 3 2 2 1 Y 
Aspin Developed the DBOF Improvement Plan 3 2 2 1 Y 
Aspin Created the Chief Financial Officer Master Plan 3 2 1 1 Y 
Aspin Town hall meetings were conducted by USD (AR) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Aspin Created the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Aspin Created the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Aspin 
Created the Logistics Corporate Information Management 
(CIM) program 3 4 2 4 Y 
Aspin Expanded OEA 3 5 2 1 N 
Perry Electronic commerce (EC) was expanded 2 1 2 1 N 
Perry Introduced IPTs 2 1 2 1 Y 
Perry Emphasized Consensus building and collaboration 2 1 2 4 Y 
Perry Recognized and dealt with globalization 2 1 1 1 Y 
Perry Expanded privatization 2 1 2 1 N 
Perry Expanded outsourcing 2 1 2 1 N 
Perry 
Standardized data, definitions, and 2s for financial 
systems 2 2 2 1 N 
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Perry 
Required performance specifications in stead of technical 
ones 2 4 2 1 N 
Perry Adopted Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 2 4 1 1 Y 
Perry Raised the acquisitions threshold 2 4 2 2 N 
Perry 
Introduced Intransit Visibility (ITV) via the Global 
Transportation network 2 4 2 1 N 
Perry Expanded interservice depot support 2 4 2 1 N 
Perry Created the Task Force to Reengineer Travel 1 2 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Created the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Reform 1 1 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Created the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group 
(ARSSG) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Established the Acquisition Reform Communications 
Center (ARCC) 1 4 2 4 Y 
Perry 
Started the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry Consolidation 1 4 1 3 Y 
Perry 
Restructured the Defense Policy Advisory Committee on 
Trade 1 4 2 1 N 
Perry Created the Defense Industrial Base Oversight Council 1 4 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Created the Government/Industry Task Force on Depot 
Maintenance 1 4 2 2 Y 
Perry Continued consolidating DFAS 3 2 2 1 N 
Perry 
Tried adopting a standard general ledger and a standard 
budget and accounting classification architecture 3 2 2 1 Y 
Perry 
DCAA assisted contractors in establishing internal 
controls 3 2 2 3 N 
Perry Government credit and travel cards expanded 3 2 2 1 N 
Perry Inserted commercial technology 3 4 2 1 Y 
Perry Expanded dual use technologies 3 4 2 1 Y 
Perry Started the Industrial Base Review 3 4 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Created the Single Process Initiative (SPI) to help existing 
programs 3 4 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Expanded the Advanced 2 Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD) program 3 4 2 1 N 
Perry Used the Defense Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Initiative 3 4 3 1 N 
Perry Used the DBOF Improvement Plan 3 2 3 1 N 
Perry Consolidated depot maintenance 3 4 3 2 N 
Perry Introduced CORE for depot maintenance 3 4 2 1 Y 
Perry Complied with Chief Financial Officers Act 4 2 2 1 N 
Perry 
Implemented additional financial internal controls and 
created the Annual Statement of Assurance 4 2 2 3 Y 
Perry 
Wrote Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change to lay 
out reform goals 4 4 2 1 Y 
Perry 
Implemented changes to adhere to Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 4 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Pushed for paperless processes 2 1 2 2 Y 
Cohen Expanded use of World Wide Web 2 1 2 1 N 
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Cohen Introduced just-in-time delivery 2 4 1 1 Y 
Cohen Adopted best business practices 2 1 2 4 N 
Cohen Adopted electronic data management (EDM) 2 1 2 1 N 
Cohen Implemented electronic funds transfer (EFT) 2 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Addressed digital signatures 2 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Introduced Electronic Business (EB) 2 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Adopted lessons learned from business  2 1 2 4 N 
Cohen Consolidated more functions  2 1 2 1 N 
Cohen Conducted outsourcing and competitive sourcing  2 1 2 1 N 
Cohen Emphasized continuous improvement 2 1 2 4 N 
Cohen Addressed change management 2 1 2 1 N 
Cohen Tested Electronic Data Access 2 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Emphasized Consensus and collaboration 2 1 3 4 N 
Cohen Expanded competitive sourcing of services 2 1 2 1 N 
Cohen Emphasized information assurance 2 2 2 3 N 
Cohen Established a cost accounting system for life-cycle costs 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Reduced National Defense Stockpile 2 4 2 2 Y 
Cohen Adopted rapid prototyping 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Created the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Emphasized incremental systems development 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Pushed for evolutionary acquisitions 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Emphasized continuous learning 2 1 2 4 N 
Cohen Used Past Performance Information (PPI) 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Favored small disadvantaged businesses (SDB) 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Favored women owned small businesses (WOSB 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Placed greater focus on TOC 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Tried to reduce development cycle times 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Tried to reduce life cycle costs (LCC) 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Incorporated occupational health (OSH) into acquisitions 
process 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Expanded globalization-related programs 2 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Focused on managing suppliers rather than supplies 2 4 1 1 Y 
Cohen Focused on engineering systems rather than components 2 4 1 1 Y 
Cohen 
Attempted a logistics transformation to create seamless 
logistics 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Transportation Reengineering Team 2 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Installations Policy Board 2 5 2 1 Y 
Cohen Encouraged joint use of facilities 2 5 2 1 N 
Cohen Encouraged regional contracting 2 5 2 1 N 
Cohen Created the Defense Management Council 1 1 2 4 Y 
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Cohen 
Created the Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office 
(JECPO) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the DoD electronic mall 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen 
Established the Competitive Sourcing and Privatization 
Directorate 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Defense Working Capital Task Force 1 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen 
Created the Office of Chancellor for Education and 
Professional Development 1 1 2 4 Y 
Cohen 
Created the Program Management Office to design and 
acquire a new Defense Travel System (DTS) 1 2 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Fraud and Internal Control Office 1 2 2 3 Y 
Cohen Appointed a Director of Internal Review 1 1 2 3 Y 
Cohen Emphasized Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 1 4 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Started the Electronic Process Initiatives Committee 
(EPIC) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen 
Created the Joint Group on Acquisition Pollutions 
Prevention (JG-APP) 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen 
Created the Joint Acquisition Sustainment Pollution 
Prevention Activity 1 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Business Opportunities Home Page 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Central Contractor Registration 3 1 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Commercial Advocates Forum 3 1 2 4 Y 
Cohen Created performance scorecards and metrics 3 1 2 4 N 
Cohen Improved the Defense Civilian Pay System (DCPS) 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Improved the Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS) 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Improved the Marine Corps Total Force System 
(MCTFS) 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Improved the Defense Transportation Payment System 
(DTRS) 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Improved the Defense Retiree and Annuitant System 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Improved the Defense Debt Management System 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Improved the Defense Cash Accountability System 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Established the Financial and Feeder System Compliance 
Process 3 2 2 1 Y 
Cohen 
Tried to adopted the U. S. Government Standard General 
Ledger 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen Created the Defense Property Accountability System 3 2 1 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS) 3 2 2 3 Y 
Cohen Integrated the Defense Procurement Payment System 3 2 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Began developing the DFAS Corporate Information 
Infrastructure (DCII) 3 2 2 1 Y 
Cohen Created the Certified Defense Financial Manager Program 3 2 2 4 Y 
Cohen 
Simplified acquisition procedures (SAPs) for commercial 
items between $100,000 and $5 million 3 4 2 2 N 
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Cohen 
Created the Commercial Technology Insertion Program 
(CTIP) 3 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Expanded the Dual Use Applications Program (DUAP) 3 4 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Created Federal Acquisitions Computer Network 
(FACENET) 3 4 2 4 Y 
Cohen Started Acquisition Reform Day 3 4 2 4 Y 
Cohen Created the outyear acquisitions program stability reserve 3 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Expanded the mentor/protégé program 3 4 2 1 N 
Cohen 
Created the Institutionalization of Pollution Prevention to 
Achieve Compliance program 3 4 2 1 Y 
Cohen Developed a Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM)  3 5 1 1 Y 
Cohen Developed a Facilities Aging Model (FAM) 3 5 2 1 Y 
Cohen Rewrote the DoD5000 series 4 4 2 1 N 
Cohen Created the Defense Acquisition Deskbook 4 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Sought Excellence in everything 2 1 1 4 Y 
Rumsfeld II His buzzword was Transformation 2 1 2 4 N 
Rumsfeld II Removed non-value-adding layers 2 1 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II Emphasized e-government 2 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Emphasized strategic management of human capital 2 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Emphasized net-centric operations 2 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Adopted a two-year budgeting cycle 2 3 2 2 N 
Rumsfeld II Adopted the use of balanced scorecards 2 1 2 3 Y 
Rumsfeld II Adopted "price-based" acquisitions 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Tried to create an agile workforce 2 4 2 4 Y 
Rumsfeld II Tried to reduce MDAP cycle time 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II Tried to reduce cost and schedule growth 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II Tried to reduced O&S costs 2 4 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II 
Emphasized trade space, the tradeoff between investment 
and risk 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created the Logistics Balanced Scorecard 2 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Adopted Customer Wait Time (CWT) 2 4 1 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created the Senior Executive Council (SEC) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created the Business Initiative Council 1 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II 
Created the Defense Business Practices Implementation 
Board (DBPIB) 1 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II 
Established the Business Financial Management 
Modernization Program Office 1 2 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Developed the Joint Logistics Board 1 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created the Unified Command Plan 3 1 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Introduced the National Security Personnel System 3 1 1 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Improved the DWCF 3 1 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II 
Created the Financial Management Modernization 
Program 3 2 2 1 Y 
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Rumsfeld II 
Created the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
(FIAR) plan 3 2 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II 
Created the Business Management Modernization Plan 
(BMMP), 3 2 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Improved guidance in the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) 3 3 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II Created the Strategic Planning Guidance 3 3 2 1 N 
Rumsfeld II Created the Future Logistics Enterprise 3 4 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created a Facilities Strategic Plan 3 5 2 1 Y 
Rumsfeld II Created the Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) 3 5 2 2 Y 
Rumsfeld II Developed the Facilities Recapitalization Metric (FRM) 3 5 2 1 Y 
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